

University of Alberta

Redefining Security in the Arctic Region

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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TO MY PARENTS

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the cold war, politicians and scholars alike have advocated a reassessment of global security needs. One of the important responses to this challenge has been to call into question the definition of security itself. Redefinitions have varied from expansions of the traditional military-based notion of "national security" to entirely new orientations which focus on individual, world, and societal security. This work attempts to take the redefining process a step further by analyzing the benefits and shortcomings of the new definitions, and then introduce a more functional framework of "people's" security.

Owing to the observation that within the discipline of International Relations, people are often reduced to their identities as citizens, the proposed framework seeks to account people's multiple identities. This is done by categorizing people into identity groups or identity regions, the borders of which are flexible enough that they can be drawn differently for different purposes. Security, then comes to mean taking into account threats as they are perceived by different identity groups. However, a distinction between people's security and scientific security is made. The latter implies a diverse range of issues that are not likely to be directly felt by the lay person, such as specific military requisites and complex environmental threats. National security therefore is not meant to be dismissed, but supplemented by people's security.

To illustrate the applicability of the redefinition, the Arctic region is used as a broad case study. The region is approached as an integrated whole with an eye toward its indigenous peoples - particularly the Inuit and the Sami - whose primary identity groups

cross state borders. Their perceived threats and insecurities bring into light the nature of environmental insecurity, economic insecurity, and cultural insecurity.

When a concept, which is at the core of a discipline is being redefined, the impact on the discipline as a whole cannot be dismissed. Therefore, any redefinition of security within the field of International Relations also draws attention to the paradigmatic level.

Keywords: Security, national security, people's security, sovereign state, identity group, Arctic region, Inuit, Sami, indigenous peoples, discipline of International Relations.

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1 INTRODUCTION

What is International Relations? Traditionally and for many today, it is both a practice and a study of state relations. This paper is about security and the Arctic region, an analysis of which readily slides into the traditional pantheon of International Relations. Security ranks as a key concept of the field, and as an area including eight sovereign states, the Arctic region regularly beckons investigation. *Redefining Security in the Arctic Region*, however, is about challenging the traditional scheme of issues in three ways: (1) rethinking security, in concept and practice; (2) redrawing the region and; (3) attempting to broaden the discipline.

About Security

"Out There" is a world of potential and real conflicts between states. Each constitutes an issue of security as such, and is clearly germane to International Relations. It is fair to assume that International Security Studies, a subfield that concentrates on topics of war and peace, is generally considered core to the discipline. Lacking an explicit definition, security came to be understood as an absence of war or as a state of peace. As a verb, securing has implied building up national/state defense apparatus, in essence preparing for war. Undoubtedly, the history of state relations would indicate this to be a worthy of analysis. Keeping the world safe from war is perhaps legitimately the ultimate goal of International Relations.

With the end of the cold war, scholars and politicians alike have been looking at establishing a "new world order." For so many years the

cold war determined so much of what was to be studied, its end made it necessary to engage in some fundamental rethinking. The dominant paradigm of "real politik" or realism spoke the language of the cold war, thus forming International Relations into "a cold war discipline." Now, almost a decade later, we still seem to exist in a "post-cold war" period. This reveals a difficulty in re-gearing the discipline.

Despite the end of the cold war, war itself is clearly not a phenomenon of the past. Perhaps the general belief about democracies rarely fighting one another is true, yet the world is hardly a conflict-free place. Europe, the cradle of Western civilization and democratic development, has this decade witnessed numerous bloody wars as the former Yugoslavia has redrawn its borders. Armed powers such as India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have developed frightening nuclear and other non-conventional weapon capacities that increase the risks for the world as a whole. Certainly then, study of security as freedom from war has legitimate bearing in today's world.

Having agreed that war is a major threat, it is likely that there is enough research material to keep Security Studies of International Relations well and alive. So, why open the concept of security itself to serious scrutiny? By restricting the meaning of security to matters of war and peace in state-to-state relations, the discipline has presented far too narrow presentation of reality at the level of people -- the ultimate subjects of any social science. Due to the statist -- and therefore deterministic -- nature of the discipline, people have been all but forgotten as the key focus of International Relations in general, and Security Studies in particular.

Who are people in International Relations? Tucked away in their respective states, the "real" people are overshadowed by their identities as citizens. Because most all people are citizens of a

state, it is the common denominator in today's world. Because states are the key actors, the fact that people always have other identities is often conveniently forgotten. The state presumably represents its people, and it is therefore considered a legitimate actor in their name. Security of a state should therefore be equal with security of the people living within it as citizens. But no state is a sum of its citizens and secure states do not imply secure people. Similarly, we may or may not be secure as citizens. Security for citizens is certainly tied in with the prospect of war, but especially in non-democratic countries, the state may itself be a threat to its citizens. Even more important however is that people may be secure as citizens of a state but insecure in their other identities. Therefore, identities should not be reduced solely to citizenship as is often the case in International Relations. As a general rule of thumb, sadly people are given attention for their other identities only when they act violently against a state or exhibit the intention to band together to form a state themselves.

The key to this gap with reality can be found in the idea of state sovereignty and all that is attached within the International Relations theory. This will be taken up in more detail in chapter 2, which considers whether sovereignty is indeed security. I shall suggest that theoretically and conceptually, security finds its locus within a sovereign state. So much is attached to sovereignty theoretically and practically that it alone can serve as the starting point for any redefining of security.

I shall attempt to show that despite its centrality, state sovereignty can and should be approached differently from the traditional understanding. States are for people and sovereignty is popular by nature. A sovereign (state) exists to secure its subjects,

its people. This continues to be the case as long as people organize themselves in political communities that take the form of a sovereign state, and there is no indication that the state nor the principle of state sovereignty are about to wither away. What is lacking however, is a more comprehensive consideration of people as people both within and beyond the sovereign state. As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, today's world carries new demands for people to be recognized for identities beyond that of state citizens. Any reconsideration of security certainly must take into account the insecurities that people experience within these identities.

Some words about the often elusive concept of "people" are here in order: Throughout this paper, people is used in broad sense, referring to all people. I advocate approaching people's insecurities based on their different identities and, more pointedly, according to their identity groups. Identity groups represent the people relevant to a given case. In Arctic security analysis, specific identity groups exist, but they are not fixed. Identity groups are turned to here as direct alternatives to states as units of analysis. Their flexibility is rooted in the fact that they are not necessarily restricted to a boundaried territory, which makes them feasible for overcoming statist dogma.

In order to develop a functional redefinition of security, one must answer three central questions:

- (1) what is security?
- (2) whose security are we concerned with? and
- (3) who provides security?

By addressing these questions can we face the key theoretical challenge. The nature of the challenge is to confront the traditional disciplinary understanding of security, which has its own explicit and

compelling answers to all three questions: International Relations has been about states' national security and freedom from war provided by the state itself. Despite numerous efforts over the past decade to come up with new understandings of security, most have failed to answer all three questions. Indeed, the issue of provider has all but been ignored. This reflects the tremendous difficulty in developing alternatives that can realistically serve in place of the state. Today, we witness countless examples of people (from Palestinians to Serbs and Croats to the Quebecois) who desire to establish their own state and usually it is at least partly, if not solely, for reasons of "security" - whether defined broadly or narrowly. Who, if not the state, can provide security?

Chapter 3 tackles the problematic of the three security questions outlined above. After presenting the dominant understanding of security, I shall introduce an array of recent innovations, and outline five categories into which they fall four: "individual", "national", "societal", "global" and "critical." Each category is discussed, evaluated, and eventually eliminated - leading ultimately to my own redefinition of security.

Due to the limitations observed in national, individual, and world security approaches, I suggest "people's" as the answer to the question of whose security, drawing on work based on societal critique. Additionally, I suggest that a true understanding of the substance of security should be based on threats to identity groups. Finally, I contend that the provider of security should remain firstly the state, as the main political organizer although increased attention to international and transnational cooperation is demanded; in today's world of global threats and multiple identities, the distinction between domestic and international is, in many cases, inaccurate. The

underlying logic of my redefinition of security, then, is that states are the providers of security, yet the groups of people are chief identifiers. However, I distinguish between "people's security" and scientific security, the latter implying a threat that cannot be expected directly to be noticed by the lay person. This type of threat includes defense issues, ecological dangers, and so forth. Traditional understanding of security is not meant to be trivialized. It is its monopoly on determining what and whose security that is meant to be broken.

About the Region

Why then the Arctic Region? The Arctic was selected as an elaborative case study for untangling the theoretical and conceptual agenda presented in the first two chapters of this paper. In Oran Young's words: despite its uniqueness, the Arctic is also a microcosm, "a region within which you develop and refine ideas about an array of political issues that are of broad, generic interest."¹ It should perhaps be stated at this early stage that this paper is not about the Arctic region *per se*. For those whose primary interest is to learn new facts about the Arctic region, this is not the ideal forum for it, although certainly some of the information should prove of value.

In a number of ways, the Arctic provides a textbook study for considering people's security from a limited territorial standpoint. The Arctic region - often termed the "circumpolar region," or the "North" -- is defined here as the territory above the Arctic Circle

¹ Oran Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North (Dartmouth, NJ: University Press of New England,

that encompasses parts of eight nation-states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. It is common to speak of these countries as the Arctic states. The circumpolar region is also a homeland of indigenous peoples -- minorities in their respective states -- whose rights to a meaningful, culturally balanced life have continually been eroded. The threat to these groups' security has never been primarily that of militarily assault. Rather, it is the threat to their culture, to the essentials of their economic survival, and to their environment's ecological balance.

As in many parts of the world, the nature of Arctic security after the cold war remains undefined. During the cold war, the region played an important strategic role on both sides of the confrontation. The positive effect of this was that it helped the Arctic acquire recognition as an international region. On the negative side, however, the possibility for military conflict effectively silenced regional discussions of other threats. In the post-cold war era, it is especially important to analyze the region's security in a considerably different way.

Richard Langlais' case study from Arctic Canada is an exemplary effort to reformulate security, but its focus is on a specific part of the region.² In my study, Arctic security is approached from the region's point of view as one whole - the integration of its respective identity groups, especially those of its indigenous peoples. My particular focus is on the Inuit and the Sami, who inhabit parts of four separate states, each of whom identify as one group despite the

1992), 7.

² Richard Langlais, Reformulating Security. A Case Study from Arctic Canada (Goteborg, Sweden: Goteborg University, 1995).

borders. It is here that the "textbook nature" of the Arctic region for this study becomes apparent: we are presented with the case of two peoples within four sovereign states with strikingly similar security needs, whose ethnic and regional identities pass far beyond citizenship. In other words, they maintain a dual existence beneath and beyond the sovereign states that host them. They believe that their survival as peoples is endangered, posing very real security threats. They are the people whose needs are examined in order to produce a new and more people-orientated definition of security.

I should also point out that for the purposes of this study, I have chosen not to take up the case of Russia. The overall situation in Russia is so different from the other Arctic states, that a separate study focusing on security threats faced by the Russian Arctic - including Inuit and Sami views - is demanded to do it justice. Perhaps the title of this paper should be *Redefining Security in the Democratic Arctic Region* to better narrow its focus. I do believe however that security threats mapped here are also of concern in Russia, but other issues - such as famine - are unfortunately more immediately pressing.

In Chapter 4, the Arctic is considered as an international region. Regions are useful units of analysis because, unlike states, they are conceptually flexible, their borders can be drawn differently for different purposes. However, a region has a specific definition in the discipline of International Relations that refers to a group of proximate states: territory and space as characteristics are taken for granted. Therefore, one must "redraw" the Arctic region. Since people in their different identities are the key to my redefinition of security, analysis is based on approaching Arctic regionality via identity. This means that whereas the Arctic is pre-defined in terms

of territorial area, its people are divided into four -- somewhat overlapping -- *identity regions* which are abstract in that they are not necessarily territorially cohesive. An identity region therefore, is synonymous with an group. The four identity regions identified in this paper include: (1) specific ethnic indigenous groups, in particular the Sami and the Inuit; (2) all Arctic indigenous peoples; (3) people of the Arctic as a singular group; and (4) the respective states. Because the identity regions are drawn with an eye toward expanding security in the Arctic, emphasis is placed on the first. Chapter 4, then, answers the first security question: "whose security are we speaking of"?

Having determined this, it is then possible look at the second question: "What is security"? To determine the substance of security, one must understand the causes of insecurity and the nature of the threats in the region. When people -- via identity groups -- are the ones to identify threats, security inherently becomes an internal as well as an external issue. In a sense, internal and external become one.

In Chapter 5, a state of insecurity in the Arctic region is proclaimed. The natural point of departure is a review of issues of military security that have affected and continue to affect the Arctic at the state level. It is then argued that in a militarized region, defense security almost guarantees broader, people-based insecurity. The connection to environmental and ecological issues has been widely acknowledged within International Relations literature over the past decade. Therefore, an assessment is made as to how exactly military security has caused insecurity in the Arctic region. Military-based threats may or may not be threats experienced by the people in question. More often, they belong to what was earlier termed as scientific security issues. Security threats identified by people --

specifically by the two case groups -- are then exposed to make this distinction.

In data analysis and document review by and about the Inuit and Sami, my theoretical criticism of "security" as a disciplinary concept found abundant support. My observation was that whereas indigenous peoples' literature was filled with complaints about injustice, lack of rights, threats to survival and so forth, *in/security* as a description of condition was avoided. "Security" referred to military security and, as such, was not contested. This was even more striking when I interviewed Sami and Inuit representatives about their security concerns. Despite explaining my purpose in redefining security, those interviewed expressed unease about the concept. A common answer was, "We do not include security in our agenda." This speaks of an entrenched counter-progressive attitude that, despite its broad literal meaning, maintains a narrow disciplinary definition, which is nevertheless accepted. This, in turn, translates to limited disciplinary practices.

Therefore, applicable literature was not directly available for determining the causes of insecurity for the Arctic people. Research focused on the terms "security" and "Arctic" merely brought up material dealing with issues of military security in the region. Consequently, a broad range of alternative literature had to be tapped in order to determine peoples' insecurities and threats in the region. In regard to the emphasized Inuit and the Sami views, three categories of insecurities were identified: (1) insecurity based on lack of self-determination, (2) economic insecurity, an integral part of which revolved around the problem of resource control, and (3) environmental insecurity. Extending the concept of security this way clearly transforms the nature of threat to a multifaceted phenomenon. Thus in

Chapter 5, the question of what is -- or should be -- security in the Arctic region is addressed.

Chapter 6 has a threefold purpose. Firstly, it reviews the security challenge of the Arctic context. Secondly, and overlapping, it confirms the role of the state as the provider of security and thus answers the third security question. Lastly, the chapter puts forward an organizational model of Arctic security cooperation. This is done by examining existing transnational regional organizations that function in a promising manner and then drafting an improved model. The model should not be mistaken for an "end-all", or conclusion for this thesis; rather it is a sketch that puts conceptual and theoretical issues set forth in this paper in practical perspective. An elaborated version of such model is the goal of future work.

About the Discipline

As stated earlier, the phenomenon known as "international relations" is traditionally understood as affairs that happen between nations - mainly states - which takes place "out there" in the world. The discipline of International Relations, born out of concern to prevent another major war after World War I, appointed the states as the legitimate key actors for an obvious reason: wars happened between states. The relations to be studied therefore were primarily conflictual relations, although a potential for peaceful affairs was hoped for.

By *discipline*, I refer to the academic and systematic study of International Relations, which emerged as a subfield of political science in Western universities in the early part of the 20th century.

The roots of the discipline are certain to be found further back in history, but the discipline is here understood as having a more limited existence. The terms, "the discipline" and "International Relations" (with capital letters) are used inter-changeably throughout this paper to imply the whole of the academic study in this field. It should be noted that when international relations is spelled in small case, it denotes the actual practice.

There are certain difficulties that arise when speaking of a discipline as a whole. Therefore, when speaking along these lines, I mean the mainstream and "traditional" approaches that form the core of the field. I distinguish between who may be called *traditionalists* and *critics* - or the modernists and postmodernists, positivists and post-positivists, old school and new school - of International Relations. The former mainly implies the theoretical approaches of realism and liberalism, or liberal internationalism; representatives of the latter group are generally made up of postmodernists, critical theorists and feminists.

I see a traditionalist as someone who studies international relations as it occurs in the "real" world, and who sees his/her task as an observer and analyzer of these events. Most importantly, a traditionalist understands that the discipline has certain borders that should not be crossed, for fear of compromising its essence and distinctiveness. Definitions and concepts are generally accepted as givens and are often static. A critic, on the other hand, refuses to respect the traditional disciplinary borders and is engaged in an ongoing questioning and re-questioning of what can be included within the discipline. At the heart of the critique are doubts about the core of International Relations, its central definitions and assumptions. A

critic concentrates on disciplinary questions, approaching "real events" from a fresh point of view.

The gap between the two general groups is obvious. There is little fruitful dialogue as each side attempts to do very different things within the same field. Traditionalists tend to treat critical views as marginal or lightweight, while they see their own work as the "real" thing. The critics tend to throw previous assumptions away - sometimes throwing the baby out with the bath water. Additionally, the two opposing groups tend to speak different languages; or traditionalists use the language of practice of international relations, and critics drawing on a meta-theoretical and existential base.

There is always much discussion about paradigmatic shifts when a new wave of scholars challenges the traditional disciplinary practice. International Relations - within the field of Political Science -- is in the midst of a paradigmatic change and, as usual, the process is slow. The best that can be said for the moment is that we have two broad, competing paradigms. More accurate, however, would be to think of this stage of the process as a *broadening of disciplinary borders*, where International Relations must re-draw its parameters. The intention of this work is to make a contribution to that process.

I contend that as far as the discipline is concerned, a two-fold problematic must be opened for scrutiny: the notion of the state as both the actor and the limit of the "reality". International Relations treats the state as an independent and unified actor, despite the fact that the state cannot exist outside of human action. International Relations clearly belongs to the social sciences, which demands the study of social groups formed by people. The state is an artifact, a human construction, and a social group formed by people, yet the

discipline portrays the state as an actor that thinks and acts of its own volition.

Secondly, the statist nature of International Relations has made the disciplinary reality into one. Too often the discipline ignores questions regarding whose reality we are concerned with, what is considered "real", and what the limits of reality are. Statist reality assumes neutral and impersonal actors that can be compared with one another. Stemming from the claim that traditional International Relations has exercised narrow disciplinary practices, this paper addresses the above problems through presenting a new way of thinking of security, one of the discipline's most central concepts. As we are looking into broadening the discipline, it is the very concepts and discourses³ that need to be examined and given new definitions. Towards this end my thesis seeks to rethink security in a way that disconnects itself from the traditionalist concepts of "the state" as well as "international anarchy" and "national interest" as conventionally understood. International anarchy is not accepted as an exclusive source of people's insecurities; national interest and security must be those of people, not one of states'. Threats must be understood in terms of the insecurities they cause to people, whether domestic or international.

When an elaborate redefinition of a central concept is attempted, important disciplinary questions arise: What becomes of International Relations when narrow definitions are broadened? Are there International Relations when internal and external are dealt with in

³ Discourses are understood as a broad matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and the world around them. A discourse makes real that which it prescribes as meaningful.

the same category? What is the use of a broad definition of security in the many parts of the world that still face war as the primary threat? These and other critical questions are taken up in the concluding chapter.

2 SOVEREIGNTY IS SECURITY?

The problem of security is informed by the concept of sovereign states. The one-dimensional security concept that has characterized International Relations for centuries comes down to the question about the ways we organize ourselves politically. States -- each claiming sovereignty -- monopolize our understanding of what political life is, and where it occurs. The state is the community within which people identify, at least politically. The easiest way to categorize people is by their respective states: they form communities of citizens. The state is the political category, and the security of the states dominates our understanding of what and where security can take place; security of the world, let alone of the people, remains more abstract.

Is it then that to understand International Relations is to understand state sovereignty? And that International Relations are essentially about relations between one sovereign to another? In recent years the very foundation of the discipline of International Relations has been shaken by convincing claims for diminishing the power of the sovereign state, and increasing global relations beyond states. International (read inter-state) Relations has been challenged by transnationality, world politics, and global civil society arguments. While this has been a very healthy turn within the discipline, I would still stress the remaining centrality of state sovereignty to understanding International Relations. Despite the fact that states are neither unitary actors, nor even the most important players in many global transactions⁴, they do persist in their sovereign

⁴ As well known, especially in economic matters multinational corporations are often believed to have more power than any given sovereign state.

rights, and we, the people, persist as citizens of these sovereigns. Individual rights amount to little if one ceases to be a member of a state.⁵

Therefore, I do not believe in redefining security without first closely examining its connection to the issue of sovereignty. The task would be substantially less difficult if one were simply to dismiss the territorial sovereign, the state. However, I do not see this as a fertile approach considering the fact that the world continues to be divided into states, and people indeed do identify as citizens of their given states. By the same token, while it is not realistic to overlook the sovereign state, it is necessary to question why the state should be the sole guardian of security in international affairs. Security has obviously concerned people long before sovereign states existed, so there is no reason why the two must be so inherently connected. While the state can function as the provider of security, security must always remain grounded first and foremost with the people. The state should function as the protector, not the ultimate identifier of security.

This chapter discusses the relationship between state sovereignty and security and its implications for the discipline of International Relations. Much of my discussion as well as structuring of this chapter is owed to R.B.J. Walker's insightful work on sovereignty, which is an especially suitable standpoint for viewing the connection to security.

⁵ See Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1966).

From Universal to the Particular

What do we understand by political community? Where are power and authority located? How is power legitimized? All these questions find their conventional resolution in the claims of state. These claims are formalized and encoded in the principle of state sovereignty.⁶

Despite the fact that the essence of the sovereign state is commonly contested, we have yet to see a true challenger that could provide a different answer to the above inquiries. The principle of state sovereignty encodes a system in which authority, territory, population and recognition are bound together for a particular place - the state.⁷ Yet this system, based on state sovereignty, is limited by an historical function which has been outgrown. "[S]overeignty describes... the territorial organization of early modern Europe: simply by adding states to its margins, the early modern world irresistibly grew to its present proportions."⁸

Where we are today is the result of a long historical process. At the end of the Middle Ages, the international system went through a dramatic transformation in which the crosscutting jurisdictions of feudal lords, emperors, king, and popes started to give way to territorially defined authorities. The feudal order was gradually replaced by a system of sovereign states...⁹

⁶ R.B.J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice," in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Communities, ed. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990b), 164.

⁷ Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, "The Social Construction of State Sovereignty," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3.

⁸ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History," Alternatives 16, (1991): 437.

⁹ Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3.

While the birth of the modern state system is connected to the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the idea of sovereignty was not new. It was first introduced in Aristotle's Politics¹⁰, and furthered in ancient Rome¹¹, but the modern understanding of sovereignty - which relates to territorial entities - was formulated in Europe toward the close of the 16th century.

The convictions that had structured medieval Europe prior to the sovereign state were fundamentally different from subsequent ones. It was a world of universalism, when universalism is defined as a canon based on the belief that after-death salvation is the goal of all men.¹² "All men" were European and they were unified under Christian societal values. In modern terms, Christianity provided the "citizenship" for the people.

For Harold Laski the medieval counterpart of the state was the Church, for "all men were Christians, and before that basic unity of outlook all differences were held as insignificant."¹³ Yet the resemblance is also deceiving: sense of belonging and societal organization were fundamentally different in a medieval society. Certainly, the medieval man lived in a community, but the idea of

¹⁰ Where it was recognized that "there must be a supreme power existing in the state." C. E. Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau (New York, NY: The Columbia University Press, 1900), 11.

¹¹ Where "it conspired with the continuation of the disorder and the need for government which had produced it.. to establish the theoretical absolutism of the powers of the Emperor and to consolidate the actual despotism of his rule." F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C.A. Watts & Co, 1966), 126.

¹² This definition is a modified version of the definition of "universalism" in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 1990).

¹³ Harold Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1968), 2.

territory and space was not fixed. Points of reference varied from cultures and religions to local communities and individual nobles, and the authority structures were unclear. The feudal system (if it can really be called a system) consisted of ruler-servant relationships based on private authority and conditional property.¹⁴ Whatever the independent units were, they were also parts of a universal community: common bodies of law, religion and custom served as an umbrella legitimizing the system.

Sovereignty as a legal principle already found its way back to the theoretical debates in the 12th and 13th centuries, but the dominance of divine over positive law and the political "conflict between Church and State and by feudal condition prevalent within the State itself" did not allow for its serious formation.¹⁵ By the 14th century, two models distinct from the feudal order were able to develop: the free city and the proto-absolutist state.¹⁶ While the church continued to play a significant role, territorial entities associated with governments were able to accumulate wealth and attract expanding groups of loyal citizens. A model for the relationship between territory and governance began to emerge.¹⁷

Before sovereignty was possible as a conceptual innovation, certain fundamental evolutions were necessary. Most significant was

¹⁴ John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 142.

¹⁵ Merriam, 12-13.

¹⁶ Alexander B. Murphy, "The Sovereign State System as Political-territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84-85.

¹⁷ Ibid.

the decline in the Catholic Church's privileged position as the political organization, and the rise of political discourse in its own right.¹⁸

Herz accounts the pursuit of peace as a necessary element leading to the political changes:

[t]he idea that a territorial coexistence of states, based on the power of the territorial princes, might afford a better guarantee of peace than the Holy Roman Empire, was already widespread at the height of the Middle Ages when the emperor proved incapable of enforcing the peace¹⁹,

while others, like Spruyt stress the economic factor: "... the economic transformation of the Late Middle Ages inspired individuals to create new forms of organization."²⁰ Most likely, it was a combination of political, economic, religious and technological developments that generated fundamental problems related to authority as well as to the status of the people. Of course no small part was played in challenging the Church by Luther's reformulation of religion.

The development of technology of war enhanced the change, and for a large part of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century, Europe was torn by civil and religious wars, culminating in the Thirty Years' War. In a sense, the idea of sovereignty was also a response to social disorder and political need.

Sovereignty as a political discourse, as a model for existence, is best illustrated by briefly discussing the thinking of Jean Bodin. Representing a republican tradition, in 1576, Bodin -- who is often accredited as the father of the modern understanding of sovereignty -- published Six Books of the Republic which was the first work "to state

¹⁸ Greenwood, 435.

¹⁹ John Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics 9 (1957): 476.

²⁰ Spruyt, 155.

the theory behind the word [sovereignty]."²¹ Responding to the chaotic disorder brought by wars, Bodin maintained that without absolute power political communities could not maintain security and escape the "conflict of new developments with medieval and feudal fetters."²² For Bodin, sovereignty was "the absolute and perpetual power of a republic and in any body politic this power must be sovereign."²³

The Protestant ethic also lent well to the new political discourse, "sharpen[ing] republicanism's ethical thrust by insisting that people and their welfare are the points of politics."²⁴ This seems to coincide with the development of territories where people clearly belonged to a given space and their wealth and well being was connected to that of the territory.

The modern state was born of the dissolution of the Christian world including thought and belief structures, politics, institutions and whole forms of life.²⁵ State sovereignty formulated a fitting ideology for the world less concerned with the move from time to eternity and more with the move from inside and outside of a community.²⁶

The discourse of sovereignty is about

determining the limits of political organization and the extent of the legitimacy of a particular political authority. The medieval solution to that problem is the location of sovereignty

²¹ Hinsley, 71.

²² Ibid., 121.

²³ Ibid., 122.

²⁴ Greenwood, 435.

²⁵ Michael Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the New World Order to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order," Alternatives 20 (1995): 335-36.

²⁶ Ibid.

in God. The modern Sovereignty, whatever its location within the state, represents the limits of a specific political space.²⁷
[italics mine]

The change from the medieval to the modern, from feudal to the state, was a fundamental transition from universal to the particular. The principle of sovereignty was by no means accepted immediately, rather the practice it brought in the form of the modern state first paralleled the Church's transnational claims for political authority and the system of overlapping authorities characteristic of the medieval system.²⁸ It is only in retrospect that we can try to locate the time of such historical changes, but it is probably safe to say that since the 17th century -- despite the persistence of certain empires -- the state has been recognized as the supreme power within a defined territory.²⁹

The idea of a "location" of sovereignty has also changed over time; in the beginning monarchs were sovereign, but after the French Revolution, the nation or the people have been conceived as sovereign, and governments merely uphold it. This, however, is less important for the general argument. What matters is that the concept of sovereignty has enabled the members of society to conceive of themselves as a systematic unity with a "source and locus of social authority."³⁰ According to R.B.J. Walker, state sovereignty provided "three

²⁷ Anthony P. Jarvis and Albert J. Paolini, "Locating the State," in The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Sphere, ed. Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 15.

²⁸ Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): 111.

²⁹ Ruggie (1986), 142.

³⁰ Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 203.

ontological resolutions of the intellectual crisis of early modern Europe" that have guaranteed the lasting significance of sovereignty: the relationships between universality and particularity, self and other, as well as that of space and time.³¹

To start with the universal-particular divide, Walker stresses how state sovereignty expresses "a unitary account of the system within which sovereign states can exist in the first place."³² Therefore, while state sovereignty did indeed break the universality -- in the European context -- that had been developed in the form of Catholic Christianity, it nevertheless provided a solution of one system composed of many units. Through sovereignty, the states were given the power to define and maintain a political universalism within. The system could still accommodate cultural identities that might overlap with the same outside the state's borders -- whether European, Christian or increasingly that of capitalist modernity.³³ People, however, were firstly citizens, committed to other loyalties only secondarily.

Perhaps most importantly -- continuing with the one-system/many-states approach -- state sovereignty provided a basis by which different entities could be separated from one other, allowing in turn, the separation of the internal from the external, and self from other. This distinction between the inside and outside, is illustrated in "a politics of spatial containment... fixing of temporality within the

³¹ R.B.J. Walker, "From International Relations to World Politics," in The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Sphere, ed. Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995a), 28.

³² R.B.J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept of Political," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995b), 320.

³³ Ibid.

ordered jurisdiction of the territorial state... Outside the state: the anarchy of contingency."³⁴

Inside the particular state, concepts of obligation, freedom, and justice could be articulated within the context of universalistic accounts of Revelation, Reason, and History. Yet these claims to universal values and processes presumed, implicitly or explicitly, a boundary beyond which such universals could be guaranteed. Beyond the boundary, beyond the borders of the sovereign state, lay a world of difference: a world of others who were both spatially outside and usually presumed to be temporally backward; and a world of international relations, even of international anarchy, in which different rules applied.³⁵

Thus, the consequence of the universality of the particular has obvious implications for the relations between the sovereign states, which will be taken up further in the next section.

Sovereignty Inside, Anarchy Outside

The change in social organization from the medieval system to the modern one was naturally not just, or even mainly, about territory and authority. The question about "who we are" had to be resolved in a situation where traditional structures of identity and belonging were fundamentally altered. Communities often take their expression as distinct from something else, the Other. The distinction of "us" versus "them" is an important part of almost any group formation.³⁶ The issue of identity was fundamentally different during the medieval period as compared to modernity. Still concerned with his salvation

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Walker (1990b), 165.

³⁶ See for example: Committee on International Relations, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Us and Them: The Psychology of Ethnonationalism (New York: Brunner/Mazel Publishers, 1984), and Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Us and Them in Modern Societies (Oslo: Scandinavia University Press, 1992).

and loyalty to the Church, religion was of primary importance for the medieval man. Sharing this loyalty was crucial and it enforced the Christian identity: "we" were Christians, the rest of the world was the "other."³⁷

Therefore, the transition in organization from Church-centrism to state-centrism rudimentarily changed people's orientation about who counted as "us."

The principle of state sovereignty formalize[d] a specific answer to questions about who we are as political beings that were posed in early-modern Europe... that we are citizens first and humans second -- and.. that, the claims of citizenship (nationalism, national interest, national security and so on) must take priority over the claims of humanity in general (universal ethics, universal human rights)....³⁸

Political life became to be understood as "a community of citizens."³⁹ With citizenship came loyalty, with loyalty exclusion of those with other loyalties and with this.... otherness. The state was now to be the political community.

The early formulations of sovereignty concentrated on its internal aspects. As in Bodin, this stemmed from the belief that a community required absolute power to keep it together and to protect it from war - ultimately, to survive. What one needed to survive from, was the chaotic situation "out there." With the principle of state sovereignty, "out there" was symbolized by other sovereign powers, and in between them was nothing concrete, once the absolute power was given

³⁷ Max Mark, Beyond Sovereignty (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 7.

³⁸ R.B.J. Walker and S.H. Mendlovitz, "Interrogating State Sovereignty," in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Communities, ed. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 1990) 5. Relevant here is Edmund Burke's argument that the rights of an Englishman was superior to the revolutionary rights of man.

³⁹ Walker (1990b), 175.

to the specific sovereign authorities. The idea is based on the assumption of "one authority among others."⁴⁰ In inter-sovereign relations absolute powers are by necessity pitted against one another should a conflict of interest arise.

Characteristic to the way the world is divided into states, sovereignty is viewed dualistically, internally and externally. This is stated clearly in F.H. Hinsley's classic and broadly accepted definition of sovereignty as "final and absolute political authority in the political community... and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere."⁴¹ Sovereignty thus implies that the governments of these political communities, the states, have the supreme decision making power within their territories and are not subject to any higher political authority.⁴² The state acts "in two dimensions, the domestic and the international."⁴³ Internally, the sovereign authority holds the right for the legal use of force, while externally sovereignty implies the lack of a higher authority (supposedly) equalizing sovereign actors in their relations to one another. When facing outside towards global politics the state has been given the power to speak in a sovereign voice, representing the unity, the "us" of the community.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Hinsley, 158.

⁴¹ Ibid., 26.

⁴² Marvin S. Soroos, Beyond Sovereignty: the Challenge of Global Sovereignty (Columbia, CA: University of South Carolina Press, 1986), 78.

⁴³ Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda," Millennium 16, no. 2 (1987): 221.

⁴⁴ Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6.

The dual nature of our understanding of sovereignty has had obvious implications for the field of International Relations, or perhaps it is the base of the discipline. As Hedley Bull observed,

[t]he starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities, each which... asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population.⁴⁵

While Bull realized the discursive centrality of sovereignty, many others have chosen to treat it as "simply" a definition or a legal principle. F.H. Hinsley, for example, writing specifically on sovereignty, conclusively stated that it is "a principle which maintains no more [italics mine] than that there must be a supreme authority within the political community if the community is to exist at all..."⁴⁶ Interestingly Hinsley states "no more" despite the fact that International Relations as a discipline has largely derived from the very principle of state sovereignty. My outlook is once again similar to R.B.J. Walker's in that we need to "look at how the principle, institution and practices of state sovereignty work to constitute the theory of international relations..."⁴⁷

Realism, as well known, has been the most influential strain of thought in International Relations for at least most of the present century. In my opinion, contemporary (20th century) realism's reading of sovereignty has had two results for the field of International Relations: narrowing the discipline to the state level as in traditional realism; and the stressing of anarchy as a condition for international relations, as in neo-realism.

⁴⁵ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London, UK: Macmillan, 1977), 8.

⁴⁶ Hinsley, 219.

⁴⁷ Walker (1995b), 317.

Contemporary realists base their truths on several philosophical writers of the past, Thomas Hobbes perhaps being the most important one. In his Leviathan (1651) Hobbes, who was also one of the most significant of the early scholars developing the idea of sovereignty, is perhaps most famous for his exploration of human nature and "every man against every man" analogy. Hobbes concluded that this unhappy state of affairs was eased only in a political community where a contract was to be made by all individuals submitting to the state, but in which the sovereign could take no part.⁴⁸ Here we see the realist's favored assumption of fundamentally fearful human beings or "the self-destructive effects of the liberty of individuals in a state of nature",⁴⁹ only capable of order inside a state. Despite the fact that Hobbes was more interested in people than in states, he did suggest that the natural condition between sovereign states was war, power against power. In recent years there have been various studies claiming that Hobbes has been mis-read, and that a closer analysis would prove that Hobbes is actually no realist after all.⁵⁰ However, Hobbes dominates the claims of the discipline, because of his close proximity to the modern principle and practice of sovereignty.⁵¹

What then, is realism? In order to simplify, Michael Smith argues that there are three central aspects which, while approached differently by different authors, constitute what is known as realism.

⁴⁸ Hinsley, 142-43.

⁴⁹ Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of IR (London, UK: Verso, 1994), 137.

⁵⁰ See for example, Cornelia Navari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought," *Millennium* 11, no. 3 (1984): 203-222.

⁵¹ Walker (1995b), 317.

It is 1) general theory that strives to show what is important in international relations; 2) evaluation of specific policies of any given state; 3) a particular solution to the problem of morality in foreign policy.⁵² Realists, as well as other positivists, also believe that the reality can be known and its forms can be objectively studied.

... [Realism] holds that there are real forces operating in the world, beyond our immediate perceptions of them, that these forces are revealed by the historical process and that the able political practitioner takes account of these forces and incorporates them into his political conceptions and his political acts.⁵³

In this century's realism, sovereign states with certain powers and territories are taken as a given; analytically speaking, realism is about the dynamics of interaction among the states.⁵⁴ This is common for the two corner stones of modern realism, E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis and Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations.

For Carr, the states are the key units of analysis, and International Relations is about posing questions on behalf of the state.⁵⁵ Similarly, the world is "out there" when

the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events, which it is powerless to influence or alter. In the field of action, realism tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and tendencies.⁵⁶

⁵² Michael J. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 10.

⁵³ Navari, 207.

⁵⁴ Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt, "The Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 103.

⁵⁵ Rosenberg, 11.

⁵⁶ E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 14.

In Morgenthau - more clearly than anywhere else - it was put forth that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."⁵⁷ Again, the given assumption that states are the sole actors in international relations is not even seriously discussed. Sovereignty, on the other hand, is discussed within a section consideration of "limitations of national power: international law." But as the title suggests, sovereignty is considered a legal principle, and there is really no need to dig into the concept of sovereignty. This is clear to both scholars; states are the relevant communities, politics is about power, and to suggest something else is utopian. Similarly, they maintain that International Relations is and should be about dealing with real and existing problems of state to state affairs.

Unquestionably, realism is convincing. Even more important, grounding power politics in human nature has enforced a laissez-faire attitude:⁵⁸ little can be done, because it is in the human nature. Indirectly, modern realism starts from the principle of state sovereignty with the inside/outside view of the human condition.

Apart from the external/internal elements, sovereignty additionally has another, dichotomial, nature. As Richard Ashley points out, there is "... a hierarchical opposition of sovereignty versus anarchy, where the former is privileged as a regulative ideal."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, NY: Knopf, 1973), 28.

⁵⁸ Barry Buzan, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?" in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53.

⁵⁹ Richard Ashley, "The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life," in James Der Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1995), 103.

When no final authority exists elsewhere, international society has been often characterized as 'anarchical'.⁶⁰

[A]narchy is taken to refer to a situation characterized by a presence and an absence. Present on the world scene are multiple states, each interpreted as an identical decision-making subject competent to wield means of violence. Absent from the world scene is any global agency, any single center of universal authority, capable of guaranteeing promises, coercing compliance, or planning and effecting rational designs for global order.⁶¹

Whereas this was already denoted in realism, neo-realism made anarchy into science. In his influential Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz notes the lack of authority in international politics: "[t]he anarchy of politics internationally is often referred to. If structure is an organizational concept, the terms 'structure' and 'anarchy' seem to be in contradiction."⁶² Criticizing the realist foundation on human nature, Waltz moved realism into a systemic level: the reason why international relations happen the way they do is not because of a man nor a state, but because of the system. The state is an actor among other sovereign actors: the reality, which is still "out there" even in neo-realism, is calculated as the sum of the rational decisions made by all sovereign actors.⁶³

I have not taken up the previous realist examples in order to criticize their theoretical value. What is most significant here is not what realism is about, but what it has left out - the silences of

⁶⁰ Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Baney, "Realizing Sovereignty," Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 12.

⁶¹ Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium 17, no. 2 (1988): 236.

⁶² Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Wesley, MA: Addison, 1979), 89.

⁶³ Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Re-Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 204.

the discipline."⁴⁴ I have concentrated on realism, although many of the same silences are also found in traditional critiques of realism.⁴⁵ Clinging onto sovereignty as a necessary factor in human life, other options for communities have been silenced, inside and out.

Sovereignty is Security ?

[T]he principle of state sovereignty not only suggests how it is necessary to defend the borders but also how it is necessary to think about borders, about the delineation of political possibility in both space and time."⁴⁶

What is the connection between state sovereignty and security?

Much should already be obvious. The principle of state sovereignty has established states as the political communities, citizenship as people's primary identities, and implied that between sovereign states is a gray area, anarchy -- even a state of war.

States are about borders, and the principle of state sovereignty legitimizes these borders. Territorial states, enforced with the principle of sovereignty, are a phenomenon, but need not necessarily be a given. Still, politically speaking, the advent of the state system marks the change from the traditional to modern. According to Anthony Giddens,

modernity refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and

⁴⁴ See especially George, chapters 3-4; Walker (1990b); and Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 1-37.

⁴⁵ By traditional critique, I mean idealism or liberalism as well as the Marxist-derived scholarship.

⁴⁶ R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations Theory as Political Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 175.

which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.⁶⁷

John Ruggie has noted that there have been at least three systems of rule different from the modern territorial state.⁶⁸ One is the so-called "primitive government" based on kinship, which illustrates a system of rule, which is not territorial in a sense that territory did not define it, kinship did. Secondly, system of rule does not need to be territorially fixed as in some tribes herding their livestock. The third type is represented by medieval Europe, with its overlapping ways of governance and jurisdiction. In this example, the systems of rule are relatively territorially fixed, yet the prevailing concept of territory is not based on exclusion.⁶⁹ As anthropologist Mary Catherine Bateson has observed, "territoriality of some sort... seems to be a human universal, but a preoccupation with boundaries or with expansion and trespass is not."⁷⁰

Yet, we continue to be preoccupied with borders, a symptom, which international relations springs from.

State's dominion over our understanding of the character and location of the political [was] a distinctive feature of modernity... [T]he modern conception of statehood derives largely from the specific experience of 16th and 17th-century Europe [with] the particular definition of political space...⁷¹

⁶⁷ Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1990), 1.

⁶⁸ John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 149.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Mary Catherine Bateson, "Beyond Sovereignty: An Emerging Global Civilization," in Contending Sovereignities: Redefining Political Communities ed. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 1990), 151.

⁷¹ Joseph A. Camilleri, "State, Civil Society, and Economy," in The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Sphere, ed. Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (Boulder, CO: Lynne

The principle of sovereignty conventionally aids the separation of modern politics into the realms of domestic and international.

Therefore, it is no wonder that the concept of security holds a key position in the literature of International Relations. An obvious connection between sovereignty and security comes into play, because

sovereignty provides the basis in international law for claims for state actions, and its violation is routinely invoked as a justification for the use of force in international relations.⁷²

While violation of a state's sovereignty is and has been common enough practice, again, my concern is mainly on the implications the principle of sovereignty has had for the discipline in general, and the aspect of security within it, in particular.

The primary reason why the meaning of security is usually regarded as straightforward, and why so much of even the critical discussion of security policy avoids coming to terms with the explicitly political problems posed by the concept of security, is that this concept is so closely tied to the principle of state sovereignty.⁷³

The main ramifications are common knowledge: the ultimate threat to security is a violation or intervention across a sovereign state's borders by an external power through a military assault. Therefore, "[t]o the extent that anybody knows what [security] means, it refers to the security of states."⁷⁴

Desire to be secure motivates state building. National security - read as state security - "appears to be that sovereign states are protectors of their populations and resources and that international

Riennner, 1995), 210.

⁷² Biersteker and Weber, 1.

⁷³ R.B.J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics." Alternatives 15 (1990a): 8.

⁷⁴ Walker (1995a), 32.

relations turn on the security and survival of states."⁷⁵ And "security" is a condition for developing and enjoying the moral and mortal condition of a civilized and prosperous existence.⁷⁶ Simply stated, "[s]ecurity is a fundamental justification of state power."⁷⁷

However, even if we speak in traditional terms of security, the contrast between the quiet incontestability of sovereignty as a principle and the violence that is deployed in its name is surely one of the crucial distinguishing characteristics of modern politics.⁷⁸

War by no means is produced by the modern state; as we all know the history of war far surpasses the history of the sovereign state. Yet, sovereignty indirectly legitimizes war, because war is the main agency producing the state. No state is ever more of an unified entity than when its existence is threatened: internal differences concerning governance and other minor issues are put aside in the event of war. As stressed in realism, war is high politics, and perhaps rightly so. War is naturally much more than just a theoretical dilemma: it is a real security threat, even the ultimate security threat. It is also true that people/citizens genuinely want to defend their borders, their livelihood, their community -- there is no fiction in this.

This is simple enough. Thinking back to Bodin, his theoretical formulation of the principle of sovereignty was a response to the chaotic situation in war-torn Europe; or Hobbes, who had witnessed the

⁷⁵ Robert H. Jackson, "The Security Dilemma in Africa," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 81.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 86.

⁷⁷ Robert Purnell, The Society of States: An Introduction to International Politics (London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), 133.

⁷⁸ Walker (1995a), 27.

Thirty Years War when he focused on the state of nature and human beings' unfortunate destiny of being evil.

I have already stressed that sovereignty cannot be treated solely as a matter of definition and legal principle, that "its historical and culturally specific character has to be taken into account as well."⁷⁹ State sovereignty was a very precise solution to the intellectual and real crisis in the 16th century Europe. It was a solution of "one system - many states," in which even with the discussed change from universal to particular, was atoned by one, relatively homogeneous entity.⁸⁰ It was one system in European terms! What we have now, several centuries later, is a much more diverse group of states that form a system. Over the years sovereignty has become the principle under which nations, ethnic groups, and other entities all around the world earned the legitimate right to exist. They became parts of the system given that the core, Europe-based "West" approved their legitimate worth of sovereignty.⁸¹ State sovereignty has also been persistent in that it is self-justifying: historical possession legitimates continued jurisdiction, similar to private property in many systems.⁸² Thus, the "one system - many states" solution has expanded over the years and, due to this expansion, it has also changed and

⁷⁹ Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National identity," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 123.

⁸⁰ Walker (1995a), 28.

⁸¹ See David Strang, "Contested Sovereignty: the Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-49.

⁸² Barkin and Cronin, 111.

taken different forms at different times. The same applies to the problem of security in international affairs.

Originally, the principle of sovereignty was indirectly a solution to a security gap, yet today it is perhaps a cause of such crisis. This comes in to play with the disciplinary preoccupation with war. First of all, for a large part of the world, war is not an immediate threat, yet the main stream international theory continues to act as it is. Secondly, the preoccupation with war, matched by the principle of state sovereignty, has made it impossible to think of security in other than state terms.

Furthermore, the preoccupation with war enforces our state-given identities as having priority over our other identities. As far as mainstream International Relations is concerned, we are secure if we are citizens of a sovereign state with secure borders. While war is devastating and true, lack of it does not necessarily equate to security. Whereas we may be secure as citizens, we are not necessarily secure in our other identities, whatever they may be. International Relations has largely ignored this problem, despite its having been the case throughout history. Yet, "[w]ho we are, what our identity is, and who defines us each have far-reaching consequences."³

On another level, categories of identity are more blurred today than what they have been in the past. The modern idea of citizenship gave us our primary identities, signified by the principle of state sovereignty. As discussed earlier, group identification usually occurs

³ As for example Jews in Nazi Germany, Communists in McCarthy's USA etc. See Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, "Questions about Identity in International Relations," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 284.

as an exclusionary process, where "We" do not include "Them."⁴⁴ Today, however, there is such a multitude of compatible identities to suggest strain for this basic distinction. Societies are always about identity, yet the capacity of people to communicate and most importantly identify with Others, even those spatially distant from them, has fundamentally changed.

In the discipline of International Relations, sovereignty - war - security - state - citizenship form an irresistible link. Yet this link must be deconstructed. There is a problematic dichotomy between internal and external, or domestic and international. In reality - especially today - the two are often connected, and constitute a single arena that encompasses countless individuals as well as numerous layered, overlapping, and interacting political authorities and other groups. From this perspective, there are no "international politics" nor "domestic politics" -- there is only politics.⁴⁵ Similarly, the inadequacy of the traditional understanding of state security needs addressing.

Such reflections focus on the fact that "time" has changed or is changing. Whereas we can only give names to "times" in retrospect, there is substantial evidence that we are currently in changing "times," the roots of which may be found in the Industrial Revolution and its ultimately far reaching changes to transportation, communication, and technology in general. This has clear ramifications for both our organization and our sense of self. Labeling our time and our political life as postmodern and the introduction of postmodernism

⁴⁴ V. Spike Peterson, "The Politics of Identity in International Relations," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 17, no. 2 (1993): 2.

⁴⁵ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory," International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991): 369.

to the discipline has caused great distress and denial among the more traditional practitioners, but so did the transfer from the medieval to the modern times. I shall decline from a more in-depth analysis of what our "time" now actually is, but it seems clear to me that if "[t]he period leading up to the Peace of Westphalia was one in which the territorial structures and spatial understandings in Europe were undergoing profound transition,"⁸⁶ similarly, are we now in the process of a significant passage. Jarvis and Paolini's assessment of the "political," whatever its definition, seems correct: "no set of discrete territorial units... can accommodate existing... arrangements." Therefore

we need to consider the possibility of a multilayered... approach... in which territorial notions that undergrind decision making more closely reflect the different spatial structures in which issues and problems arise.⁸⁷

In the discipline of International Relations, we should accept the era of "postinternational" politics.⁸⁸ This change has profoundly to do with borders and identities. As I shall suggest in the next chapter on redefining security, there is no evidence that states are withering away, nor are our state-given identities to be forgotten. Rather, we have to be open for mutual identities:

the task of accommodating.. multiple identities by advancing... diffuse sovereignties... That is to rethink understandings of state and nation and reconceptualize the notion of sovereignty to accommodate both.⁸⁹

The same goes for a reconstruction of security:

⁸⁶ Murphy, 84.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 84.

⁸⁸ James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 6.

⁸⁹ Sumatra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Movement (New Delhi, India: Sage Publications, 1994), 198.

any attempt to focus exclusively on national security -- the state -- and ignore domestic and personal insecurity -- the individual -- is myopic: the state is not an end, it is only the means.⁹⁰

My attempt to redefine security, taken up in the following chapter, will follow this reasoning.

⁹⁰ Jackson, 94.

3 REDEFINING SECURITY

For centuries we have accepted sovereignty as inherently connected to security. This has meant accepting security "as the protection of state boundaries from military incursion from another state."⁹¹ As a pristine and change-resistant definition, it has not challenged disciplinary borders, nor questioned the essence of the state's primacy. People have been considered only within the context of clearly defined borders. Most importantly, the approach has functioned to provide answers to the questions of: *What is security? Whose security is to be considered?* -- with indirect implications as to: *Who provides security?*

The 1990s has witnessed a broadening of the concept, as many writers have given fundamentally different answers to the above questions. Firstly, the concept of security has been broadened to consider that of states, or the world, or the international system, or individuals... Secondly, security has been cited at issue in connection to a variety of threats: ecological erosion, poverty, famine, disease, and structural violence against groups of people, to mention just a few. As a result, the discipline has become "disorderly." Differentiating between international, versus domestic/internal issues has lost some of its relevance, as people claim to be more than just citizens. This leaves the question as to who should provide security far from resolved -- a concern frequently raised by traditionalists, not to be dismissed. However, it is also time to be responsible about our disciplinary definitions. "Reality"

⁹¹ Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: the Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," Alternatives 17 (1992): 98.

as portrayed by traditional security advocates is one-dimensional and elitist. Protecting people, instead of states, must be the principal goal. This chapter will serve two primary functions: Firstly, after a brief conceptual history, I shall group and evaluate recent trends in security redefinitions. While the debate has been innovative and necessary, I believe that there is room for another redefinition - one that I shall introduce in the second part of this chapter.

Most fundamentally, I maintain that security must focus on people rather than states. States, however, cannot be terminated; globally, people remain organized according to states, and due to the unique relationship between the state and its people, security continues to be best provided by states. Yet, regarding the relationship between states and people, the basis of exclusion and inclusion, as well as the identification of threat, needs to be approached differently. As concluded in the previous chapter, in the modern world of multiple channels of communication and transportation, citizenship alone cannot answer the broadening needs of human identification. This requires emphasizing and, in my opinion, is fundamental for a redefinition of security. The way threat is conceived by different groups of people comes to play here; accepting multiple identities means accepting multiple threats.

Before proceeding, certain qualifications need to be laid out. As stressed in the introduction, I am uncomfortable asserting that the social sciences are able to singularly provide universally applicable models. People of the world are facing varied threats based on their living situations. If I maintain that the state needs to remain as a caretaker of groups of people, this naturally dismisses the fact that in many parts of the world, states are not doing this, and that the state itself can be the main threat to its people. But because

statehood continues to be desirable, I can simply attempt an ideal. Tentative models and theories only go so far, and this fact needs to be accepted. While this results in a more rambunctious field of study, it is more realistic, and therefore should be desirable.

Extending Security: The What and Whose of Security?

Security has two primary literal meanings: (a) freedom from danger, and (b) freedom from fear or anxiety.⁹² Practically security is about identifying threats and eliminating them. For the past four hundred years, security has been predominantly associated with the state - functionally indicating absence from a military threat, and protection of the state from external overthrow or attack.⁹³

Since "foreign" implies a person who is not like us, and since territorially based states (or nation-states) emerged in Europe after 1648 as the dominant organizing principle for separating us from them, security's identification with the state is not surprising.⁹⁴

As discussed in the previous chapter, the dual nature of sovereign security is important: security inside, anarchy outside. The sovereign state has been understood as a provider of domestic order as well as guarantor of security in a situation of unrest.

Indeed, security is the basic value of statehood. Many political theorists claim that the state was established by a social contract,

⁹² "Security" in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 1990).

⁹³ H. Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1991): 3.

⁹⁴ Stephen J. Del Rosso, "The Insecure State: Reflections on the State and Security in a Changing World," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (Spring, 1995): 183.

which gave the sovereign a monopoly of force and, in turn, subjects gained defense from external and internal threats alike.⁹⁵ According to Emma Rothschild, there is a substantial difference in the way security was conceived in the period from the mid-17th century to the French Revolution, versus in post-revolutionary Europe. In the former, security was understood to be pluralistic -- an objective of individuals and groups, as well as of states. The outcome of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was a one-dimensional notion of security, conceived as an objective solely of states and achieved by diplomacy and military policies.⁹⁶

It is safe to say that from the Napoleonic period to the present security has been distanced further and further from the people: the issue of security has amounted to "the quest for a political system that will provide domestic peace and the protection of the state."⁹⁷ The interpretation of security was the privilege firstly of the rulers (in the era of sovereign kings), and later, passed on to the ambiguous state system. As a result, the international aspect of security has been about borders, defense and strategic analyses -- concern for people's freedom from threats other than in connection to their state's survival has long been missing.

The actual discipline of International Relations was also born out of this type of intellectual reality: to provide solutions for the problem of war on the world stage. While its theoretical roots can be traced back for centuries, the actual discipline started to emerge in

⁹⁵ Jackson, 82.

⁹⁶ Emma Rothschild, "What is Security?" Daedalus 124, no. 3 (1995): 61.

⁹⁷ Pierre De Senarclens, "Population and Security," International Social Science Journal 141 (1994): 439.

the time around the end of World War I, in search of solutions for breaking the cycle of international war.⁹⁸ In theory as well as in practice, the problem of war was then first encountered by Wilsonian style idealism, based on strong international cooperation and organization.⁹⁹ The outbreak of yet another major war only a couple of decades later, however, prompted an introduction of a supposedly more realistic approach to International Relations. Realism, claiming hundreds of years of intellectual heritage from Thucydides to von Clausewitz and Machiavelli to Hobbes, answered the challenge by further empowering the state, and ultimately limiting international politics to a struggle for state power. The threat of war was ever present, and therefore ever justified itself as the core of the discipline.

For the most of the discipline's existence, International Relations was over-shadowed by the cold war. Analytically the cold war provided a perfect match for the territorial dualism found in the practices of sovereign statehood: the distinction between Us and Them was intensified by the two hostile blocs; the importance of security of the territorial state could not be argued; and when the military invasion by the Other was an apparent threat, securing Us from Them legitimized military build-up like never before. In the world of stark contrasts, International Relations became essentially a cold war discipline for which realism provided the pat ideology.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ For (a critical view of) disciplinary development, see for example, J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992), chapter 1.

⁹⁹ Wilson was also a supporter of self-determination of people, thus he also linked domestic order and international security in his conceptualization.

¹⁰⁰ See George, chapter 3.

While war and peace were major concerns, the definition of security itself was not questioned. Despite the fact that the notion of "national security" was part and parcel of the cold war politics of the United States, the meaning of security was assumed. Throughout the cold war, the concept remained somewhat mystified as it was attached to issues as varied as the development of industries, to scientific experiments, to tax raises etc. In the public's eyes, national security was a punch-word for "serious" politics, and thereby a legitimization of various government decisions. National security became a kind of veneer protecting the forever vague core values of the state.¹⁰¹ In retrospect, national security had a life of its own, however much it was or was not concerned with nation or security.

As Thom Workman has observed, what is most striking about security is its theoretical undertreatment in the decades following World War II. Despite its underlined centrality, security remained overshadowed by the concept of power,¹⁰² the main organizing principle of realist thought. Power was catapulted as the key word, in Hans Morgenthau's post-war realist "bible" of International Relations, Politics Among Nations. Morgenthau hardly touched the concept of security. Only in the very last pages, Morgenthau observed that "national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and of its institutions."¹⁰³ Vague in its own right, national

¹⁰¹ Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the Asean and GCC," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 143.

¹⁰² Thom Workman, Amplifying the Social Dimension of Security (Toronto, ON: York University, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1993), 2.

¹⁰³ Morgenthau, 562.

security was connected to [national] interest which, as is well known, was defined in terms of power.

But the unstated overlap with the concept of power was not the sole reason for the theoretical underdevelopment of security. Barry Buzan totals four other reasons: (1) the complexity behind the idea of security; (2) the nature of criticism against the realist orthodoxy; (3) the nature of a sub-field of strategic studies with strong focus on empirical problems of military issues; and (4) the symbolic ambiguity of the concept that worked in favor of the state.¹⁰⁴ In my opinion, all these reasons illustrate a reluctance to question fundamental truths attached to international theory, as well as reality. Certainly there was truth to the assumed complexity: when opened for serious inquiry, it became obvious that "security" was far removed from its literal definition, better suited to the discipline than the reality. Furthermore, official criticism of realism was provided by other positivists -- particularly, the liberal school of thought -- who tended to focus on issues not concerned with fundamental discursive changes. And when there were enough real military problems to constitute actual security threats to the world, other anxieties were effectively ignored. At the heart of this was the sovereign state, whose standing in the field was largely taken for granted. A real challenge would have forced a more critical look into state practices.

Apart from a couple of earlier attempts to develop the notion of security¹⁰⁵, it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that security came under

¹⁰⁴ Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1983), 6-9.

¹⁰⁵ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (1950): 157-80; Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1968.); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chapter 10.

serious intellectual scrutiny. Finally, the 1990s have witnessed some fundamentally different kinds of expansions to the parameters of security. Because the intellectual development of security in the past two-three decades has been thoroughly covered elsewhere¹⁰⁶, I shall only touch on trends in the 1970s and 1980s security debate, and focus on a more elaborate mapping of security positions of the 1990s.

In the 1970s and 1980s, national security was still the answer to the question of "whose" security was actually threatened. Neorealism, especially as introduced in Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics simply shifted the focus on the system, characterized by "anarchy... [which] is associated with the occurrence of violence."¹⁰⁷ Mainstream International Relations continued to treat security in military terms. Even those who sought to extend the concept of security¹⁰⁸ were still basically comfortable with the national level of analysis. Although the content of security was broadened to include environmental/ecological and resource-related matters, these were primarily seen as threats to national security. Often these "new" threats were viewed in terms of possible causes of war, or as obstacles for sufficiently preparing for one, as with resources. But awareness

¹⁰⁶ See for example, Del Rosso; Rothschild; Workman.

¹⁰⁷ Waltz, 102.

¹⁰⁸ See for example, Lester Brown, Redefining National Security, (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1977); Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Buzan (1983); Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 129-53; Edward E. Azar and Chuang-in Moon, "Third World National Security: Toward and New Conceptual Framework," International Interactions 11, no. 2 (1984): 103-135; Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," Journal of Peace Research 21, no. 2 (1984): 109-125; World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987); Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989): 162-77; Norman Myers, "Environment and Security," Foreign Policy 74 (1989): 23-41.

about the potential of ecologically based disasters as threats in their own right was slowly growing. Similarly, the general understanding of national security was occasionally broached. Barry Buzan, while not compromising on the primacy of traditional security, went as far as to admit that in some countries, the state itself was a "possible" threat for individual security. Regardless, serious broadening of security parameters began with questions about "what" rather than "whose".

As argued earlier, International Relations, and especially its sub-field of security studies, was inherently a cold war discipline. While some of the earlier attempts already stressed fundamental flaws in the traditional security thinking,¹⁰⁹ with the end of the cold war, it became clear that despite the fact that the "primary threat" was over, various insecurities persisted. Whereas the likelihood of a major war between super powers decreased, threats concerning environmental degradation, terrorism, famine, disease, future of nuclear weapons etc. persisted. Therefore, it is no wonder that the 1990s has witnessed a true growth in the definition of security.

Emma Rothschild has observed four types of "extensions" to the definitions that became popular in the security writings of the 1990s: 1) extension from the state security to security of groups and individuals; 2) extension from the state security to security of the international system; 3) extension to the kind of security that is in question; and 4) extension in the political responsibility for ensuring

¹⁰⁹ For example, Azar and Moon maintained that each dimension of security requires different policies; the Commission Report observed that there are no military solutions for environmental threats; Mathews Tuchman tried to awake US policy makers with concrete examples that re-considered the causes of threats, e.g. "until Haiti is reforested, it will never be politically stable", 168.

security.¹¹⁰ Again, the core related questions to be asked are: Whose security? What is security? and Who provides security?

In the next page, I have grouped central scholarly positions according to the issues: whose security, and the content of security. Following the groupings of the table, I shall proceed briefly to explain how the different contemporary scholars have approached the problem of security. In arriving at my own redefinition of security, I shall explain how most of these positions fall short by failing to acknowledge some broader implications of their own definitions. Therefore, I go on eliminating security that is labeled national, individual, global or societal in order to define security as *people's*.

National Security. While extensions to security have been called for, many -- if not most -- scholars continue to define security primarily in connection to the state. Three groups of national security proponents focus on the content of security. The first group of scholars persist in giving military-related issues priority in international security analysis, although some of the ways of approaching military related security are highly innovative.¹¹¹ The

¹¹⁰ Rothschild, 54.

¹¹¹ Some continue to stress the traditional defense issues while acknowledging other threats, as in Donald M. Snow, National Security, Defense Policy for a New International Order (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995); or Brian Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), a collection of essays with a focus on the third world and a broad variety of security issues, which nevertheless refuses to forego the primacy of political-military threats. More innovative yet military-related approaches include: Kevin J. Cassidy & G.A. Bischak, eds., Real Security: Converting the Defense Economy and Building Peace (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1993), a collection to explore the idea of converting the military economy to civilian purposes; and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996) in which writers look into the non-traditional aspects of national military security through for example culture and identity.

The Whose and What of Security?

WHOSE?	WHAT?		
	Military related	Broad content	Identity related
Individual	JOB	BOOTH ROTHSCHILD	
National	CASSIDY & BISCHAK JOB KATZENSTEIN SNOW	BROWN ROCHLIN ROMM	PETERSON TICKNER
Societal	KATZENSTEIN	SHAW KATZENSTEIN WAEVER	
Global	FROMUTH	DE SENARCLENS JOHANSEN KLARE & THOMAS ROCHE	
Critical			DALBY DILLON TICKNER WALKER

second group of national security advocates extends the content of security by arguing that military safety is not sufficient to secure nation-states.¹¹² Security is broadened to include environmental and resource issues, drug trafficking, economics and so forth. These groups of definers are not seriously concerned with the ambiguous nature of national security, and while cursory mention is made of people, as opposed to states, as the ultimate security recipients are made, the fine-tuning of this relationship is left without answers. The third type of national security re-analysis is best put forth by feminist writers.¹¹³ While essentially critical about the structure of traditional security, they still do speak of national security. Theirs is a fundamentally different kind of understanding in which the states are disrobed from their assumed neutrality revealing the masculine nature of states. Speaking in gendered terms, they strive for building security institutions that are responsive to the security needs of all people inside and outside of states.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Janet Welsh Brown, ed., In the US Interest: Resources, Growth, and Security in the Developing World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); James Rochlin, "Redefining Mexican 'National Security,'" Alternatives 20 (1995b): 369-402; Joseph Romm, Defining National Security: the Nonmilitary Aspects (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 1993).

¹¹³ See especially, J. Ann Tickner, "Inadequate Providers? A Gendered Analysis," in The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Sphere, ed. Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995a), 125-140; J. Ann Tickner, "Revisioning Security," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995b), 175-197; and V. Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously," in Gendered States. Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 31-64.

¹¹⁴ Tickner (1995b), 194.

Eliminating national security. Speaking of national security in traditional terms is problematic because of the ambiguities involved in the nature of a nation, or more correctly, that of the state. The state is often defined to have certain core elements, which minimally include territory, permanent population, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states¹¹⁵, basic social and economic welfare, maintenance of law and order, establishment of property rights, and protection of human rights.¹¹⁶ It is then, these borders, populations, governments, capacities and standards that are being protected through national security procedures. This is already familiar from the previous chapter. However, the concept of national security holds a dual fallacy: firstly, as has been criticized by its opponents, the nature of threat -- be it nuclear war or environmental catastrophe -- is often such that states alone cannot guarantee their own safety or survival; secondly, because states are imagined actors, it has to be questioned what is meant by state/national security. The first shortcoming is clear enough and convincingly argued elsewhere¹¹⁷, but the second requires further elaboration.

Foremost, I contest the erroneous unstated premise that the state is a thinking actor. No state thinks, acts or fears. Despite borders and populations, in the final analysis, states exist because they are believed to exist. Sovereign states were created by groups of people to guarantee domestic order, and protection from war. While not

¹¹⁵ Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: the Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 15-16.

¹¹⁶ Del Rosso, 178.

¹¹⁷ See for example Dalby.

suggesting that other threats did not endure even then, the danger posed by war was the most pressing, particularly for the key actors of the day, the elite land-holders. In redefining security, we should be more concerned about what people -- whose security is concerned with far more than just freedom from war -- need to be secured against today.

It is here that I wish to take up the difficult concept of identity.¹¹⁸ Sometimes regarded as just another fashionable concept in the social sciences of the 1990s, I would argue that identity is an important, yet often neglected or misunderstood component of security. The first issue at hand is the connection between identity and citizenship. Traditionally citizenship is not treated in these terms:

In the nation-state each citizen stands in a direct relation to the sovereign authority of the country in contrast with the medieval polity in which that direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men of the realm. Therefore, a core element of nation building is the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Since in the context of this dissertation, I am able to engage identity only in a limited manner, for identity related literature helpful for understanding asserted connections to security, please refer to William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Raymond Breton and others, Ethnic Identity and Equality (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1990); David Campbell, Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1992); William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiation of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, Rethinking Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Kirstie McClure, "On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity," in Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community ed. Chantal Mouffe (London, UK: Verso, 1992), 109-27; Anssi Paasi, "The Internationalization of Regions: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Emergence of Regions and the Constitution of Regional Identity," Fennia 164 (1986): 105-46; and Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991).

¹¹⁹ Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), 74.

This description depicts the relationship between the citizenship and the state, one based on rights and duties. However, it neglects an additional fundamental characteristic of citizenship, mainly as a carrier of identity.

And yet, in International Relations citizenship has been the only identity that has really mattered: people are citizens. States are seen as comprised of citizens, who in turn are seen as relevant only within the context of the state. By categorizing people solely according to their citizenship, the discipline has maintained order. While it is true that people all over the world have demonstrated national loyalties that indicate primacy of their citizenship identities, in the contemporary era of an ever-shrinking world of high-speed communication and transportation this is can no longer be tolerated. The people-factor of International Relations has to be opened to scrutiny.

Similarly, people's insecurities have mostly been examined through the lens of the state. It is therefore crucial that in understanding security, we make the connection with identity. Some, like Emma Rothschild, take issue with identities included in the security debate due to their over-lapping nature and the simple fact that they can not in themselves provide security.¹²⁰ Though it carries some validity, the argument is superficial. Identity plays an instrumental role in the roots of insecurity, and to ignore it is to miss a critical factor in identifying security threats. I have already argued in the previous chapter that in International Relations, sovereignty and security have been treated as if they are inherently

¹²⁰ Rothschild, 80.

connected. Sovereign security has been tied to people almost strictly in their capacity as citizens.

Furthermore, the theoretical formulation of citizenship is necessarily one-sided.¹²¹ Similar to the fact that citizenship can only be a part of one's identity, it can only represent a fraction of the people occupying a given state. Who the model citizen is goes according to what is the *citizenship ideal*.¹²² By promoting traditional national security thinking, the whole question of who counts as a citizen, and whose security is at stake, is assumed. However, as the table of security positions indicates, identity-related national security proponents do exist, most of them feminist writers. I shall return to them later in my own security reformulation.

Individual security. A more radically different kind of approach to security is suggested by those who assert that the fundamental concern should be the individual. There are some who acknowledge the individual as the proper level of analysis, yet stress the centrality

¹²¹ According to Barry Hindess it is one based on the ideal of cultural homogeneity.... which is rooted in, for example Locke's assumption of a common culture. See, Barry Hindess, "Power and Rationality: the Western Concept of Political Community," Alternatives 17 (1992): 160.

¹²² On citizenship, see Ronald Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995); Bendix; Rene Gádacz, Challenging the Concept of Citizenship (Edmonton, AB: CSC Consulting, 1986); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995); Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London, UK: Verso, 1992); James N. Rosenau, "Citizenship in a Changing Global Order," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 272-94; Yasmin Nunoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Andrew Vincent, Philosophy, Politics, and Citizenship (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1984).

of national security,¹²³ while some believe that security should be about individuals rather than about states.¹²⁴ Ken Booth's rejection of states stems from the fact that he sees them as analytically unreliable: some of them are in the business of security, while some are not. States are simply too diverse in character to allow such generalizations. A different approach is given by Emma Rothschild, who, following the liberal tradition concerned with the contract between the state and the individual, approaches security as a good for which individuals are willing to give up other goods. Ultimately, she is not dismissing national security; she simply wants to draw attention to its basic connection to individual well being and security. Consequently, Rothschild is extremely critical of those new approaches that fail to answer the question about the provider of security.

Eliminating individual security. It is reasonable to assume that most scholars are indeed concerned about individual security, at least indirectly. Whether one speaks of national/state security or world/common security, underneath there must be an interest in individuals' well-being. Whereas the ideal that the well looked after individual equals a more secure world is worth acknowledging, the goal of individual security features analytical problems.

Firstly, promoting the individual as a level of analysis is logistically impossible. If we claim to be pursuing every individual's security, how do we take into an account the countless individuals in

¹²³ See, Brian Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 11-35.

¹²⁴ See for example, Rothschild; and Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation." Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991b): 313-26.

their varied situations in the different parts throughout the world? Clearly, this has traditionally been dealt with by grouping individuals by their national/state- given identities. But certainly there are more universal issues of security that do not recognize state borders. If we are to broaden our understanding of security, we must first look at its single common denominator, which is its opposite -- threat. Threat cannot be trivialized. However, it comes in countless forms, all the more so in the contemporary postmodern/ postindustrial era. It is therefore impossible to make conclusive arguments based on each individual's sense of threats.

It is worth remembering that although the security of individuals is at the heart of liberal political thought, it is understood actually to be a combination of both the individual and the collective good:

[i]t is a condition, and an objective, of individuals. But it is one that can only be achieved in some sort of collective enterprise... It is something that individuals get for themselves, in a collective or contractual enterprise.¹²⁵

This itself is not dubious. However, liberal political thought is inherently an "ism" of the Enlightenment. Subsequently, belief in progress, eternal potential and development have implications for the pursuit of individual security. If progress and development are taken for granted, is it not a given that individual security is a side product of the two? Is individualism the highest good? What if this progress can only be achieved through sacrifice of many to guarantee gain and security of a few? There is plenty of global evidence that individualism can equal inhumanity. In capitalism, we see the economic consequences of this.¹²⁶ In security analysis, individualism poses a

¹²⁵ Rothschild, 63.

¹²⁶ Obviously my goal is far from offering a critique to capitalism, and since I have chosen to forego much of the realities

similar problem: what happens when one's security is another's threat? This is also a well-known problem in traditional national security thinking¹²⁷ (when state A's security is state B's insecurity) and which comes into play in all security analysis, but is likely to be most evident at the individual level.

While individual security is a worthwhile goal, when its limitations are understood, it is analytically unintelligible. Indeed, we all want to be secure. There is something to be said about looking at the most vulnerable individuals when security is to cover more than just a surface. We shall return into this below in my redefinition.

World Security. What is world security? Different writers have used diverse terms in their attempts to construct a concept of security that is not limited to individual states but, rather to answer the question: what is required to make the world as a whole, a safer place? Some require collective security¹²⁸, some demand democratic security¹²⁹, while others simply speak of world¹³⁰, global¹³¹, or the international system's¹³² security. Some believe that world security is ultimately

economics bear to international relations in general, and the problem of security in particular, I simply take the risk of sounding trite when using capitalism as an example here.

¹²⁷ Conveniently named as "security dilemma" by Robert Jervis.

¹²⁸ See De Senarclens.

¹²⁹ Robert C. Johansen, "Real Security is Democratic Security", Alternatives 16 (1991): 209-42.

¹³⁰ Michael Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, ed., World Security: Challenges for a New Security (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

¹³¹ Douglas Roche, A Bargain for Humanity (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1993).

¹³² Peter J. Fromuth, "The Making of a Security Community: the UN after the Cold War," Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 2 (1993):

about preventing war and, thus, suggest ways for the international community to work together on the quest for peace.¹³³ More common, however, is a broader approach, in which the world is viewed as an entity connecting different actors through various bonds, stemming from the idea that any nation's security can only be a symptomatic cure to more expansive problems. Many threats face the world as a whole, and cannot be fought other than in unison; no one nation can provide ultimate security for its citizens in the era of nuclear bombs and environmental catastrophes. Many of these writers focus on international organizations and increased international cooperation in order to build a community that is able to guarantee security for the world as a whole.

Eliminating world security. The fundamental problem here is the question of who defines what is world, common, global, or system security. Is the developed and industrialized West allowed to decide, for example, that global environment, being a concern of all, should be dealt with by Western standards, following strict environmental policies? Or is it up to the so-called under-developed South to decide that for the world to be secure, the wealth has to be evenly divided? Unquestionably, world security is defined by those who have power to do so.

Another central issue in defining security today is that of ethnocentrism.¹³⁴ Ethnocentrism is defined as an attitude characterized

341-66.

¹³³ For example, Fromuth has faith in the United Nations and especially on its Security Council for safeguarding peace in the world.

¹³⁴ Ethnocentrism or eurocentrism is apparent also in much of the traditional national security analysis which is based on assumption that all states have similar functions although different capacities. See K.J. Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992),

by belief that one's own group is superior.¹³⁵ To elaborate, Samir Amin's description of "eurocentrism" is helpful: eurocentrism refers to a bourgeois discourse on civilization and historical development, which is pseudo-universalistic and imperialistic.¹³⁶ Ethnocentrism (or eurocentrism since I am referring to the Western/European-rooted attitudes) is understood as global generalizations based on Western attitudes. Western values are commonly projected onto social sciences in general -- security studies in particular. Values such as freedom and self-fulfillment of the individual¹³⁷ may be globally desirable. Nevertheless, culturally base values should not be automatically projected onto global concerns.

By the same token, Western scholars often make triumphant platitudes akin to "democracies do not fight one another"¹³⁸, thus further demonstrating the Western political superiority complex. Of course, if the above assertion was truly the case, would it not all the more be time to focus on other security issues? On the other hand,

37-60. On ethnocentrism in general, please refer to Johan M.G. Van der Dennen, "Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-group Differentiation. A Review and Interpretation of Literature," in The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism, ed. V. Reynolds (London, UK: Crown Helm, 1987), 1-47.

¹³⁵ "Ethnocentrism" in Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 1990).

¹³⁶ Val Moghadam, "Against Eurocentrism and Nativism: A Review Essay on Samir Amin's Eurocentrism and Other Texts," Socialism and Democracy (Fall/Winter, 1989): 82.

¹³⁷ Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations," in Diplomatic Investigations, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966), 89.

¹³⁸ See, Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and World Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205-235; and Bruce Russett, "Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, Therefore More Peaceful World," in Alternative Security: Living Without Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Burns H. Weston (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 112-120.

even if the democracies do not fight one another, it does not imply that people either within democracies or outside them enjoy security. Security should be defined by the people for the people.

Similarly, the question about who provides world security remains unclear. If the goal is world security, is it to be provided by Western institutions in Western terms? As shown earlier, some scholars hope to achieve world security through national security; others hope to do so through fortified international institutions. Most of these solutions fail to take into account problems related to ethnocentrism.

Whatever the means, another analytical problem related to world security is defining world security itself. Does it refer to the survival of the world? Does this include environmental and other natural catastrophes, nuclear holocaust and destruction... What about insecurities of a smaller scale? Similarly, what is system security? Are we in that case interested in the survival of the states system at any price? Sovereignty has proven to be a strong and lasting principle. International organizations are primarily concerned with threats to the sovereign state. National security practices have already guaranteed system security, as discussed in the previous chapter's "one system - many states" analogy.

If world security means making the world safe for both present and future generations, it is a desirable goal. However, similar to individual security, it shows inherent conceptual weaknesses that should not be overlooked.

Societal Security. Typically, "societal" refers to society and social groups within the state, but as many writers have accurately pointed out, contemporary notions of society encompass social groups beyond state borders. According to Ole Waever, "societal" should refer

to large-scale social units. In general he maintains that groups, which form significant separate 'societies' (he mentions the Kurds and the Palestinians) within the state, should be accepted as relevant and distinct units of security analyses.¹³⁹ Waever's societal security influences the levels beyond and below the state level, albeit the essence of it comes down to the connection between state and societal security.

Martin Shaw provides another societal approach to security.¹⁴⁰ While acknowledging the merits of Waever's works, Shaw does not agree with tying societies to the system of states. In Shaw's opinion the fundamental flaw comes down to the disciplinary divisions within the social sciences: security is not -- and should not be -- restricted to International Relations alone, but has significance for all of social science. Furthermore, he points the finger at political science, especially International Relations, for having made security a statist matter. Accordingly, Shaw suggests a sociological model of security,¹⁴¹ in which the state and other levels of society are "interpenetrated". Despite his criticisms, Shaw admits that for now, sociology does not have answers for organizing the global societal security, but can only pose conceptual questions to international security studies.

Eliminating societal security. I find Waever's concept of societal security promising. This kind of thinking takes into account

¹³⁹ Ole Waever, "Societal Security: the Concept," in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, ed. Ole Waever and others (London, UK: Pinter, 1993), 17-40.

¹⁴⁰ Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994b), especially chapter 4.

¹⁴¹ Shaw's work relies heavily on Anthony Giddens' The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1990); and Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1991).

those whose primary identity cannot be that of citizenship. As stated, however, societal security cannot be relegated to a position subservient to state security; it has broader as well as narrower implications. Also, Waever's fixation with nationhood is limiting. Indeed, although he observes the shortcomings of statism in security thinking, by looking at only large social groupings, he is engaging in what might be called "nation-ism".¹⁴² It is not enough to be concerned with those who potentially can form state-like societies. Therefore, Shaw's critique of Waever's preoccupation with the system of states is also important.

Despite these observed difficulties, the roots for my own reformulation of security were seeded with this kind of societal security thinking. I shall attempt to expand Waever and yet move beyond the criticisms of Shaw.

Critical Views of Security. This last category is also closely connected to Shaw's type of reasoning. For lack of a better title, I have chosen to call this group broadly "critical views of security". By this I mean that specific answers to the basic questions such as, whose security? what is security? and who provides security?, are generally uninvolved. This category consists of writers who primarily are critical of the way security has generally been approached in international theory, thus bringing the debate to the discursive level. Another common element is their focus on identity in constructing security. Security is never taken at face value, rather it is defined as identity, unity, and an imposed order where difference is a threat.¹⁴³

¹⁴² I choose to use the term nation-ism, instead of nationalism, because the latter obviously has broader insinuations.

¹⁴³ See Dalby. Similarly, in Michael Dillon, "Modernity Discourse

Feminist writers like Tickner who I placed in the national security category think similarly.

These are convincing criticisms, yet due to their lack of clear guidance as to what security is and where it occurs, they are often dismissed by the traditionalists.

Redefining Security

"Security needs to be for people -- all people -- not for abstractions like the state."¹⁴⁴

It should be apparent by now that there is no shortage of redefinitions and new approaches to security, and unquestionably most of the above writers have added important insights and additions to the discussion. Yet, the debate is far from over. There are two elements that require further attention: (1) the analytical potential of any suggested definition: and (2) a true concern for people.

In order to be analytically sound, yet realistic, security must be defined so that it can answer all three above discussed questions: whose security; what is security; and who provides security. But this alone is not a sufficient criterion. The task is to face, what can be called a theoretical, as well as more practical, security challenge. By this I mean providing new answers to the three security related questions. The problem is that the search for analytical cohesiveness can lead to narrow definitions which, in turn, make for biased

and Deterrence," Current Research on Peace and Violence 12, no. 2 (1989): 90-104, security, differentiation and identity are connected issues; and R.B.J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," Alternatives 15 (1990a): 3-27, which criticizes the sovereign state's monopoly in security matters due to its exclusive position as a political community in international relations.

¹⁴⁴ Johansen, 211.

disciplinary practices. The traditional realist definition (or implication, since security was seldom seriously defined) did answer each of these questions: security was that of the states, was based on military threat, and the state was the provider of security. Realism undoubtedly produced a neat and analytically sensible framework, applicable to different state actors. Demands for new definitions arose when it became clearer than ever that many of the contemporary threats were of such caliber that the state was powerless to provide security for itself and its citizens. Therefore, when deciding what is included in the definition of security, certain value-judgments must be taken into account. This especially includes the questions of: (1) Who is it that we are really concerned for? and (2) What qualifies as a threat in international relations?

In my opinion, any social science is foremost about people. Due to the limitations I observed in national, individual, and world security approaches, I shall suggest "people's" as the answer to the question of whose security. The what of security should be based on threats identified by groups of people. The provider of security should still firstly be the state as the main political organizer, but secondly due to the global nature of insecurity, increased cooperation at inter-national as well as trans-national levels is demanded.

What Is Security: The goal of security should be freedom from threat. That is the answer to those who express concern that if the meaning of security is extended too far, it becomes synonymous with "development" or "rights", and will cease to have useful analytical interpretation.¹⁴⁵ Development, to the extent that it has been

¹⁴⁵ As indicated in Walker (1990a), 5.

successfully defined, refers to change -- whether this change is about improvement, or finding the right niche for one's existence, is a matter of opinion. This change may or may not include freedom from threat. Achieving security may be a part of development, or certain development may aid the process of achieving security. Threat is central to any security analysis, while it may or may not be so to the issues of development.

The same applies to differentiating "rights" from security. The rights of persons have traditionally been concerns of domestic jurisdiction, and it is only since the end of World War II, and the establishment of the United Nations, that promotion of human rights has become a large-scale international matter.¹⁴⁶ However, aside from economic aid and some services rendered directly to persons in need, "states guard their sovereign authority to define individual rights and decide what protection shall be given".¹⁴⁷ In The Universal Declaration of Human Rights individual rights are spelled out in a thorough manner. Varying from "the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person" (Article 3) to the right of "a social and international order" (Article 28), security is regarded as a right.

Rights and security can also be intertwined:

... when human rights and the environment are protected, people's lives and identities are likely to be secure; where they are not

¹⁴⁶ I am speaking of human rights as a wide-spread international issue. Prior the United Nations, protection has been limited to specific groups, such as diplomats and aliens, whose status concerned a foreign sovereign. Also, at times countries have agreed on treaty obligations regarding their own citizens, as from the 16th century onward freedom of worship for religious minorities. The League of Nations furthered a concern to the well-being and development of peoples in mandated territories (Article 22), and to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of dependent territories (Article 23). See Robert E. Riggs and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988), 240-41.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 241.

protected, people are not secure, regardless of the military capacity of the state under which they live.¹⁴⁸

There is little doubt that most human rights have to be assured for people to be secure. But security is about survival based on people's understanding of threat. If the survival of a given people is threatened one way or another, that is a security issue, not a right. Rights are about privileges, even when so fundamental for human existence that they ought to be taken for granted.

Therefore, while I agree that security cannot be about anything, security should be about any threat to people's survival. I have already pointed out that, especially in the cold war period, security became expert knowledge.¹⁴⁹ The issue of security must be brought closer to people. The identification of threat is the key for understanding security and people must always remain directly involved in that process.

Having stressed the importance of people, there is nevertheless a need to separate between people's security and what I call, "scientific security". While the former is based on threats identified by the people concerned, the latter indicates threats that cannot -- and are likely will not -- be observed by the lay person. A similar idea is expressed by Martin Shaw, who distinguishes between security issues focusing on threats perceived by social groups and those that are identified by the state.¹⁵⁰ The contemporary world is facing very real threats in the form of resource deficit, ecological and environmental distress, nuclear power and war -- threats that often can be identified

¹⁴⁸ Klare and Thomas, 4.

¹⁴⁹ Particularly pointed article on the issue is Carol Coen, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," *Signs* 12, no. 4 (1987): 687-718.

¹⁵⁰ Shaw, 99.

as crucial only by experts. These issues must be handled at least partly at the expert level, and with greater and greater global awareness and cooperation.

What is meant by security based on threats identified by people will become clearer as I next turn to the question of who counts as people. Despite the distinctions above, it has to be remembered that various insecurities and threats are interrelated. Threats add up to form insecurity phenomena on a global scale: conversely global threats are rooted in causes spread among many different locales.

Whose Security: When I talk about people's security, the key question at hand is, who counts as people? In order to make analytical sense, people can be grouped according to their "identity groups". Obviously, citizens of any given state also form an identity group. But the citizenship ideal, as discussed earlier, is at best based on a one-sided image of the people. Therefore, concern should be on groups beyond the ideal. An especially humane guideline is suggested by Simon Dalby: "it is necessary to look at the situation of the most vulnerable sectors of populations"¹⁵¹ in order to formulate a positive security picture. The view is that, if threats facing the most vulnerable of people are dealt with, it is reasonable to assume that others will be secure as well.

While the goal is all people's security, in principle this is best done by accommodating people's multiple identities. Focusing on these identity groups and their various understandings of threat, is a true way of understanding global insecurity. Identity-related approaches to social sciences have been particularly popular in the

¹⁵¹ Dalby, 116.

1990s. In order to clarify my limited use of identity here, it is necessary to distinguish between threats to identities themselves, and threats we face due to our identities. In the post-industrial era, it can be argued that identities themselves are threatened:

[t]he security threat... is the threat to [people's] very identity from the ways the in which abstract systems operate... [and] the challenge... is to construct and reconstruct their own identity, which is no longer given for them by traditional institutions and cultures... ¹⁵²

This is a very real threat, yet not the most important one as far as security of people is concerned. Revealing the nature of threat faced by people as members of different identity groups is the first step towards achieving global security for people.

Martin Shaw uses the term social groups to cover an enormous amount of ways in which individuals are involved in social relations, and goes on to argue that social relations is the missing dimension of the security debate.¹⁵³ This is true, although social groups not only should be added as dimensions of states, they must also acclimate to the complexity of relations that happen beyond state borders.

A helpful way of categorizing identity groups for security purposes can be found within Ole Waever's concepts of societal security. He made important additions to the traditional security thinking by emphasizing certain major ethnic groups, whose primary identity is different from their citizenship. A brief look at recent events points to Kurds, Palestinians, Serbs, Croats, Tutsies and Hutus as important global actors. However, it is worth noting that these groups have been acknowledged as serious actors only after their involvement in violent conflicts, in most cases wars. By following an

¹⁵² Shaw, 105.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 99.

ideology of "do-not-fix-before-it-is-broken", the global community has failed to recognize ethnic groups unless their given situation has escalated to a point of war. Because security has been about peaceful relations among nations/states, which in practice actually means non-war, insecurities of ethnic groups have been able to escalate into violent conflicts. Lack of recognition has meant ignoring fundamental instabilities that have led to wars -- some of which probably could have been resolved without violence, had they been acknowledged and accepted as profound security issues. Few would any longer disagree about the importance of these kinds of groups: by threatening international order, they have legitimized their relevance as global actors. As a result it can be concluded that we are indirectly rewarding war and disorder: often the only way to gain global acknowledgment as a people is by posing a violent threat.

However, as should be clear by now, I am not willing to consider only actors that themselves cause threats to international order. International order refers to the system of states whose own maintenance has, unfortunately, been the ultimate security goal. Since my concern is with people, it is their security, not international order, that is the supreme ambition. Therefore, I am extending my security analysis to include traditionally "insignificant" ethnic groups, who do not shake the system, nor threaten their state borders through violent actions. Similar to the previous category, these identity groups see themselves predominantly different (either beyond or beneath) from their citizenship. Some of them have sought to gain independence, while others do not intend to set up their own nation-states. Examples of the former include French-speaking Canadians, and of the latter numerous indigenous groups. The discipline of International Relations has traditionally acknowledged groups like

these mainly in the human rights context, but in order to include people as international actors, they have to be brought into the security debate as well.

The case for large ethnic groups and indigenous people is simple enough: they often inhabit specific geographical areas, and frequently have their own political institutions and organizations separate from the state structure. The question of what kinds of groups of people are taken into account, becomes more complicated if, for example, women are accepted as identity groups. Despite the fact that in most states, men and women enjoy the same citizenship rights, many feminists¹⁵⁴ have convincingly argued that the state itself is engaged in masculine practices, rooted in centuries of exclusion of women as citizens. Therefore, if the emphasis is on groups that are ignored in the prototypical citizenship ideal, women should be counted as a group. Also,

[i]f we believe that various insecurities are interrelated we must begin to take steps towards constructing a vision of security that can promote a viable ecosystem while at the same time working towards the elimination of both physical and structural violence.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Besides the above mentioned, see for example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Realism, Just War, and Feminism in a Nuclear Age," Political Theory 13, no. 1, (1985): 39-57; Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice," in Gendered States, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 141-54; Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives (London, UK: Pandora Press, 1988); Rebecca Grant, "The Quagmire of Gender in International relations: Women and the International Affairs," in Gendered States, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 83-98; Fred Halliday, "Hidden From International Relations: Women and the International Arena," Millennium 17, no. 3 (1988): 419-28; Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, "The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory," Alternatives 16 (1991): 67-106; J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," Millennium 17, no. 3 (1988): 429-440.

¹⁵⁵ Tickner (1995b), 194.

All forms of violence can be viewed as interrelated. Women as people can be counted as a global identity group, because women face similar insecurities everywhere in the world. Other analytically difficult groups would include for example, immigrants and refugees. Similar to women, they can be grouped on a global basis as identity groups who face specific threats based on who they are.

Yet, this is not a solely satisfactory argument. While I believe that these kinds of large inter-cultural identity groups can and should be taken into account, many feminists for example see inherent problems in this kind of thinking. This strand of argumentation is based on the rather obvious observations to the effect that women in Western societies face completely different life experiences than for example, women in developing countries.¹⁵⁶ While still standing behind my earlier connotations, there is a strong qualifying validity involved -- that of space and cultural experience.

As I proceeded to recognize identity groups, some qualifications had to be made. Since the framework is on the global realm, some identity groups were prioritized while others cannot be accommodated at all. Generally, I considered ethnic, cultural, religious, biological and historical identities more central than those based on class or economic standing.¹⁵⁷ These characteristics often -- yet by no means

¹⁵⁶ See for example, M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Genealogies, Legacies, Movements," in Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures, ed. M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), viii-xlii; Maivaan Clech Lam, "Feeling Foreign in Feminism," Signs 19 (1994): 865-893; Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Catographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism," in Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, ed. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 1-41.

¹⁵⁷ Despite many of the obvious analytic benefits of Marxism, it seems to have been proved that workers' class identity has been secondary compared to many, more ethnically based identities.

exclusively -- go hand in hand with geographical proximity. Therefore, space is relevant in security analysis: different geographical regions often face particular threats that are in turn of concern to people occupying that region. Yet, security borders should not be drawn according to nationality, rather they should accommodate threats. An appropriate term is then, "identity regionalism" or "regionalism based on identity".

To summarize, people's primary identities are accommodated by working in terms of identity groups; which in turn are utilized in identifying various security threats. Identity groups can be localized within a nation, spread over a region, or they can encompass people in different parts of the world. Global identity groups are, however, complex in that the people's identities are multiple; commonality in one issue does not take away diversity in another (women are women all over the world, but due to their life experiences in different parts of the world, their concerns and threats can be very different from one another). Therefore, it is most feasible to concentrate on regions -- which in turn can be divided differently depending on issues. The Arctic region, as will be shown, forms a natural example of a regional security model.

Who Provides Security. I have thus far established the importance of people in identifying threats to their security. Having moved away from a traditional national security approach, the question about the provider of security must be opened for scrutiny. As quoted earlier, Emma Rothschild's connotation about identities not being able to provide security holds truth. Neither are many of the identity groups recognized above expected to have the sole means to provide security from their perceived threats. As I have several times stated,

the state's position as the most important political community remains largely unchallenged. Hence, the state should still be held accountable for providing much of the security for people. Yet no state alone is able to handle many of the major scientific threats of the day, nor can the state alone identify people's multiple insecurities. The answer to the question about the provider of security is thus twofold.

Firstly, most people are citizens among their other identities. Identity groups fall both within, but also beyond state boundaries. The state has the responsibility -- granted to it since the beginnings of sovereignty -- to provide security for its citizens. As long as the state is the primary political community, it is the main provider of security. Also, due to the nature of the scientific threat, state institutions for providing the necessary expertise are still needed. On the other hand, the bulk of the process of identifying what is security for people should be transformed and extended to include broader forms of identity -- as in regionalism based on identity. I shall provide more specific suggestions as I turn to my case study of the Arctic region.

Secondly, as many of our identities spill over state boundaries, increased global cooperation is required. Many of these identities are being represented by informal as well as formal international organizations. But because organizations seldom have the apparatus to provide security, states should use them as tools for understanding the security needs of the people. Again, as I move from these theoretical premises to introducing my case study, more concrete examples will be given as to how these processes can function in practice.

An observant reader has probably noticed that what I have suggested here is analytically not so different from the principles of

national security. Yet, at the same time it is fundamentally distinct. "Structures for security provision should be built from bottom up, rather than from top down,"¹³⁸ in a way that are responsive to the identification of threat by citizens and others, inside and outside of territorial borders. It is only this way that a security approach can reflect the world as it is, rather than how it is imagined to be.

When a comprehensive redefinition of security is attempted, it becomes painfully clear that while it is simple to demand people's security, it is an immense task to provide a sound framework. There are no foolproof solutions. While it can be argued that realism's national security granted us a solid definition for several decades, I am much more content with a more fragmentary people's security. The focus is where it should be, the people.

¹³⁸ Tickner (1995a), 134.

4 THE ARCTIC AS AN INTERNATIONAL REGION

What does it mean, in practice, to move from the idea of security of the states to security of the people? Most importantly, it necessitates the identification of the people in question. Whose security do we want to redefine? I have called for accounts that would take people into consideration in actuality, rather than just in principle. This means in part that besides providing a general theoretical framework, as I have done in the previous chapters, one must take the initiative to examine specific groups of people. In this case they are the identity groups I attempted to establish in the previous chapter.

To this end, I have chosen the Arctic as a testing ground for redefining security. Apart from its inherent interest, the Arctic was selected because it comes as close as possible to what may be considered a "textbook" case. Firstly, I am interested in identities that go beyond state borders. In the Arctic exist two indigenous groups whose traditional homeland cover the territories of four different states. The same groups - the Inuit and the Sami - strongly identify themselves according to their ethnic identities. Secondly, the North's status as a military region is slowly changing due to the end of the cold war: redefinitions of security are timely and necessary. And thirdly, some efforts have already been made to bring the states and other actors -- namely indigenous organizations -- together to work on regional issues.

In this chapter, I shall introduce the Arctic as an international region. This includes answering questions such as: How has the discipline of International Relations usually defined a region? What types of regions are there? What role has the Arctic played as a

region, and for how long? What is my own definition of a region, and how does it relate to the issues of security? By answering these questions, I hope to portray both the traditional view of the region, and alternative approaches for the future.

Understanding Regionality in the Arctic

Typically regions have been secondary units and points of interest in International Relations. In everyday language, regions are understood to be identical to geographical continents or subcontinents: we speak of Europe and East- and Central-Europe, the Americas and North America, Asia and Southeast Asia as regions. Due to the centrality of war in International Relations theory, our ideas of regions have been reinforced by regional conflicts. This makes sense from the historical viewpoint, considering that wars most often have occurred between states with close proximity to one another. In anthropological terms, groups and nations identify in contrast to the "Other", often represented by a group that competes for the same resources, and thus with whom wars have been fought. This, however, is no longer solely the case in the era of global economy and communications -- not to speak of the improvements in war-technology. The theoretical focus has therefore shifted from military to economic regions. Much of the recent literature considers regionalism in international political economy's terms.¹⁵⁹ Regions, such as the European Union, form significant economic powers.

¹⁵⁹ See for example, Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, ed., Regionalism & World Order (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

Whatever the region, the traditional idea is that states form them. There is no agreed-upon definition, but most scholars refer to Robert Thompson's 21 different meanings of regions -- then narrowed down to three main properties: geographic proximity, significant interaction (whether cooperative or conflictual), and recognition of the area as distinctive by actors themselves and by outsiders.¹⁶⁰ Castberg, Stokke, and Østreng talk in this context about "the interactive and discursive *distinctiveness* of a defined geographic area."¹⁶¹ Regions are thus understood as "areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units..."¹⁶² Moving away from the idea of natural geographical regions, Joseph Nye stresses that regional geographical boundaries vary according to different purposes: "a relevant region for security may not be one for economic integration."¹⁶³

According to Waever and Joenniemi, political regions should be discussed at three levels: intra-state, inter-state and trans-state.¹⁶⁴ In the past decade and especially with the growth of the civil society approach to International Relations, states are no longer viewed as the

¹⁶⁰ William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem," International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1973): 89-117.

¹⁶¹ Rune Castberg, Olav Schram Stokke, and Willy Østreng, "The Dynamics of the Barents Region," in The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe, ed. Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, 1994), 71.

¹⁶² Louis J. Cantori and Steve L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973), 1.

¹⁶³ Joseph S. Nye, ed., International Regionalism. Readings (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1968), v.

¹⁶⁴ Ole Waever and Pertti Joenniemi, Regionalization Around the Baltic Rim: Notions on Baltic Sea Politics (Stockholm, Sweden: The Nordic Council, 1992).

sole constituents of regions. A useful distinction can be made between what is understood as *regionalism* and *regionalization*. According to Käkönen, in regionalism, the states are major actors that have formed regions in order to improve national interests -- as in the EU.¹⁶⁵ He goes on referring to regionalization as the process that happens at the grassroots or civil society level; the role of the state is minimal or none.¹⁶⁶ In either case, regionality¹⁶⁷ does not imply a condition of fixed criteria,¹⁶⁸ rather the focus is on the process, and regionality is thus based on more or less concrete goal-orientated behavior. Placing the locus on the process is, in my opinion the only meaningful way to approach regions.

The Arctic regionality has been approached both traditionally -- from the state perspective -- and "innovatively" -- from the region-centric perspective. There is evidence that for thousands of years people of the Circumpolar Region have cooperated in the fields of culture as well as in trade. It is only since the beginning of the 20th century that national borders have been closed in many parts of the Arctic.¹⁶⁹ The most drastic change occurred half a century later when after the World War II and the beginning of the cold war, the Arctic became "a high-tension zone in the power struggle between the

¹⁶⁵ Jyrki Käkönen, "North Calotte as a Political Actor," in Dreaming of the Barents Region, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996b), 58.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 58-60.

¹⁶⁷ Having defined regionalism and regionalization, I use regionality as a "neutral" term that can mean either one or both of the above.

¹⁶⁸ Käkönen (1996b), 72.

¹⁶⁹ Lassi Heininen, "Introduction," in The Changing Circumpolar North: Opportunities for Academic Development, ed. Lassi Heininen (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Rovaniemi, 1993), 8.

superpowers."¹⁷⁰ Ironically, recognition of the Arctic as a region a'la Thompson - fulfilling the needs for geographical proximity, interaction, and recognition as a distinct area -- started to form on the eve of the cold war. Arctic regionality was thereby based on military terms, due to its vital location as the closest bridge between the two major powers of the cold war. For the world at large therefore, the Arctic was a military region.

The Arctic consequently became a *strategically significant area*, one characterized by the likelihood to be involved in an armed conflict between the super powers. The possibility of the conflict in the North intensified in the late 1970s when both super powers became more active in the Northern Waters by increasing their numbers of ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). By the late 1980s the Soviet Union had over half of its total SLBMs in the Kola Peninsula.¹⁷¹

The significance of the Arctic for the competing super powers, however, went beyond its strategic location and the weapons build-up. The resource and security issues were connected to the Arctic in general, and in the Northern Waters in particular. Archer and Scrivener observed the overlap in three dimensions.¹⁷² Firstly, the waters were important for the transportation needs of the economic resources. Secondly, some of the resources of the region -- like oil

¹⁷⁰ Willy Østreng, "The Barents Region: A Contribution to European Security and Cooperation?" International Challenges 12, no. 4 (1992), 14.

¹⁷¹ For detailed information on the Soviet strategies in the Arctic, see Kirsten Amundsen, Soviet Strategic Interests in the North (London, UK: Pinter, 1990).

¹⁷² Clive Archer and David Scrivener, "Introduction," in Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues, ed. Clive Archer and David Scrivener (London, UK: Croon Helm, 1986), 6-7

and gas -- were of substantial strategic value. And thirdly, the connection influenced the positions of the political actors in regard to one another.¹⁷³

Whether the focus was on military security directly or indirectly -- as with resources -- the meanings of peace and security in the Arctic were conceived in their most bare terms.¹⁷⁴ But as will be shown later, the cold war has left its insecurity marks on the region permanently. Perhaps the only positive effect of this confrontation was that it helped the Arctic assume recognition as an international region. Unfortunately it is only now, after the cold war, as the most urgent possibility of a military conflict has been removed, that regional discussions of insecurities different from the obvious ones could have been opened.

Also it is worth remembering that while the processes of state-led regionalism in the Arctic were limited during the cold war, regionalization did start to take form. Most importantly, the indigenous peoples of the region connected via their ethnic ties through formal bodies of cooperation, by establishing the (Nordic) Sami Council in 1956¹⁷⁵, and the Inuit International Conference (ICC) in 1977. Both the ICC and the Sami Council function firstly as promoters of their respective indigenous interests and needs, but their program goals also include broader Arctic policies.

¹⁷³ Another good source for explaining the interplay between security and resources in the Arctic during the cold war is H.C. Bach and Jorgen Taagholt, Greenland and the Arctic Region (Copenhagen, Denmark: Information and Warfare Services of the Danish Defense, 1982).

¹⁷⁴ Sanjay Chaturvedi, "The Arctic Today: New Thinking, New Visions, Old Power Structures, in Dreaming the Barents Region, ed. Jyrki Kähkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996), 30.

¹⁷⁵ The original name was the Nordic Sami Council, but with the end of the cold war, the Russian Sami were finally able to join and the Nordic-part of the name was dropped.

Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, who in 1987 called for a distinction between military and non-military issues in the Arctic, launched a new era for Arctic regionalism. Gorbachev identified five non-military cooperative issue areas for the Arctic: natural resources, energy programs, environmental protection, scientific cooperation, and the opening of the Northern Sea Route.¹⁷⁶ In 1988, Franklyn Griffiths made the case for the Arctic as an international political region recognizing

[t]he Arctic as a distinct theater of operations in which politics occurs as regional states allocate benefits and deprivations among one another by means of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral action.¹⁷⁷

And indeed, in the following years concrete actions were taken to increase cooperation in the Arctic. In the early 1990s forums of collaboration were created in the fields of science¹⁷⁸, and environmental protection¹⁷⁹, as well as for more general¹⁸⁰ concerns. Agreements and activity have grown at both bilateral as well as at multilateral levels.

During these years it also became apparent who were the relevant actors in the Arctic region. In 1989, Gail Osherenko and Oran Young identified the Arctic players according to their central interests.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁶ Østreng, 14.

¹⁷⁷ Franklyn Griffiths, The Arctic as International Political Region (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 7.

¹⁷⁸ International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was established in 1990.

¹⁷⁹ The Rovaniemi Process launched in 1991 led to "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy."

¹⁸⁰ Northern Forum established in 1991 is the corporate body for the districts of the Arctic, encouraging trans-regional, pan-Arctic activities. See Østreng, 15.

¹⁸¹ Gail Osherenko and Oran Young, The Age of the Arctic (Cambridge,

As a result, they discuss interests related to security, industry, native issues and environment. Security actors include the relevant states and their respective military organizations - today, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Trade and commerce in the Arctic region has grown especially since the late 1980s, making private corporations as well as states act as industrial players interested in utilizing reserves of natural resources. Native players are the indigenous peoples of the region: the Arctic is a homeland of many native groups encompassing seven different states. Finally, the environmental actors come into play through national governments, environmental organizations and native populations. With a different orientation, all these issues can be grouped under a broad concept of security. Similarly, indigenous peoples and the states should be viewed as relevant players under each of these interest areas.

In politics defined in terms of power, the Arctic region is a periphery of several states, which decide on the region's behalf what policies are appropriate. The state centers are in the south, miles away from the actual region. Therefore, it is no wonder that the people of the Arctic have organized themselves as political actors. The ICC as well as the Sami Council have often joined together to strengthen their stand, not simply as the original inhabitants of the region, but also as current inhabitants effected by state politics. Since the 1990s, the Arctic Leaders Summit, which brings together the leaders of the Sami and the Inuit as well as the Northern Small Peoples Association of Russia, have met regularly. Apart from the indigenous issues the unofficial Northern Forum has provided a meeting place for

the people living in the Circumpolar North¹⁸² -- including in Japan and South Korea. All such efforts are the results of the process of internationalization of the regional actors.

Since the end of the cold war, there has finally been room to recognize the Arctic region that exists with or without the threat of war. Most literature directly linked with regionality has come from Nordic scholars¹⁸³ who have published broadly on both regionalization and regionalism in the North. In their case, the focus has been mainly on Europe's North. Especially popular have been the comparisons between regionalization in the so-called North Calotte cooperation and regionalism in, what is known as the Barents Region. Although the

¹⁸² In practice this means local authorities, business representatives, indigenous representatives, scholars etc. See Jyrki Kähkönen, "North Calotte as a Political Actor," in Dreaming of the Barents Region, ed. Jyrki Kähkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996a).

¹⁸³ See for example, Margareta Dahlström, Heikki Eskelinen, and Ulf Wiberg, ed., East Meets West in the North. The East-West Interface in the European North (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordisk Samhällsgeografisk Tidskrift, 1995); Jan Åke Dellenbrandt and Mats Olov Olsson, ed., Regionalization and Security in the European North (Umeå, Sweden: Center for Regional Science, 1994); Johan Eriksson, Security in the Barents Region: Interpretations and Implications of the Norwegian Barents Initiative (Umeå, Sweden: Center for Regional Science, 1995); Truls Hanevold, Jan Åke Dellenbrandt, and Mats-Olov Olsson, ed., Security Policy and Natural Resources in the Arctic Region (Umeå, Sweden: Center for Regional Science, 1994); Lassi Heininen, Olli-Pekka Jalonen, and Jyrki Kähkönen, ed., Expanding the Northern Dimension (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1995); Lassi Heininen and Tuomo Katermaa, ed., Regionalism in the North (Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Centre, 1992); Lassi Heininen and Jyrki Kähkönen, ed., Arctic Complexity: Essays on Arctic Interdependencies (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1991); Johan Holst, Franklyn Griffiths, and Tony Samstag, ed., Security and Defense Issues Relating to the Arctic Region (Stockholm, Sweden: The Nordic Council, 1993); Olli-Pekka Jalonen, "The Arctic as a Multi-Faceted Region," Centre Piece 20 (1991), 1-41; Jyrki Kähkönen, ed., Dreaming of the Barents Region. Interpreting Cooperation in the Euro-Arctic Rim (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996b); Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander, ed., The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe (Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, 1994); Ulf Wiberg, From Vision to Functional Relationship in the Barents Region. Umeå, Sweden: Center for Regional Science, 1995).

scope of this study goes beyond Europe to the Arctic as a whole, some observations are nevertheless worth recognizing.

North Calotte is a political term given by the Nordic Council¹⁸⁴ in 1957 when it recommended an increase in economic cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden in the northern areas. North Calotte includes the northern districts of Finland (Lapland), Sweden (Norrbotten), and Norway (Finnmark, Troms and Nordland). In 1977, the North Calotte Committee was established to coordinate multilateral cooperation in the region -- in the late 1980 the Kola Region of the Soviet Union was invited to participate. The name Barents Region refers to the 1991 Norwegian initiative for cooperation in the area of the North Calotte, the Kola Peninsula and the Archangel District, but excluding the Barents Sea. The Barents Region with appropriate Councils was established in 1993, by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden and the Commission of the European Union, to promote environment, economy, science, indigenous affairs, and regional issues.

Accordingly, Käkönen has observed two different approaches for regional cooperation coexisting in the European Circumpolar North: (1) the traditional Calotte cooperation based on local interests and activities, and (2) the broader Barents cooperation based on governmental initiative and coordination.¹⁸⁵ For Käkönen, the importance of the two regions is threefold.¹⁸⁶ Firstly, regionality in the north is parallel to general developmental trends and processes taking place all over Europe. Secondly, both of the Euro-Arctic regions also belong to

¹⁸⁴ Which is the name of the intergovernmental body coordinating the cooperation between the five Nordic countries on various issues.

¹⁸⁵ Käkönen (1996a), 11.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

the wider Arctic context, which in turn imply -- thirdly -- the possibility of connecting the Arctic as a whole into Europe.

It is necessary to keep in mind, as the above examples show, that no region exists in exclusion. Regions include or belong to other regions. The beauty of regions in contrast to the nation-states is that they are flexible and borders can be drawn differently for different purposes. The state borders are set, and therefore the state-centric approaches to International Relations are deterministic and inflexible. By imprisoning the "reality" within borders, the discipline has convinced us to concentrate on a relatively limited number of issues.

The Arctic Identity Regions

Despite the acknowledged flexibility of regions in comparison to the states, what is most clear from my review of the region-terminology above, is that it is confusing, incomplete and questionable. I have used the term *international political region*, because it is appropriate for International Relations. However, it implies a focus on regions characterized by political power. Whereas economic factors can broadly be seen as encompassed under this definition, it fails to acknowledge questions of identity or identification. A state would be a poor state if there was no common identity among its citizens. Similarly, a region must include some form of identification. Regionality must happen foremost at the societal level: "individuals and groups must have a significant sense of community and identity with others living in the region."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Castberg, Stokke, and Østreng, 72.

As became apparent in my earlier sections of redefining security, my project is about people's security. It was not in the scope of this study to conduct statistically accurate polling or interviews to be able to determine the actual security threats of a wide variety of people inhabiting the Arctic. Also, due to my construction of security based on identity groups, it is more meaningful to focus on people whose identities clearly cross borders in a given region. Therefore, the study is not about indigenous people *per se*. The study focuses on two groups, the Sami and the Inuit, because they live in the Arctic the way they do - as one people separated by state borders. The Arctic, borrowing Oran Young's words, functions therefore as a microcosm, "a region within which to develop and refine ideas about an array of political issues that are of broad, generic interest."¹⁸⁸

In my own observation of the Arctic region, I shall follow a kind of postmodern approach in which satisfying any pre-fixed criteria of regionality is not essential. In a sense I shall define the region according to the needs of my study on security. Therefore, I argue that the Arctic as a whole¹⁸⁹ is an identity region. At the same time, to understand this, one must pay attention to the different identities within it. Similarly, to recognize the real Arctic insecurities based on the parameters I established for redefining security in the earlier chapter, we must turn to the different identity groups for answers. In order to simplify, and make my focus more clear, I stress identification that occurs at four main levels:

¹⁸⁸ Oran Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North (Dartmouth, NH: University Press of New England, 1992). 7.

¹⁸⁹ The Arctic, as defined in the introductory chapter.

- 1) among those who belong to the same ethnic group (the examples are drawn from the Sami and the Inuit);
- 2) among all indigenous groups due to the similarity of their life situation;
- 3) among indigenous groups and other people (who may of course concurrently form other identity groups) living in the region due to the environment, nature, resources, and life styles which fundamentally affect their lives; and
- 4) among different states. Although I claim that the state-imposed identities are secondary, in some cases they do come in to play.

For understanding the real identities as well as insecurities in the Arctic, all four levels are important. My focus is on the interplay between the Sami and the Inuit groups and the state actors. I shall next familiarize the reader with the different identity groups listed above.

The Ethnic Identity Groups

(A) The Sami.

The Sami people are the indigenous people of Fenno-Scandinavia, Norden.

We are a small nation and a minority people. The relationship between the Norwegian state, the Swedish state, the Finnish state and the Russian state, on the one hand and the Sami people, on the other, is colonial in origin. People from outside began with trading, plundering and missionary expeditions and drew up borders without asking our people; the states installed themselves as private owners of all land and waters. Our people are a people of peace. We have never fought a war and as a result, have been brought to the brink of extinction. Some might protest and say that my picture of the past and present of the Sami people is not entirely true or right: however, this brings

us to the most important point when talking about knowledge and the picture of reality. Who owns truth? Whose picture of the world is the right one? My picture is certainly right to me.¹⁹⁰

The above quotation of Ole Henrik Magga very concisely expresses the situation in which the present-day Sami finds its collective self. The Sami form communities in Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia. The aboriginal inhabitants of northern Norden number about 60,000¹⁹¹ - approximately 30,000 within the Norwegian state borders, about 20,000 in Sweden, some 5,000 in Finland, and approximately 2,000 on the Kola Peninsula in Russia.¹⁹² The Sami remain a minority in most communities.

The Sami are best known for their reindeer herding culture, and while reindeer husbandry was not their original trade, nor is it a predominant one today, it is central for the maintenance of the Sami culture.¹⁹³ For the Sami, people are part of the ecosystem, the users of natural resources but also the guardians of its balance. Traditional Sami culture was based on subsistence economy -- dependent on fishing, hunting, and later on reindeer herding.¹⁹⁴ Today only about 10% are engaged in reindeer herding,¹⁹⁵ but a vast majority of those who have not

¹⁹⁰ Ole Henrik Magga, "Sami Past and Present and the Sami Picture of the World," in The Changing Circumpolar North: Opportunities for Academic Development, ed. Lassi Heininen (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Rovaniemi Arctic Centre, 1994), 13.

¹⁹¹ Numbers are approximate - there is a great discrepancy between different sources.

¹⁹² "Emergence of the Nordic Sami," Circumpolar Notes 2, no. 1 (1993): 5.

¹⁹³ Osherenko and Young, 86.

¹⁹⁴ Pekka Aikio, "Beyond the Last Line of Forest Trees," in Story Earth. Native Voices on the Environment, compiled by The Inter Press Service (San Francisco, CA: Mercury House, 1993), 194.

¹⁹⁵ According to Magga (1994), although some other sources use a higher percentage -- even up to 30% in Young and Osherenko.

migrated to the south are engaged in traditional economics of agriculture, forestry, and fishing.

The status of the Sami as the indigenous people of the Nordic countries is clear. They have populated the northern part of Fennoscandia since long before the contemporary state borders were drawn. Similar to other indigenous cultures, while there is a distinct Sami society, its formation has not resulted in establishing a sovereign state.¹⁹⁶ The Sami nation can be defined on the basis of "cultural, linguistic and occupational strength and... [it] has clearly defined geographical borders which do not need defending."¹⁹⁷

The Sami borders obviously have not coincided with geographical territories of the sovereign states; the traditional homeland has been under serious threats by outside settlements ever since the 17th century. Over the centuries, this has resulted in the loss of lands, as government policies of industrialization and assimilation have brought new threats to the Sami homelands. The Sami environment, livelihood and culture have been permanently challenged by growing transportation networks and industrial projects, varying from hydropower and mining to tourism.¹⁹⁸ Most importantly, the homeland has been split between four sovereign governments.

The Sami therefore view themselves as victims of colonialism -- sometimes called internal colonialism. It can hardly be denied that the original inhabitants of Sapmi (Samiland) have experienced "territorial, political and socio-economic encroachments by foreign powers and the incorporation of their lands into foreign political

¹⁹⁶ Ingvar Åhren, "Small Nations of the North in Constitutional and International Law," Nordic Journal of International Law 64 (1995), 457.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Osherenko and Young, 87.

entities."¹⁹⁹ Similar to the more traditional form of colonialism, this has resulted in economic dependence, cultural policies of assimilation, displacement and relocation.²⁰⁰

Since this study is concerned with the Sami as one identity group, I shall refrain from illustrating most of the singular events that have occurred in any individual state. Instead, the focus is on cross-border Sami unity, which was institutionalized in 1953 when the First Nordic Sami Conference took place. By then it was clear that both the Sami culture as well as the economy were in crisis. The national governments were called upon to respect the distinctive character of the Sami culture and livelihood. The development within individual states happened slowly and it was only in the 1973 when Finland, as the first of the Sami states, opened the Finnish Sami Parliament. Similar arrangements were later established also in Norway and Sweden. The Sami assemblies today have a recognized status within the individual states as the collective voice of the Sami minority. Similarly, the Sami culture and language have received an official status in key Sami areas.

The Nordic Sami Council -- a collective body of Sami from the different Sami states -- has operated since 1956. In 1992 the name was changed to the Sami Council when the Russian representatives were officially recognized and allowed to join their ethnicity. The basic goals of the Sami Council are to safeguard and promote the economic, social and educational interests of the Sami. An important aspect is the strengthening of their sense of unity and collective voice, which

¹⁹⁹ Ludger Muller-Wille, "An Introduction: the Sami and the International System," in Arctic Policy, ed. Marianne Stenbaek (Montreal, QB: McGill University, 1985), 258.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

in turn, allows more of their interests and policies to become publicized.²⁰¹

In recent years, the Sami Council's efforts have been concentrated on the creation of a special declaration of Sami rights, called "The Sami Convention".²⁰² The convention is working on the delicate issues of guaranteed land ownership and self-determination to secure rights for natural resources and cultural survival. The Sami demand to be involved in setting the rules, not just following them. The cooperative efforts, such as the Barents cooperation with its state-based emphasis do not therefore generate great enthusiasm among the Sami. Despite its acknowledged worthwhile goals of environmental security and regional stability, it is difficult to conceive it other than as another example of continued colonization.²⁰³

From what has been said above, it is evident that the Sami are one people. Therefore it is also assumed that the Sami currently living within four different states do form a nation, and an identity group.

(B) The Inuit

Our challenge is first and foremost to decolonize ourselves. Formally, our land is no longer a colony, so we are told. What the actual facts are, we know. We are facing a white man's governing establishment, which, in its engrained attitudes, is very colonialist indeed. But let that be. We can't change that. We can, however, change ourselves. We must decolonize our own

²⁰¹ Samiraddi. Programa Politico Same (Ohcejohka, Finland: Sami Council, 1991).

²⁰² Elina Helander, "The Status of the Sami People in the Inter-State Cooperation," in Dreaming of the Barents Region. Interpreting Cooperation in the Euro-Arctic Rim, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996), 298.

²⁰³ Ibid.

minds. We still have among us entirely too many people who bow to every word and wish that proceeds from the mouth of a white/southern establishment representative. We suffer from a colonized mind.²⁰⁴

Whereas the Sami are gathered in a relatively small geographical area, the Inuit are spread over a much larger part of the circumpolar region covering also four separate states. Nevertheless, as Finn Lynge's Greenlandic point of view above demonstrates, the issues and problems are very similar to those of their Nordic counterparts. Due to the long distances between different Inuit groups, it is difficult to view them as one nation. However, the last decades of cooperation have demonstrated that they indeed form a peoplehood, or for the purposes of this study, a distinct identity group.

The traditional Inuit homeland extends some five thousand miles across the circumpolar region, embracing political domains of four states: Canada, Denmark, Russia, and the United States. In Canada, out of some 55,000 Arctic Native,²⁰⁵ about 27,000 are Inuit. They inhabit the land in the Northwest territories, the Arctic Quebec, and Labrador. In Denmark, the Inuit populate the semi-independent island of Greenland.

In Greenland, approximately 45,000 Inuit form a vast majority of the population (over 80%). In Russia the number of Inuit is small, around 2,000. They inhabit the area of Chukotka in Northern Russia. The Inuit of the United States are concentrated in Alaska with some 35,000 members. The total number of Inuit is then over 100,000.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ Finn Lynge, "Cultural Genocide of Tomorrow - Or: A Future for us all," in Arctic Policy, ed. Marianna Stenbaek (Montreal, QB: McGill University, 1985), 59.

²⁰⁵ Living in the region north of 60 N.

²⁰⁶ The numbers vary greatly according to different sources. I have therefore used a "general average".

The Inuit are the best known of the various Arctic indigenous groups. Their distinctive life style has created stories and myths of exotic people living in igloos and making their livelihood in fishing and hunting in dramatic conditions. What is often forgotten is that Inuit are spread over the circumpolar region, where local circumstances have forced different ways of adopting to the realities of life.

However, there are great similarities in the life-styles of the four far-flung groups.²⁰⁷ The cultural homogeneity of the Inuit derives from their original homeland around the Bering Strait from where they have migrated during the past 2,000 - 3,000 years. Similarly, frequent travel and intercultural exchange has enforced the cultural similarity.²⁰⁸ Characteristic of the traditional Inuit culture and life is dependence on the sea. Or as Graburn and Strong put it, their "whole life rests on a land-sea dichotomy."²⁰⁹

This diversion is not only technologically and ecologically apparent, but it is fundamental to [Inuit] symbolism and world view; at a deeper level of analysis the same dualistic world view could be mapped onto aspects of life such as esthetics, mythology, spatial arrangements, household and household organization, the annual cycle, and religious beliefs and operations.²¹⁰

The unity of the Inuit people has been challenged by the modern state system. Similar to other indigenous homelands, sovereign states have claimed territorial rights that have encompassed and transformed

²⁰⁷ Nelson H.H. Graburn and B. Stephen Strong, Circumpolar Peoples: An Anthropological Perspective (Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing, 1973), 137.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 137-38.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 139. The authors also remind that not all the Inuit live by the sea - there are those living by the rivers in Alaska, and those predominantly engaged in caribou herding instead of fishing and hunting.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 140.

the borderless land. Whereas the Inuit have not attempted to redraw borders in order to establish nation-states, land rights and self-determination remain on top of their priority list. At the present, the different Inuit groups inhabiting the Arctic, have gained various types of settlements.

In Greenland, Inuit conditions are the most advanced. While Greenland remains part of Denmark, the island has enjoyed a large measure of self-government in the form of the Home Rule since 1979. The Home Rule naturally applies to everyone inhabiting Greenland, but since the population is predominantly Inuit, in practice it means that the native people are controlling the internal politics.²¹¹ In Canada and Alaska, various land claim settlements have been reached, while many others remain unsolved. A system resembling the Greenlandic Home Rule is being developed in Canada with the Nunavut Territory in Eastern Canada. At the current stage, it nevertheless seems inferior compared to the Home Rule in matters related to redistribution of political power and authority. In the case of Russia, the indigenous recognition, not to speak of settlements for land rights, are at their earliest stages.

But as Caleb Pungowiyi, then president of the ICC said, "[i]n each of the successful examples, there are also instances of deception... many Inuit are still subjected to subtle... discrimination, and lack of opportunities."²¹² The Inuit face problems similar to other indigenous groups whether they are in the "safe haven" of the Home Rule in

²¹¹ Matters of foreign policy and finances are still in the hands of the Danish government.

²¹² Caleb Pungowiyi, "Inuit Politics in Arctic Cooperation," in *Arctic Leader's Summit II*, ed. Mads Faegteborg and Anna Prakhova (Copenhagen, Denmark: Arctic Information, 1995), 73.

Greenland²¹³, or in the beginning of the road in Russia. Similarly, the effects of colonialism are felt everywhere in the Arctic.

It is true that each Inuit community and each Inuit group living in any of the four states, is a story unto its own. But since my purpose is to concentrate on the *common*, I shall keep my focus on the collaborative issues, the most impressive of which is the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC). The foundations of ICC were laid in 1977, when the Inuit representatives from Alaska, Canada and Greenland gathered together in Barrow, Alaska to discuss common interests and concerns. The groundwork for the future activities was laid in the form of Resolution 77-01, which called for a Charter for the ICC.²¹⁴ The most burning issues were the protection and safeguarding of the Inuit homeland -- its resources as well as all aspects of the Inuit culture. Other relevant points centered on developmental issues varying from increased Inuit participation in decision-making to land and infrastructure development. Despite many improvements, the basic concerns remain the same now, some 20 years later.

Over the years, however, the ICC has gained international recognition and become increasingly powerful. The ICC holds Non-Governmental Organization consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council since 1983. Also as an active participant of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP), ICC

²¹³ Despite their majority status and the privileges brought by the Home Rule, the Greenlandic Inuit stress the importance of their status as indigenous people. A long history as part of Denmark, especially the years of direct colonialism from 1721 to 1953 has left its marks on the nation.

²¹⁴ See Hans-Pavia Rosing, "Towards Arctic Policy," in Arctic Policy, ed. Marianne Stenbaek (Quebec: Centre for Northern Studies and Research, McGill University, 1985), 14.

has assisted with the drafting of a Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Today ICC states its principal goals as:

- strengthening unity among Inuit of the circumpolar region;
- promoting Inuit rights and interests on an international level;
- developing and encouraging long-term policies which safeguard the Arctic environment; and
- seeking full and active partnership in the political, economic, and social development of circumpolar regions.²¹⁵

Since the end of the cold war, the Inuit from Chukotka, Russia have been able to become full members of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference.

In many ways the Inuit people are now one. It is clear that the need to identify oneself as Inuit instead of a citizen of a given state is taking priority among many. Since the end of the 1970s and the establishment of the ICC, there has been increased awareness of assimilation experiences gone wrong. Therefore, answers are now being sought from inside the identity group, both locally and internationally.

The Arctic Indigenous Peoples as an Identity Group

Although my concentration is on the Sami and the Inuit, due to their unique situation as identity groups cutting across cross-state borders, we have to bear in mind that there are other indigenous groups inhabiting the Arctic region. It is reasonable to assume that all indigenous people of the region face similar life situations. Similarly, there are enough cooperative activities to indicate that they all identify jointly as Arctic indigenous peoples.

²¹⁵ Source: Inuit Circumpolar Conference, program statement.

Almost all the countries of the circumpolar region - with the exception of Iceland - have indigenous populations. In Alaska, apart from the groups that belong to the Inuit,²¹⁶ there are also Athabascan Indians and Pacific Indians. In Canada, apart from the Inuit, the indigenous peoples include the Indians in the Yukon; Indians, Metis, Inuvialuit in the Northwest Territories; Cree Indians in Quebec; and Indians on the Labrador Coast.²¹⁷ In Russia there are the Tsarms, Nenets, Kahnty, Mansi, Enets, Nganasans, Selkups, Kets, Evenks, Evens, Dolgans, Yukaggirs, Chukchi, Koryaaks, Eskimos, Aleuts, Itelmens, Tofalars, Ulchi, Nanaians, Nivkhs, Udege, Negidals, Orochs, Orochs, Chuvans and Sami.²¹⁸ They number about 170,000, and their collective interests are increasingly safeguarded by the Northern Small People's Association of Russia. Indigenous peoples are the original inhabitants of a country. They are people who have been colonized. International organizations recognize indigenous peoples as victims of colonialism whose basic human rights have been and continue to be violated.²¹⁹

The history is, in principle, the same everywhere in the Arctic: people from outside began their invasion with trading, plundering, and missionary expeditions, and they created borders without asking our peoples. As a consequence today, Arctic indigenous peoples have little control over their land and the exploitation of resources. Clearly, establishment of modern sovereign states in this northern region has not ensured that indigenous peoples can preserve their cultures and ways of life, nor has it preserved the Arctic environment. We assert, therefore, that this political

²¹⁶ The Inupiat, Yupiit, Aleut and Alutiiq-Aleut.

²¹⁷ The source for the list of the Arctic indigenous peoples: Ole Henrik Magga, "Indigenous Peoples of the North," in Arctic Wilderness, ed. Vance G. Martin and Nicholas Tyler (Golden, CO: North American Press, 1993), 28.

²¹⁸ A. Pika and B. Prokhorov, "Soviet Union: the Big Problems of Small Ethnic Groups," IWGIA Newsletter 57 (1989): 123.

²¹⁹ See for example, IWGIA Working Programme (Copenhagen, DK: IWGIA, 1996), 1.

exercise has been a failure.²²⁰

As these issues have become more and more politicized in recent decades, fundamental challenges are also confronting state structures, starting with the principle of sovereignty. The eternal debate over the "right of self-determination of all peoples" vs. the persistence of "state sovereignty", comes to play in a very real way with indigenous issues.²²¹ Challenging the legitimacy of state sovereignty over a monopoly of self-determination and territorial ownership, indigenous peoples see themselves as the owners of the region which they occupy.

Despite this inherent conflict, the Arctic peoples have remained loyal to their states. Their ambitions are concentrated on establishing ways to preserve their cultures, which are fundamentally connected to the land.²²² In 1989, Gail Osherenko and Oran Young observed that the three issues dominating the indigenous agenda in the north were self-government, protection of the land, and cultural survival.²²³ It seems to me that the same agenda is still very much the case now, almost a decade later. These issues easily tie together the Arctic indigenous peoples as one identity group.²²⁴

I have concentrated on those aspects of indigenous identification that enforce the assumption of common heritage, first among and between the Sami and the Inuit groups, and second among all indigenous peoples of the North. While this has been meaningful for the purpose of this

²²⁰ Magga (1993), 29.

²²¹ For an interesting study with focus on international law on this relevant issue, see Hannum.

²²² Magga (1993), 29.

²²³ Osherenko and Young, 73.

²²⁴ Cooperative efforts include Arctic Peoples' Conference (since 1973), participation in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (established in 1975), Arctic Leaders's Summit (since 1991).

work, it is necessary to touch on the issue of assimilation. A critique, pointedly expressed by Ari Lehtinen regarding the Sami, claims that such identities live and prosper mainly as a defense mechanism against the dominant cultures -- thus as a counter-cultural ideology.²²⁵ His point of view asserts that the elite forms myths of a common culture, which in actuality is far from reality. The reality, in his opinion, speaks of people who are modernizing and removing themselves further and further away from their origins.

This may be the case, but we should be careful not to categorize any peoples according to ethnocentric images. Western views do not match the reality, but why should they? It is true that the Sami are not predominantly engaged in reindeer herding, wearing their traditional costumes and living in tents; neither are the Inuit living in igloos and fishing by traditional methods. This does not mean that theirs is a lost cause. Modernization, technological innovation, and mass culture challenge any people's heritage. We do not question the identity of a Finn who prefers foreign movies and music to sauna and Finnish folksongs -- why should we set different standards for the Sami, and the other indigenous groups? There is no criterion that claims that only a group of perfect prototypes qualify as a people. Furthermore, the notion that nationalism is an elite-driven process has been accepted, but this does not make it any less real.

Similarly, certain simplifications, while unfortunate, are necessary. My interviews with some of the Sami as well as Inuit representatives clearly indicated that there are great discrepancies about the course of action different individuals or segments of any

²²⁵ Ari Lehtinen, "Kalottipolitiikka ja saamelainen regionalismi," *Terra* 99, no. 1 (1987): 14.

identity groups agree on. It is difficult for academics, working "in theory", to remember this. Similar to the old saying "the state is a state is a state", it is even easier to think that "Inuit is an Inuit is an Inuit." Unfortunately in a study that does not concentrate on the internal politics of these interesting identity groups, this element has to be somewhat discounted. Generalizations and middle-of-the-road assumptions are necessary.

The Arctic as a Living Region

Despite the fact that the interests and needs of the indigenous populations of the North often cause tension for the others inhabiting the region, I believe that there nevertheless are reasons to call for a common Arctic identity. As already explained above, no identity is "cohesive." The discipline of International Relations has melded citizens and mechanisms of any given state into one structure - and despite my criticism, this has been a fairly successful way of looking at issues.

I am putting forward the people of the Arctic - all living in the region - as one identity group. Baernholdt speaks of "construction of regions" through the institutionalization process.²²⁶ He asks important questions to the effect of: what are the similarities and differences regarding specific issues in different parts of the region? Is the

²²⁶ Jorgen Ule Baernholdt, "The Barents Sea Fisheries - New Divisions of Labor, Regionalization and Regionalist Policies," in Dreaming the Barents Region, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996), 212.

region recognized as such? Do the people identify within the region? Is there regional identity?²²⁷

The Arctic, when considered as a whole, is a region of vast differences and similarities. Apart from the Russian Arctic, I believe that the similarities outweigh the differences. The general situation and the lack of development in Russia as a whole begs attention to the differences. Nevertheless, in politically important terms, we can concentrate on issues such as the peripheral nature of the Arctic, resource questions, environmental problems, and traditional security concerns. As far as the indigenous populations are concerned, the similarities between the Inuit and the Sami needs are already expressed above.

It is also already clear that the native peoples of the Arctic very much identify with the region. They have a spiritual as well as economic connection to the land, and it is fair to say that their whole survival as peoples depend on that land. As far as the "main populations" are concerned, it is more difficult to estimate how much people identify with the region. We seldom ask these questions about groups other than ethnic minorities. I shall nevertheless proceed on the assumption that geographical regions do indeed also form identity regions, at least secondary ones. There already were discussed some of the intra-Arctic efforts that bring people from different areas of expertise together. These efforts speak of regionalization, which stems from common experiences and identification among people. In a region formed by regionalization

... individuals and groups view problems and opportunities in the area through a regional prism, implying that the regional level is seen as relevant, if not always sufficient, when responding to challenges. In this sense, regionality is a matter

²²⁷ Ibid., 213.

matter of framing problems and solutions.²²⁸

The States as Identity Groups

I do not have to discuss in much further detail the state's role in creating identity groups. The critique against the monopoly of our state-given identities in International Relations discussed in the earlier chapters demonstrates how predominant these identities are. This is a given, and in some situations people are likely to be most loyal to their state-given identities.

I do not expect that the state-given identities will be conflicting with the others in what shall be presented. The state is not threatened nor are people expected to choose where their loyalties lie. The conflict is more likely to occur with the involved state structures.

This chapter has established the Arctic region. I have built my construction of the region on identities, or identity groups. As I shall proceed to formulate a redefined Arctic security region, my main focus will be on contrasting national security with civil security. I shall concentrate on the Sami and Inuit and their security needs. At the same time, however, I shall attempt to construct consequent circles that can encompass firstly all the indigenous groups, and secondly all the people of the region. The underlying idea regarding the respective states is that, as long as the region is secure, the states will be

²²⁸ Castberg, Stokke, and Østreng, 71.

safe. In the following chapter, more specific consideration will be given to the problem of how to make this happen in practice.

5 INSECURITY IN THE ARCTIC REGION

The conversion of Arctic security from a traditional type to one that would reflect the Arctic as a region of identities requires some fundamental changes in thinking. There are two main issues at stake when rethinking Arctic security. Both of them require challenging "national security" as the only kind of security relevant for International Relations. The first is to replace the idea of national security with civil security. "The concept of security, for civil society, is not based on military or strategic considerations, but has a much wider meaning. This is why it is so difficult for the nation-state and civil society to face each other in an open dialogue."²²⁹ The second one is to establish an Arctic security agenda for the Circumpolar Region as a whole, instead of national security agendas for each of the eight states concerned. The first challenge will be taken up in this chapter, the second in the next.

In civil society there is a multitude of social movements working towards diverse goals also as one coherent force, and at the same time -- at least to an extent -- challenging the state apparatus as a sole form of social organization.²³⁰ In the Arctic context, indigenous communities form a part of civil society and a particularly appealing one, in that they can be viewed as one transnational actor. Within the one actor called the Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples, the Inuit and the Sami also form transnational identity groups among themselves.

The potential security-related conflicts of interest between the

²²⁹ Jyrki Käkönen, "Nation States and Civil Societies: Conflicts of Interest in the Arctic International Relations," in Vulnerable Arctic: Need for an Alternative Orientation, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1992), 79.

²³⁰ Ibid., 77

nation-state and civil society in the Arctic region are primarily related to military and economic issues. The security needs of Arctic indigenous peoples are mainly cultural, economic and environmental. In some cases, the indigenous peoples' security interests are likely to match those of the other people in the region, while in other instances there is a potential for tensions. Tensions are likely to occur when the indigenous peoples claim certain special rights due to their historical status in the region.

The first section of this chapter will give a brief overview of the nature of traditional military security in the Arctic region. Whereas the massive military build-up is considered a cold war phenomenon, its implications for the present are overbearing. Instead of military security, we can speak of insecurity caused by military security in the Arctic today. In order to rethink security, we must understand insecurity. Therefore, the bulk of the chapter will concentrate on mapping the in/securities identified by the indigenous peoples. The conclusive section will address some of the tension areas between the different identity groups in the Arctic region.

Military Security of the Arctic States

Whether one does or does not agree on the reality of the military threat posed by the cold war is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I have also said enough about the one-sided disciplinary practices and the need for a broader understanding of security. What remains here is that for the Arctic states, the cold war was a real military security threat and this has had serious implications for the region during the confrontation as well as today.

It is important to remember that militarization of the Arctic does not have anything to do with the internal politics or territorial disputes of the region itself. Due to geostrategic reasons, the region was caught in the middle of super-power security concerns. The Arctic first emerged as a significant military region during the Second World War when the advantages of air power were first appreciated in a war situation.²³¹ During the cold war the Arctic became an area of strategic significance. This means that it was likely to be involved in a major way in an armed conflict between the great powers.²³² As discussed earlier, the strategic significance of the Arctic, however, soon focused, especially on the Northern Waters²³³ that join areas between North America and Western Europe, which provide access to the Atlantic Ocean and to the Mediterranean Sea.²³⁴ Therefore, the Arctic has had important military security implications for all eight states of the region.

According to Steven Miller the Arctic became a significant maritime theatre due to at least five reasons:²³⁵ (1) the proximity of Arctic waters to the Soviet Union; (2) the nature of the Arctic Ocean as a "closed sea"; (3) the size and remoteness of the Arctic which

²³¹ Steven E. Miller, "The Arctic as a Maritime Theatre," in Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Toronto, ON: Science for Peace, 1992), 211.

²³² Olli-Pekka Jalonen, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," in The Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 157.

²³³ By Northern Waters it is generally meant the maritime areas within the latitudes 80 N and 60 N and from longitude 90 W to 40 E, including the islands of Arctic Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, Shetlands, Jan Mayen and Svalbard; and reach as far as the Kola Peninsula in the Soviet Union. See Archer and Scrivener (1986), 1.

²³⁴ Archer and Scrivener, 1.

²³⁵ Miller, 212-219.

allowed a hide-and-seek competition between the two super powers; (4) the ice coverage of the Arctic basin which further enforces the secrecy in the area; and (5) the division of the region into more and less strategically important sections due to the previous four reasons. In terms of geographic subdivision, the European part of the Arctic was the most military-intensive in the region.²³⁶

Indeed, there is no question that the region was of central military importance for the two super-powers during their years of rivalry. Apart from the Kola Peninsula, where the Soviet Union stationed its naval forces, the Arctic military installations have been primarily defensive. Developments in war technology reflect changes in the ways the Arctic was utilized over the decades: in the 1950s, strategic bombers and air defense systems were of central importance; in the 1960s and 1970s, SSBNs replaced strategic bombers with their ability to allow patrolling under ice; but since the 1980s the strategic bombers have been back, improved by the cruise missiles carriers (CMC).²³⁷ The strategic systems in the Arctic context thus mean SSBNs and strategic bombers. Development of the long-range ballistic missiles that could be launched across the ocean signified the Arctic's role as a region for early-warning and anti-ballistic missiles.

For the Soviet Union, which had relatively small coastal areas, the Arctic provided the central base for naval power.²³⁸ A large portion of Soviet naval power was concentrated around the Kola Peninsula where several bases were set up. Therefore, the Arctic was an area of key

²³⁶ Ibid., 220.

²³⁷ Jalonon (1988), 166.

²³⁸ For more detailed treatment of the Russian naval strategy, see Olli-Pekka Jalonon, "Russian Naval Strategy: the Feasibility of Non-Offensive Alternatives," in *Vulnerable Arctic*, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1992), 6-33.

military security for the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union started its own SLBM program in the 1960s, its submarines' accessibility to the Atlantic was best and almost solely guaranteed by its bases in the Kola Peninsula.²³⁹ Since the 1970s, the deployment of long-range SLBMs further increased the importance of the polar region to the Soviet nuclear strike capability.²⁴⁰

For the United States and its northern NATO allies, the Arctic became the location for the early-warning air-defense systems. During the first two decades of the cold war, the United States relied heavily on strategic bombers as its dominant strategic force, but since the 1960s, the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs decreased their significance.²⁴¹ The implications of the ICBMs meant that trajectories directed at a large number of targets would cross the Arctic, making early warning necessary.²⁴² Similarly, as the accuracy of the SLBMs grew, the United States was able to distance itself further and further away from its targets, thus hindering the Soviet defense capabilities. While the United States has not had permanent conventional naval units in the Arctic,²⁴³ the Air Force has air bases in several Arctic locations - four in Alaska, two in Greenland, and one in Iceland.

²³⁹ Jalonon (1988), 159.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 165.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 158.

²⁴² John Kristen Skogan, "Militarization and Confidence-Building Measures in the Arctic," in Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Toronto, ON: Science for Peace, 1992), 253.

²⁴³ The presence of U.S. naval forces has mainly been limited to NATO exercises.

As far as the smaller Arctic states are concerned, the super power presence in the region caused threats to their military security. The "smaller six" can be grouped in twos according to their position regarding military security. Greenland and Iceland are the two main islands in the Atlantic Ocean. Denmark is an Arctic state due to its possession of Greenland. As a NATO member Denmark has relied heavily on the defense provided by the military organization, with little emphasis on its own military build up. In the Arctic context, Greenland has been a NATO territory with obvious strategic significance for the United States.²⁴⁴ Similarly, Iceland, with no military forces of its own, has been required to accept military bases on its territory because of its connection to NATO. The geostrategic position of both islands has provided the United States with perfect spots for its air bases.²⁴⁵

Lassi Heininen has called Norway and Canada the "two countries which most evidently meet the criteria of Arctic states."²⁴⁶ Both are NATO members and both have brought the issue of sovereignty into the Arctic debate; their concerns involve the Arctic Archipelago and the sea routes. Norway has had serious concerns for its security due to the sea route provided by the Norwegian Sea for both sides of the cold war. With a long coast and open access to the Northern Waters, Norway's national security would have been seriously affected by an

²⁴⁴ On Denmark and Greenland's military security during the cold war, see Nikolaj Petersen, "Denmark, Greenland, and Arctic Security," in The Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 39-73.

²⁴⁵ On Iceland, see Gunnar Gunnarsson, "Icelandic Security and the Arctic," in The Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 75-85.

²⁴⁶ Lassi Heininen, "National Approaches to the Arctic," in Vulnerable Arctic: Need for an Alternative Orientation, ed. Jyrki Kähkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1992), 36.

actual super power confrontation.²⁴⁷ Canada's situation has been somewhat different due to its distance from the Soviet Union. Close relationship with the United States - within and beyond NATO - has affected Canada's defense policy in that controlled United States access to Canadian territory has been allowed.²⁴⁸

Norway "caps" both northern Finland and northern Sweden, thus making them non-basin countries with no direct sea links to the Arctic Ocean. Because of their geographical locations, these Nordic neutrals have not been active contributors to the security-political equation of the Arctic. The fact that both are neutral states has also left them outside of any direct obligations from either one of the two super powers. Nevertheless, close proximity to a region which played such a central part in both the Soviet and United States' global military strategies, has influenced the way the defense structures have been built in these countries.²⁴⁹

The situation described above was that of the cold war, which supposedly ended nearly a decade ago. But what Peter Dobell reminded us of in 1991 still holds true: "Despite the breaking down of alliance distinctions in Europe, the Arctic remains a region occupied by

²⁴⁷ On Norway and the Norwegian Sea, see Ola Tunander, "Four Scenarios for the Norwegian Sea," in The Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 131-155.

²⁴⁸ On Canada, see David Cox, "Canada's Changing Defense Priorities: Comparing Notes with the Nordic States," in Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 15-39.

²⁴⁹ On Finland, see Kalevi Ruhala, "Finland's Security Policy: the Arctic Dimension," in The Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 117-129; and on Sweden, Bo Huld, "Swedish Security in the 1980s and 1990s - Between the Arctic and Europe," in The Arctic Challenge, ed. Kari Möttölä (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 317-331.

countries which belong to very different military blocs."²⁵⁰ Certainly, the end of the cold war has promoted a series of negotiated East-West arms control agreements, as well as unilateral reductions, which indicate a major shrinking of United States and Russian nuclear weaponry.²⁵¹ But despite many achievements, the Arctic region in many ways remains a militarized zone. And while recent trends indicate decreases in quantity, improvements in quality of weaponry may tell a different story.

The fact is that Russia continues to maintain large nuclear, naval and land forces in the North due to historical and geographical realities. Indeed, the Russian military presence towers above all others in the region.

The greatest part of this military power, and notably the Northern Fleet, is deployed on the Kola Peninsula, which serves as the principal location of a large portion of the former Soviet ballistic missile submarine force - Russia's chief retaliatory deterrent. Currently the Northern Fleet accounts for more than half of the former Soviet Navy's fleet of ballistic missile submarines, and more than 70 percent of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles."²⁵²

During the cold war, the Kola Peninsula became one of the most heavily militarized regions in the Soviet Union. It provided the most powerful naval base for the Soviets including the bulk of its strategic nuclear submarines. This is a case in point: the Kola Peninsula remains a highly militarized area nearly a decade after the official ending of the cold war, and in many ways its strategic significance has

²⁵⁰ Peter Dobell, The Changing Soviet Union (Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Company, 1991), 133.

²⁵¹ E.g. the conclusion of the START agreement in 1991; the Bush-Gorbachev reciprocal unilateral initiatives on tactical and strategic systems in 1991; and further reductions on strategic forces agreed on during the Bush-Yeltsin summit, 1992.

²⁵² Peter Gizewski, Arctic security After the Thaw: a Post-Cold War Reassessment (Ottawa, ON: Canadian center for Global Security, 1993), 4.

not lessened, but increased. There are obvious reasons for this: 1) with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the Baltic states and the important naval bases there; 2) as a result of the START agreement in 1991 - which decreased strategic nuclear arsenals in vulnerable land-based delivery systems -- the importance of the strategic nuclear arsenals in submarines has increased; 3) since such a naval strength is concentrated on the region, it only makes sense to continue having sufficient air and ground forces to support them.²⁵³

As a result, the United States' naval activity continues in the Arctic, if for no other reason, to keep a watch on Russian military activities.²⁵⁴ The fact that the United States Navy's focus has shifted from a global conflict to regional tensions does not account for much in practice: nuclear powered submarines continue to patrol under the Arctic ice.²⁵⁵ Steven Miller describes a struggle between the forces of continuity and the forces of change.²⁵⁶ The former implies the tradition of geostrategic elements, nuclear weapons and navy activities in the region. The latter, on the other hand, emphasizes the beginning of peace after the cold war, the need for a new military strategy for Russia, and the new threats that may come in the form of civil or ethnic wars in the former Soviet empire or environmental degradation.

²⁵³ Robert G. Darst, "Contemporary Challenges to International Security in the Barents Sea Region," in Dreaming of the Barents Region, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996), 94-95.

²⁵⁴ Gizewski (1993), 5.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Steven Miller, "Geopolitical Position of the Arctic and Changes in the Arms Control and Superpower Relations," Presentation in the Calotte Academy May 22, 1992, Inari, Finland, as discussed in Lassi Heininen, "Common, Competing and Conflicting Interests in the Barents Region Cooperation," in Dreaming of the Barents Region, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996),

Insecurity Caused by Military Security In the Arctic

My research on the Arctic indigenous peoples clearly suggests that the cold war was not perceived as a primary threat to their existence. This is not to say that people were not at least somewhat insecure because of the potential war. Essentially, the cold war was fought in theory and at the state level. However, military build-up has influenced people's lives in the Arctic region - to the point that we can call this phenomenon *insecurity caused by military security*.

By military insecurity I hence mean the direct or indirect threats that the above-discussed military security of the states has caused for the people of the region. This also translates to the problem of matching the idea of traditional national security with much needed comprehensive civil security.

Once subjected to the hegemonic conflict between the two superpowers, hooked on to the cold war geopolitical discourse and entangled in its containment militarism the Arctic was to experience an unprecedented militarization and nuclearization. Its physical as well as human geography came to be dominated by a militarized geography, characterized by confrontation, arms race, divided security, and conflict lines.²⁵⁷

Sanjay Chaturvedi goes on to describe the thought and behavior patterns constructed by the cold war. The cold war created a setting of such threat that basically anything and everything in the name of "security" and national interest was considered legitimate.²⁵⁸ Much damage occurred on the environmental front. Both Robert Darst and Peter

147.

²⁵⁷ Chaturvedi, 27-28.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 30.

Gizewski²⁵⁹ identify three major military threats to the Arctic environment, and thereby on the Arctic peoples: nuclear testing, accidents at sea, and radioactive waste disposal. A fourth one could be added: disturbances to the environment, and more directly to the people, caused by placing air bases in the Arctic lands.

(1) **Nuclear testing.** From the beginning of the cold war, testing was a significant part of the nuclear programs of both the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁶⁰ Both states conducted numerous tests in the Arctic region. The United States' Arctic testing ground was Amchitka Island of the Alaska Peninsula, while the Soviet Union tested extensively on Novaya Zemlya, the archipelago that separates the Barents and Kara Seas. There is very little information available on the Alaska testing, but it is known that Novaya Zemlya was the site of over one hundred nuclear tests.²⁶¹ The Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 limited atmospheric testing, after which testing occurred underground. Both the official United States as well as the Soviet (now Russian) position has been that underground testing "has had no appreciable effect upon the regional environment."²⁶² However, at least between the late 1950s and early 1960s high-level radioactive contamination was evident not only in Russia, but also in Alaska and northern parts of Canada.²⁶³ The negative implications of underground nuclear tests remain a serious concern, yet the results of studies have been ambiguous.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 30.

²⁵⁹ Darst, 89-121 and Gizewski (1993/94), 16.

²⁶⁰ Gizewski (1993/94), 16.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 17.

²⁶² Darst, 107.

²⁶³ Gizewski (1993/94), 17.

Both the United States and Russia continue to stress the importance of testing for national security.

The environmental and health effects on people occupying near-by areas also remain unclear. Amchitka Island is no longer an active test site, but The American Public Health Association Task Force on National Arctic Health Science Policy (appointed in 1983) has "concluded that there was an urgent need for continuous monitoring of radionuclides in human, soil, and natural resources in Alaska", and that Inuit and Indian peoples are living in areas "with known exposure to high levels of fallout radionuclides."²⁶⁴ Yet, as Mary Simon concludes, the essential further studies on health issues never were done.

(2) Accidents. Another environmental danger that continues to threaten the Arctic region is the problem of accidents on board nuclear-powered vessels, especially nuclear submarines. Accidents may happen "as a result of mechanical malfunctions while the vessel is at sea," or "while submarines and other nuclear-powered vessels are in port," or "as a result of collisions at sea."²⁶⁵ According to Gizewski, between 1945 and 1988, there has been over 20 naval accidents involving nuclear submarines or warships.²⁶⁶ As long as Russian submarines continue the surveillance of the northern waters, and their American counterparts continue to monitor their movements, collisions are a possibility.²⁶⁷ While these kinds of accidents may happen to any naval power involved in nuclear activity, there is no doubt that Russia, in

²⁶⁴ Mary Simon, "Militarization and the Aboriginal Peoples," in Arctic Alternatives, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Toronto, ON: Science for Peace, 1992), 55-56.

²⁶⁵ Darst, 108-019.

²⁶⁶ Gizewski (1993/94), 17.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 18.

its current state of confusion and technical deterioration, is particularly vulnerable to such disasters.²⁶⁸

Again, the question about how harmful such accident-caused leaks are for the environment remains controversial. For example, the ecological damage caused by the 1989 sinking of the *Komsomolets*, a Soviet SSN carrying nuclear-armed torpedoes, was downplayed by the scientists. However, while the investigations did not immediately show high levels of radiation, more intense leakage may occur little by little.²⁶⁹ The long-term effects of such leaks on the Arctic ecology and food chain remain unknown.

(3) **Radioactive waste disposal.** The continued development of nuclear power was one of the key points of the cold war. This resulted in the problem of dealing with substantial quantities of radioactive waste. The "simplest" solution was to dispose radioactive waste directly in the sea, far from human settlements. For example, the Soviet Union dumped 2.5 million curies of radioactive wastes, including nuclear reactors from submarines. "Most of these power plants were cast into the shallow waters of the Kara Sea - six of them heavy radioactive fuel - turning the Arctic site near major northern fisheries into the world's largest known nuclear dump."²⁷⁰ The Arctic continues to be burdened by the past Soviet dumping practices and by the need to find solutions for safe disposing of accumulated radioactive waste.²⁷¹

This is another area in which debate about potential health risks

²⁶⁸ Darst, 109-110.

²⁶⁹ Gizewski (1993/94), 18.

²⁷⁰ Chaturvedi, 32.

²⁷¹ Darst, 110.

continues. Research on the issue is lacking although continued international surveillance should be of extreme importance. The problem is not likely to disappear. As Robert Darst observes, the post-cold war reduction in the size of Russian nuclear submarine fleet does not simplify the problem -- on the contrary, it makes it more intensified:

[A]s each submarine is decommissioned, its reactor compartment must be defueled and removed, after which arrangements must be made for the disposal of the spent fuel assemblies, any other radioactive debris, and the disregarded reactor compartment itself.²⁷²

(4) **Air Bases.** Another, and in many ways a more direct insecurity issue for the Arctic people is stationing of the air bases in the region. This problem has been made public especially by the Inuit of Greenland and to some extent the indigenous groups of Alaska. In Greenland alone, there are four Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar sites, and also a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at the American air base in Thule. Militarization of Thule has brought forth the issue of compensation arising from the forced relocation of Inuit to Qaanaaq to accommodate an expansion of the Air Base in 1953. While some compensation was offered, outstanding issues remain:

the base was an infringement of the Thule people's local laws and constituted an illegal compensation of Inuit land and resulted in a loss of Inuit hunting territories and access to resources; (2) negative impacts on the economic self-sufficiency of the Thule people whose subsistence hunting economy depends on the integrity and health of the sensitive Arctic ecosystem; (3) compensation claims and human rights issues arising from the forced relocation... in order to accommodate the expansion of the Thule Air Base; (4) the legality of various activities connected with the Thule Air Base such as storage of atomic bombs and overlying by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons; (5) the environmental and health implications of various military

²⁷² Ibid., 111-112.

actions taken in the 1950s and 1960s such as the storage of nuclear weapons on the Base, the discharge of radioactive waste contaminating approximately 4,000 tons of ice and creating the potential for radioactive ice glaciers.²⁷³

Land rights, whether in war or in peace, raise special problem areas that will be further discussed in the context of cultural security later in this chapter. Land rights are bound to get secondary attention when bases are deemed essential in the name of national interest and security. For the people suffering from the consequences of forced relocation, the insecurity it causes often far supersedes the fear of war.

Whether we are concerned with indirect (environmental) or direct (land-rights and relocation) issues, militarization has caused significant insecurities for the Arctic people. In some cases, the effects are most striking for a part of the people, but in the case of the unknown defects of ecological degradation, it is likely that the region as a whole is in danger. Mary Simon pointedly expresses the Inuit point of view:

While military activities continue to be justified by governments on the basis of defense and security considerations, such actions often serve to promote Inuit insecurity and may threaten the unique and delicate polar environment. These activities may also conflict with aboriginal uses of Arctic lands, waters, and sea-ice. Moreover, because of the confidential nature of military activity, the Inuit right to self-government would be more and more eroded or otherwise curtailed. Future policy options would be unnecessarily limited. Any adverse repercussions that might arise from excessive military strategies would most likely affect first and foremost those who live in the North. Also, any radioactive pollution, arising by accident or out of conflict, could easily devastate the Arctic environment and the traditional Inuit way of life.²⁷⁴

²⁷³ Agqaluk Lynge, Inuit Circumpolar Conference - Greenland, (Nuuk, Greenland: ICC, 1993), 2

²⁷⁴ Simon (1992), 60.

In/Security in the Arctic Region

What is considered "security" depends on whose security we are talking about. In chapter three, I established the need to move from security of states to security of people. As qualified in chapter one, I have intentionally not given a strict definition for what is meant by people. In general, we should accept people to imply all people, while in particular cases, people are those who are relevant to the given case. Peoples implies indigenous groups. In chapter four, I mapped the Arctic identity region in a way that best suits my purpose of taking people of the selected region into account.

The problem of rethinking security in a cohesive manner is nevertheless complex. I believe in Simon Dalby's observation presented earlier: in order to achieve a positive, comprehensive security "it is necessary to look at the situation of the most vulnerable sectors of populations."²⁷⁵ Therefore, I shall base my rethinking of Arctic security on the threats relevant to the Inuit and the Sami, who act as representatives of the indigenous peoples of the region. Other identity groups identified in the previous chapter will be reflected where applicable. It is perhaps appropriate to note that while the views presented here represent the concerns of the Arctic indigenous peoples, they are not meant to imply ultimate truths. But when the quest is about promoting a particular people's security, it is necessary to take these views seriously, as given. All the sides have their own truths.

As far as the Sami and the Inuit are concerned, the issue of cultural security is an obvious stepping stone to the rest of the

²⁷⁵ Dalby, 116.

security problematic. Cultural security translates into cultural survival of an identity group - in this case that of the indigenous peoples. In the words of Terry Flenge from the Inuit side: "While cultural survival is not a key agenda in itself - by which I mean that it is not in our short-list for the most pressing things to do - it is something that is behind every other issue we deal with,"²⁷⁶ and Ingvar Åhren from the Sami side: "We talk about land rights, language, education and environment, but all these are about how do we survive as Sami."²⁷⁷

What do cultural security and cultural survival then mean? Simply stated, both imply the right to maintain one's own distinct culture and to have the means to do so. This is no simple statement, considering the vagueness of the term culture. My understanding of cultural survival is therefore connected to the idea of preserving one's culture by maintaining one's identity. But there is no one thing called identity. "Identity is best studied from the perspective of interaction informed by and informing a broader perspective of the workings of the social system."²⁷⁸ It is perhaps helpful to look at Ingvar Åhren's quote above: *how do we survive as Sami?*²⁷⁹ This implies that the other issues of concern (land rights, language, education and environment) are influenced by the very "Saminess" of them. They are connected to being Sami: the Sami are not surviving unless certain

²⁷⁶ Terry Flenge, ICC Research Director, interview by author, 7 October 1996.

²⁷⁷ Ingvar Åhren, Swedish Sami Parliament, interview by author, 29 August 1996.

²⁷⁸ Susanne Dybbroe, "Questions of Identity and Issues of Determination," *Etudes/Inuit/Studies* 20, no. 2 (1996): 42.

²⁷⁹ The qualifications for being Sami - or Inuit, for that matter - vary according to who is labeling them. For the purpose of this study, we can proceed with the presumption that those who identify and

prerequisites are in place.

Why are people culturally insecure? In the case of indigenous peoples, the tradition of colonialism is often considered the primary reason. This is not the forum to engage the historical experiences of each group, but a brief overview is in order. As the history of many indigenous groups - including the Sami and the Inuit -- indicates, their cultures and social practices have been viewed inferior to those of the dominant group. This has resulted in politics of assimilation, which comes into play at two important levels. Firstly, the formal instruments of keeping the traditional culture alive through education and cultural promotion have been destroyed, and secondly, the people themselves have internalized a colonized consciousness.²⁸⁰ Therefore, in the 1960s and the 1970s, when the revival of both Sami and Inuit cultures and identity was increasingly being expressed, it was difficult to change the colonized mentality among large numbers of people. This continues to be the problem today despite the fact that government policies all over the Arctic have become more favorable to maintaining indigenous cultures. Modified ethnocentrism continues to persist. Ole-Henrik Magga asks a pointed question: "who is to decide what is belongs to real Sami education and culture - the Sami, or the Ministry of Culture and Education?"²⁸¹ In order to recover from the colonized mind, gaining recognition is of central importance. By "recognition" is meant that the group is acknowledged as distinct, but also as equal.

ethnically belong to an indigenous group are part of it.

²⁸⁰ See Howard Adams, A Tortured People (Penticton, BC: Theytus Books, 1995).

²⁸¹ Ole-Henrik Magga, Norwegian Sami Parliament, interview by author, 1 September 1996.

Having said this, it is time to look at what makes the groups in question insecure, and how that insecurity could be transformed into security. In broad terms, the primary concerns of both the Inuit and the Sami are related to the issue of cultural survival. In order to achieve cultural security, and overcome some of the defects of colonialism, there are certain requirements that must be fulfilled. I have divided these requirements in three overlapping groups: self-determination, economy, and environment. The three are so inherently inter-connected that it is indeed difficult to categorize them separately, but in order to keep the focus on rethinking security, it must be attempted.

Security Based on Self-Determination

[T]he continuing struggle of the indigenous peoples for self-determination underscores the fact that for indigenous peoples a positive, meaningful security can only result from safeguarding their rights to land and natural resources.²⁸²

As is well known, there is an obvious tension between the principle of sovereignty and the principle of self-determination in international affairs. The former legitimizes the state with a "hands-off" attitude, while the latter contradicts it by implying that people who identify as a nation should have the right to form a state and exercise sovereignty. In the case of the Arctic indigenous peoples, fortunately we do not have to take the issue quite that far. As already discussed, the groups in question are not attempting to gain sovereignty, nor to question state borders. Rather, self-determination in the Arctic is about the right to determine social, cultural and

²⁸² Chaturvedi, 36.

land-related matters. According to some, it is also about individual rights.

Surely no one should want to deny the right of an individual to shape his/her own life out of personal choice. Whatever the limitations of jurisprudence, there is a core of individualist ethics which remains of crucial significance.²⁸³

Article 31 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as agreed upon by the members of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations states: "Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs." While different indigenous groups have specific needs, the general regional overview provided here translates self-determination basically to the questions of self-government, land-rights, control of resources and the environment.

In its thorough Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy, the ICC has, among other issues, outlined the components of self-government. The right for self-government is consistent with rights and principles under international law, and it is acknowledged that

Inuit can only continue to develop as a distinct people by exercising adequate powers of self-government within their traditional territories. Presently, the lack of self-government fosters harmful dependency, which is leading to serious deterioration of Inuit culture and society.²⁸⁴

Other principles of Inuit self-government include rights for their own institutions and the right to decide on their accountability to the people. These rightful institutions should be granted control over

²⁸³ Oliver Mendelsohn and Upendra Baxi, "Introduction," in The Rights of Subordinated Peoples, ed. Oliver Mendelsohn and Upendra Baxi (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7-8.

²⁸⁴ Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy (Montreal, QB: Centre for Northern Studies and Research, 1992), 13.

lands and waters. The list continues with powers, financial arrangements and training; control over policies, programs and priorities; mechanisms for joint management; relations with Inuit in different regions; collective and individual rights; fair and independent procedures; existing structures and Inuit aspirations; and coordination of transnational policies.²⁸⁵

The basic requirements of the Sami are similar to those of the Inuit. "The Sami are claiming their right to their territory and they are demanding that the states identify this territory."²⁸⁶ Sami Political Program demands that Sami rights to land and natural resources be protected by law. Furthermore, legal recognition for relevant institutions has been demanded, and despite the state borders the Sami stress the natural unity of the Sami people, which should not be hindered due to state politics.²⁸⁷

The right to decide on one's own communal/societal destiny is crucial here. Both the Sami and the Inuit feel that they must control the direction their way of life takes. One of the most complex issues has been that of land rights. The mainstream population often seems to think that indigenous groups want unreasonably much, and that if granted land and the right to self-government, then all other minority groups would claim the same. Such attitudes, however, speak of ignorance and lack of understanding of how their cultural survival is connected to the land. Whereas I believe that it is true that we, outside of these cultures, can never fully understand the connection, it hardly is a reason enough to ignore it. Furthermore, indigenous

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 13-15.

²⁸⁶ Helander, 304.

²⁸⁷ See Samiraddi (1991), 4-5.

peoples' view is that they are not claiming new rights, but seeking to preserve ones that used to belong to them.²⁸⁸ A problem is relatively more simple in the Arctic due to region's remoteness and certain peripheral "unattractiveness". A much more complex issue would be to tackle the problem with more southern Indian tribes and their possible land claims.

The responses which the Inuit have received to their land claims have varied in different parts of the Arctic region:

Inuit have had an extensive and varied experience with various State responses to Inuit land "claims" from imposed legislative settlement and extinguishment under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, to the complex, varied and difficult negotiations in Canada under the federal "comprehensive claims" policy to a measure of self-determination and authority over lands and resources in Greenland. At the other extreme...Inuit in Chukotka, Russia... have no process available to them yet to address their land rights issues.²⁸⁹

As my purpose here is to find common elements for the Inuit as a transnational identity group, it is more important to speak about the reasons behind the requests. Land is an economic and cultural base for the Inuit. The characteristic life-style of the Inuit is nomadic, one based on seasonal hunting and fishing, dependent on vast availability of land. Since World War II, the Inuit have experienced the arrival of modern technology to their traditional homelands, which has reshaped their lives in a variety of ways.²⁹⁰ This relates back to the colonialism discussed earlier. In the last few decades, the Inuit are

²⁸⁸ Jens Brosted, "Sami Rights and Self-Determination," in Self-determination and Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen, DK: IWGIA, 1987), 156.

²⁸⁹ Wendy Moss, (Unpublished) Notes for Oral Presentation to UN Experts Seminar on Practical Experiences Relating to Indigenous Land Rights and Claims, Whitehorse, Yukon, March 24-28, 1996.

²⁹⁰ Peter Jull, "Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas," in Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Montreal, QB: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 55.

have been fighting to regain control of their society. While it is true that the contemporary Inuit work in all sectors of economy, many still complement their income with fishing and hunting. Therefore, the Inuit are not looking back; rather, the future sees uniting traditional culture with the modern techniques of development.²⁹¹

The Sami tradition is also founded on a nomadic way of life - either through hunting and fishing or reindeer herding. The Sami year used to be divided up into seasonal migrations in order to exploit a variety of resources, and thus avoid over-exploitation.²⁹² For traditional Sami, man is a part of the ecosystem in which there is a balance between what nature can give, and what man can take.²⁹³ The balance has been broken by modern technologies that have unbalanced the scales toward domination by man. Similar to the Inuit, the Sami are no longer dependent on the traditional means of survival, although for those living in the old homeland reindeer herding is still the main source of income. During the many years of assimilation, a number of Sami "gave up" and moved to the South for better employment and living conditions; today many return for the ritual reindeer round up.²⁹⁴ The importance of being Sami and connecting with one's roots is becoming more popular with those living inside and outside of the homeland. Today's active Sami believe that theirs is the right "to take good care for [their] livelihoods and communities according to [their] common

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Helge Salvesen, "Sami Aednan: Four States - One Nation," in Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, ed. Sven Tägil, (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 1995), 107.

²⁹³ Aikio, 194.

²⁹⁴ Ole-Henrik Magga, Norwegian Sami Parliament, interview by author, 1 September 1996.

provisions; together [they] are going to protect the lands, waters, resources, and national inheritance for future generations."²⁹⁵ But there is also a strong understanding that new concepts of Saminess are necessary. Change has to be accepted as a part of culture and identity, and there is a growing need to build up new economic bases on their own terms.²⁹⁶ In the Sami point of view, there is an on-going conflict with the state regarding what industry can be brought to the region; the fact that the state gives a permission for a foreign enterprise to operate in the region, does not mean that the Sami do. This will become clearer as the discussion moves to economics and resource control.

It is evident that the issue of self-determination is a complex one. While the demands are often plain enough, their implementation hardly ever is. The next two sections will provide a more concrete understanding of the issue.

Economic Security and Resource Control

The concept Arctic economy is defined as a two-part economy consisting both of settlements with traditional economy depending on transfer income from the state and of advanced high technology economy in connection to resource exploitation and with price setting and investment in Arctic economy are decided outside the Arctic area based on market economic considerations and economic considerations and economic strength.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Aikio, 200. The wording is from a Sami environmental program that was developed by the Sami Council in 1986.

²⁹⁶ Ingvar Åhren, Swedish Sami Parliament, interview by author, 29 August 1996.

²⁹⁷ Lise Lyck, "Perspectives on Arctic Economy and Arctic Economies towards Year 2000," in Nordic Arctic Research on Contemporary Arctic Problems, ed. Lise Lyck (Copenhagen, DK: Nordic Arctic Research Institute, 1992), 9.

The above quote explains the reality of modern day economics. Market forces, technological advancement and income transfer tell a very different story from what the Inuit hunter or Sami herder are used to. Is there legitimate room for the indigenous people's point of view? As far as survival and comprehensive view on security is concerned, there should be. I have chosen to include resource control as a part of this section, although it also closely tied to the next one, which is concerned with environmental security. But because it is understood that these security topics are cumulative in that they encompass one another, my suggested "snowball effect" is in order. For the indigenous peoples, economic security is also connected to the issues of cultural survival and self-determination. In essence, it is a matter of *sustainable development* on one's own terms.

Sustainable development has been such an overly used concept in the past couple of decades, that it has lost some of its inherent meaning. Simply stated, it implies a development based on the *maintenance of ecological balance in a region in a manner that today's use of renewable resources does not inhibit their future use.* Development being such a loaded term, further complicates the invoking of the concept. Similarly, the implementation of such a concept can vary greatly depending on the interpreter. In the Arctic, it is fair to assume that any interpretation should include "the establishment of economic systems capable of maintaining themselves over time without disrupting major Arctic ecosystems or destroying the distinctive cultures of the Arctic permanent residents."²⁹⁸

The indigenous peoples' perspective focuses on the small communities. Sustainable development must enable them to maintain

²⁹⁸ Young (1992), 21.

their close relationship with nature by simultaneously reinforcing their culture and securing their future as distinct peoples.²⁹⁹ For centuries the Arctic indigenous population have hunted sea mammals and land animals, as well as relied on fishing, trapping, and gathering for livelihood. During this century, as modernization and technological invasion has arrived in the Arctic, the traditional economy has been supplemented by the cash economy. Today, the two work side by side. While more and more people find their primary income from paid labor, the traditional economy has remained an essential component of economic life. With Arctic remoteness, sparse population, and limited infrastructure, there is no reason why a healthy traditional economy should not constitute an integral element of sustainable development.³⁰⁰

"The Inuit culture depends of sustainable development, which in turn can only be achieved through sufficient self-determination."³⁰¹ In order to assess these needs, the ICC has put together Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy (IRCS) which gives guidelines for achieving conservation and sustainable development. Whether the concern is on developing new industries or maintaining old ones, the Inuit want to have a hand in it. Central to the strategy is the right to harvest, which is a fundamental part of Inuit life. The right to harvest has been a matter of great controversy as the views of many indigenous peoples and those of the environment and animal protection movements have not found common ground. The controversy has been particularly

²⁹⁹ Arctic Environment. Indigenous Perspectives (Copenhagen, DK: IWGIA, 1991), 20.

³⁰⁰ Young (1992), 217.

³⁰¹ Terry Flenge, ICC Research Director, interview by author, 7 October 1996.

heated in relation to sea mammals,³⁰² and has resulted in a series of debates regarding the priority of human rights as opposed to animal rights. Whereas many environmental groups today acknowledge the indigenous harvesting rights for pure subsistence needs, they do not accept any commercial usage. Similarly, the fact that the Inuit have adopted modern technology in hunting raises objections: only traditional means of harvesting are believed to be culturally important. From the indigenous point of view, such conservationist bans hinder the future development of communities towards self-reliance. They do not accept industrialization as a solution for their homelands, but want self-reliant economies that can strengthen their cultural and political integrity. Therefore, for small communities, the harvesting of renewable resources for the market would constitute a natural economic base.

The existence of the Sami people has depended upon a close and inseparable unity with the surrounding flora and fauna, which have yielded food and clothes, forming bases of their survival and identity.³⁰³ The economic foundations have been in fishing, hunting, farming, and reindeer herding, and still today the main income of the Sami is closely connected to nature. Special programs, in order to develop new techniques in the traditional trades and create new occupations, are being called for.³⁰⁴ The modern exploitation of natural resources has brought the question of land ownership to the forefront of the Sami agenda. Transportation, the encroachment of roads,

³⁰² Some of the famous cases have concerned harp seals, bowhead whales, and northern fur seals. See Young (1992), 127-130

³⁰³ Samiraddi. (Ochejohka, Finland: the Nordic Sami Council, 1981), 8.

³⁰⁴ Ingvar Åhren, Swedish Sami Parliament, interview by author, 29 August 1996.

development of mines and hydro-electronic power plants, and the growth of tourism have reduced opportunities for self-sufficiency.³⁰⁵

This brings us to the question of resource management at a higher level. Thus far I have discussed the traditional economies and their reliance on the environment. This is, however, only part of the problem of economic security for indigenous peoples. The Arctic is rich in both non-renewable (e.g. oil and minerals) and renewable resources (e.g. fish), and the presence of the former makes the region especially attractive for various interest groups. A growing awareness of earth's limited resources has led to invasions of remote areas, including the Arctic.³⁰⁶ Conflicts regarding fisheries and fishing rights have been typical all over the Arctic. Non-renewable resources, especially oil, have made the Arctic relevant for the global agenda.

Although Arctic natural resources have been exploited for centuries, it has only been during this century that the utilization has begun on a mass scale.³⁰⁷ This has led to various types of resource conflicts. By resource conflicts is meant situations in which "the efforts of one party to obtain benefits by using a given natural resource harm or threaten to harm the interests of other parties, regardless of the benefits accruing to the initial user(s)."³⁰⁸

Oran Young has identified three basic types of resource conflicts likely to occur in the Arctic context: 1) those in which one actor's

³⁰⁵ D.M. Epstein and A. Valmari, "Reindeer Herding and Ecology in Finnish Lapland," *Geojournal* 8, no. 2 (1984): 167.

³⁰⁶ Jason W. Clay, "Resource Wars: Nation and State Conflicts of the Twentieth Century," in *Who Pays the Price?*, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1994), 22.

³⁰⁷ Heininen (1992), 40.

³⁰⁸ Young (1992), 105.

material interests are likely to harm the material interests of another actor; 2) those in which the pursuit of someone's material interests may injure intangible interests of another party; and 3) those in which achieving one's intangible interests can damage the intangible interests of others.³⁰⁹ Indigenous peoples are involved in all three types of conflicts: for example 1) oil developments may harm the sea life causing damage for the indigenous people's subsistence hunting and fishing practices; 2) large oil or hydroelectric power plants may disturb central elements of the preexisting indigenous life style; and 3) developing the natural resources through high-technology operations may hinder the preservation and development of self-sufficient indigenous communities in the region.³¹⁰ As these examples show, in most cases, it is likely that the indigenous lifestyles amount to little in the face of never-ending development and technological advancement. The small peoples are likely to be forgotten as a relevant actor when "progress" and "development" are in question.

The question of resource control is closely connected to the issue of self-determination as well as to environmental protection. As far as self-determination is concerned, the basic problematic lies in the question of who has the right to decide. States claiming territorial sovereignty have legitimized themselves as the rightful owners of that territory, whereas the indigenous people claim ownership based on their historical rights. Environmental degradation, on the other hand, has become an issue that can no longer be ignored on the grounds of endless development. Who then is, the rightful guardian of

³⁰⁹ Ibid., 106-107.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

the environment? Whose methods should be applied?

Environmental Security

The Arctic is an environmentally vulnerable area. Environment in this context refers to the "biophysical realm supporting humans and other life forms in their efforts to survive and thrive."³¹¹ Due to the "low levels of biological, chemical and thermal energy the Arctic ecosystems [are] particularly vulnerable to human disturbance."³¹² This comes in to play for several reasons:

(1) Low temperatures retard the decomposition of natural and manmade substances and the breakdown of pollutants... (2) Regeneration is a protracted process because of the short growing season... (3) Large concentrations of animal populations heighten vulnerability to catastrophes... (4) Food is concentrated in the sea where nutrients are continually available... (5) Climatic conditions are likely to produce a more pronounced CO₂-induced warming trend in the Arctic than in temperate regions and are already leading to high concentrations of air pollutants that threaten vegetation as well as human and animal health... (6) Severe weather and ice dynamics make environmental protection and cleanup extremely difficult.³¹³

Whether we speak on a global or an Arctic scale, environmental degradation has been the one area which has encouraged policy-makers and theorists alike to acknowledge the need for broadening the concept of security. Environmental threats do not respect state borders and therefore traditional answers to national security provide insufficient methods for dealing with the problem. Regional considerations are

³¹¹ Barbara Rose Johnston, "Environmental Degradation and Human Rights Abuse," in Who Pays the Price?, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston (Washington, DC.: Island Press, 1994), 7.

³¹² John F. Merrit, "The Arctic: An Overview," in The Arctic Choices for Peace and Security, ed. Thomas Berger (West Vancouver, BC: Gordon Soules Book Publishers, 1989), 25.

³¹³ Osherenko and Young, 111.

particularly important, and the Arctic makes a natural environmental area. Similarly, the Arctic peoples are the ones most acutely facing the threats posed by environmental degradation.

Lassi Heininen has divided the Arctic environmental threats into three categories: global, regional, and those caused by militarization.³¹⁴ We have already discussed the effects of militarization, and therefore will proceed here according to the scope of the threats. Global environmental threats refer to those that concern the whole world. Air pollution, the greenhouse effect, the ozone deficit as well as seaborne environmental threats fall into this category.³¹⁵ As far as air pollution is concerned, its causes are traceable to industries in the South, carried to the Arctic by the prevailing winds. "The pollutants reach the high latitudes through long-range transport mechanisms involving airborne or waterborne particulates [which] ordinarily... involve transboundary flows of harmful substances."³¹⁶ The consequences of such pollutants are clearly detrimental for Arctic sustainable development, and at no time has this been more obvious than during the Chernobyl catastrophe. For example, in Sweden the whole Sami reindeer industry was damaged by high dosages of radiation found in reindeer meat.³¹⁷ Also, the presence of toxic

³¹⁴ Lassi Heininen, "Introduction," in Arctic Environmental Problems, ed. Lassi Heininen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), 12.

³¹⁵ For more scientific inquiry on these topics, see Anders Karlqvist and Jost Heintzenberg, "Arctic Pollution and the Greenhouse Effect," in Arctic Alternatives, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Toronto, ON: Science for Peace, 1992), 156-169.

³¹⁶ Young (1992), 219.

³¹⁷ Dalee Sambo, "Sustainable Security: an Inuit Perspective," in Politics and Sustainable Growth in the Arctic, ed. Jyrki Käkönen (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993), 55.

pollutants like cadmium, mercury, and polychlorinated biphenyls has been discovered in the Arctic food chains, ending up with the Inuit, whose diet has largely consisted of sea mammals.³¹⁸ The effects of greenhouse gases are likely to become visible in Arctic permafrost temperatures. Ecosystems, as well as the Arctic livelihood as a whole, are threatened by the possibility of changes in weather patterns caused by global warming. "Among the many adverse effects of stratospheric ozone layer depletion [*italics mine*] is the damage to shallow, dwelling marine organisms, which are an essential part of the overall food chain."³¹⁹

Regional environmental threats include large-scale economic exploitation, utilization of non-renewable resources in sensitive areas, oil and gas pipelines on ranging routes, harnessing of waterfalls and construction of reservoirs, and logging near the northern timber line - all of which cause threats to the Arctic fauna and flora.³²⁰ Generally speaking, industrial activities of the nation states are affecting the environment globally as well as regionally. Oil discoveries have naturally made the Arctic a hot spot in the world economy, and it most likely will continue to be so far into the future. The first major oil discoveries were made in Siberia in the early 1960s, and in Alaska later in the decade. When these discoveries were followed by huge gas finds in Siberia in the 1970s and 1980s, the future of the Arctic was sealed.³²¹ But as often is the case, the

³¹⁸ Ibid., 56.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 55.

³²⁰ Heininen (1990), 13.

³²¹ Pauli Jumppanen, "Environmental Aspects of the Exploitation of Arctic Oil and Gas Reserves," in Arctic Environmental Problems, ed. Lassi Heininen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), 73.

consequences have been mixed at best. Arctic mining, as well as onshore oil and gas production, have already caused several environmental disasters. Towards the end of the 1980s with the atmosphere of openness, the ecological disasters in the Soviet Arctic became publicized. Years of negligence of the environment as well as of the indigenous peoples, in the name of development by the oil and gas industry, had all but destroyed living conditions in many parts of the region.³²²

Some of the worst industrial damage to nature and native economy had occurred in the tundra, where large areas of reindeer pastures were turned into wastelands, and the number of reindeer was reduced to lower level than at any previous time during the 20th century.³²³

One of the main threats is insufficient knowledge about the Arctic environment in general, and the specific effects of industry on society in particular.³²⁴ This brings us back to the question of resource management, which is understood very differently by indigenous peoples, modern scientists, and environmental agencies. The indigenous peoples claim thousands of years of knowledge of the Arctic environment, which should not be discounted. At the same time it is questionable how far this takes us with the contemporary problems related to industrial development.

The Inuit have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years, and we consider ourselves the custodians of these vast lands and seas. Our custodianship is motivated by our fundamental beliefs about how human beings should relate to the land and how the land should be cared for and used. To preserve the Arctic lands and seas and exercise our rights, the Inuit have dedicated an enormous amount of time and effort to the negotiation of land-claims settlements

³²² Chaturvedi, 31.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Olav Schram Stokke, "Environmental Threats in the Arctic," in Arctic Environmental Problems, ed. Lassi Heininen (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), 23.

and to the constitutional recognition of native rights.³²⁵

In his article on Arctic ocean management, Anders Stigebrandt has identified five relevant interest groups as far as the Arctic environment is concerned: mankind (as the area is believed to be important for the global climate); indigenous peoples (for it is their home and source of livelihood); the scientific community (for the challenging scientific possibilities the region offers regionally as well as globally); states and smaller groups (for industrial exploitation of both renewable and non-renewable resources); and the great powers (for military use).³²⁶ Although environmental protection groups could be added as a sixth relevant one for their goals of preserving wildlife and environment -- often they claim to be the speakers for the mankind.

The indigenous peoples' claims are plain enough. While resource control in traditional terms refers to renewable resources such as wildlife management, the indigenous interests extend also to non-renewable resources. In both cases they claim the right to the possession, ownership, and control -- and joint management where appropriate. None of the environmental claims are purely questions of preservation, but are also inherently connected to land rights, self-government, sustainable development, and economic considerations. The related problems are similarly clear. If it is difficult to reach agreement on strategies on how to sustain the Arctic environment, it has proven virtually impossible to convince the states that the aboriginal populations of the region are the rightful owners of the

³²⁵ Rosemarie Kuptana, "The Recognition and Exercise of Inuit and Responsibilities," in Arctic Wilderness, ed. Vance G. Marin and Bicholas Tyler (Ojai, CA: the WILD Foundation, 1993), 38.

³²⁶ Anders Stigebrandt, "Knowledge Requirements for Ocean Management," in Arctic Alternatives, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Toronto,

land, and therefore should have decision-making power regarding oil and other non-renewable resources.

Conflicting Security Needs in the Arctic Region

In the earlier sections of this chapter, it was indicated that a pursuit of traditional military security is likely to cause at least some insecurity among the people of a given country or a region. While I concentrated mainly on the environmental effects of military build-up in the Arctic, just the fact that states prepare for war makes people insecure. The possibility of war is always a cause of insecurity. This alone speaks of a false connection between security and war, frequently forwarded by International Relations theorists. Therefore, when extending the concept of security in the way that has been done in this paper, it is important to question whether any one group's -- or people's -- pursuit of security causes insecurity for others. This section will look at the Arctic region as a whole in relation to the previously established identity groups in order to point out possible tensions in regard to security of the indigenous peoples versus the other identity groups. The other identity groups are the non-indigenous people living in the region and the states.

Calls for cultural security are specific for small ethnic groups living in societies where the dominant culture is different from theirs. Indigenous peoples are a unique example. In general, it can be assumed that one's pursuit of cultural security does not inherently harm any other group. Specific examples sometimes prove otherwise. As far as the issue of indigenous people's self-determination is

concerned, other people living in the region have expressed worry over it. This is especially the case in the areas where the indigenous peoples are not the sole or vast majority of the population. What will happen to the others if indigenous groups are granted land rights? Can the others be denied their right for fishing and hunting or reindeer herding? And what if granting land rights for the indigenous peoples means that development of industries produces decreasing possibilities for employment? There are no simple solutions. Undoubtedly, in some cases answers to the above questions are bound to be unfavorable for some people. However, unfavorable does not mean insecure. While the indigenous groups can make claims that without certain elements there will be no more Inuit or Sami, the implications are not the same for those who would "suffer" from lack of such rights.

As far as the state actors are concerned, claims for cultural security hardly constitute a serious threat. They may be against the idea of sovereignty, but since there is no question of redrawing state borders, there is no territorial security risk. Indigenous peoples' needs for economic security and resource control are more likely to cause serious resistance. As already discussed, even if the right to manage renewable resources in certain areas was granted, the right to decide on oil and other precious non-renewable resources can easily be connected to the issue of national security. Innovative approaches to this dilemma are required so that the needs of each side could be satisfied, but before this can happen the issue of ownership and land rights must be determined.

Undoubtedly environmental security is needed in the Arctic as a whole. Environmental degradation should be a concern for each of the identity groups. Military "necessities" have unfortunately dismissed this factor, although in the latter years, there has been a growing

awareness regarding environmental degradation in the Arctic. It is the most promising area of innovative transnational cooperation in the region, as will be shown in the upcoming chapter. However, the forums of environmental cooperation are still dominated by state actors whose pursuit of national interest leaves much to be desired. Similarly, even when a pure conservation of the Arctic environment is in question, there is the possibility for disagreement about the methods. Indigenous peoples' methods do not coincide with the more scientifically proven ones, and it is often difficult to say which is the most feasible way for lasting environmental management.

In this chapter I have explained the need to seriously rethink the elements of Arctic security. Traditional security thinking concentrates on the military security of each individual state. This has done very little good for securing the region as a whole. In a number of ways the Arctic region is more insecure than ever before, -- even if only traditional security issues are taken into consideration. The basis of my reconsideration of Arctic security was on the indigenous peoples' insecurities, which allowed a general analysis of their situation in the Arctic region as a whole. It is true that the Arctic region's security cannot have at its foundations solely the needs of the indigenous peoples, but their views must be a significant part of the total security picture. Firstly and most importantly, they represent transnational identities in the region, and through their viewpoints and experiences we are able to look at the region as a whole, not as separate units. Secondly, to an extent, they represent all the people in the Arctic.

Therefore, a comprehensive security picture must be made up of issues related to military as well as cultural, economic, and

environmental agenda. Redefining security is about identifying the security needs of the people in question. Through this kind of identification, we are able to get a more thorough security picture for the region as a whole. The challenge is to consider both civil security and the whole region's security. This chapter has been about civil security; the next will try to indicate ways to create a workable model for the Arctic security region.

6 ANSWERING THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN THE ARCTIC REGION

The way we understand security must be broadened to include *insecurities* relevant to given people. The previous chapter attempted to answer that challenge by recognizing the security needs of the indigenous peoples of the region in question, the Arctic. The second challenge is to rethink security within the region in a way that allows for one comprehensive security agenda that would encompass different elements. This does not mean that the Arctic states cannot have their own national security agendas - they do and they will, whether we want it or not. But in order to secure the region, it is essential to focus on a regionwide agenda where countering people's insecurities is the key to real security.

The first part of the chapter returns to the three central security questions established in the chapter 3 -- what is security? whose security are we concerned about? who provides security? - placing them in the Arctic context. The first two questions have already been answered indirectly in the two previous chapters, and the third answer will be clarified in this chapter. All three also need to be assessed in terms of a comprehensive security framework for the region. In order to respond to the *security challenge* in the Arctic region, the answers to the above three questions are instrumental.

It is noteworthy that organizing multilateral and transnational cooperation in the Arctic region is not new. The Arctic has already gained international attention with some innovative organizations that have been built in the recent decade. The most notable ones are the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic Council, and the Euro-Arctic Barents Region. None of the three is a security

organization, although each covers elements of the broad definition of security introduced and identified in this paper. Therefore, it is worth looking at them as possible models for Arctic security cooperation, despite the fact that they are not set up to answer the Arctic security challenge *per se*. This will be done in the second part of this chapter.

After assessing the existing organizations, it is necessary to consider how security could be identified and organized regionally in a way that would provide satisfactory answers to its challenge. This is done by recognizing problem areas and considering new approaches necessary to increase awareness of the real security issues in question. Finally, a sketch model of cooperation is suggested to answer the practical security challenge in the Arctic region.

Security Challenge in the Arctic Region

Throughout I have stressed that in order to rethink security in a constructive manner one has to be able to provide answers, or at least guidelines, to the three central questions: whose security? what is security? and who provides security? While traditional practice of the discipline of International Relations took the answers for granted, many of the recent redefinitions tend to forego answering the question about the provider, speaking only of the content of security.

When security involves more than just a prefixed criterion, it is increasingly important to look at regions, groups of people, identities and other smaller units in order to determine the relevant answers to the three questions. The Arctic Region provides its own answers - answers which together form a security challenge for the region. The

challenge is to organize a new regional security agenda.

Whose Security in the Arctic Region?

This question was already somewhat answered in Chapter 4, where Arctic identity groups were introduced. The fundamental issue at stake is making people secure. People were recognized as identity groups in order to focus on pertinent security threats, and the identity groups were determined by focusing on the Arctic region as one whole, not by limiting the analysis according to state borders. Whereas in Chapter 3 identity groups were accepted simply according to common identity and common threat, the relevance of space to people's insecurities was nevertheless acknowledged. It is meaningful to think of regionally specific threats. This does not imply that generalizations cannot be made. Indigenous peoples do face similar threats all over the world, but we can be more specific about the nature of these threats when there is a regional focus.³²⁷

In the Arctic, the region as a whole forms one identity group within which the other groups belong. The Arctic is a limited geographical area defined primarily by the people living there, and -- in my opinion - only secondarily by the states occupying parts of the region. The geographical borders of the Arctic Region are drawn north of the Arctic Circle, although it is not completely definite, in that it is constantly affected by outside influences. This, however, is

³²⁷ The same applies, for example, to women and threats they face. We can and should talk of global threats that make women everywhere insecure (masculinity of global order and state practices etc.), but at the same time the specific nature of threats can be quite different depending on where they occur.

only one aspect of the security challenge. The main issue is securing Arctic people and identifying their insecurities. Ideally this should not happen in a way that threatens other groups within or outside the region. However, because the challenge is about identifying threats and reasons behind people's insecurity, there may be instances where one group's security is another's insecurity. In the Arctic region this is seldom a serious concern, but in high-tension areas elsewhere in the world this cannot be underestimated.³²⁸

Within the Arctic Region, I specified four identity groups: 1) those belonging to the same ethnic group (for example, the Sami and the Inuit); 2) all indigenous peoples in the Arctic region; 3) all people living in the region; and 4) those identities formed according to citizenship. It could be argued that citizenship-based identity groups should be included as specific ethnic groups: Finns and Canadians just as much as Inuit and Sami. Two reasons however warn against this. Firstly, due to the nature of the region, citizenship remains a secondary categorization: Sami stress their Saminess much more than their citizenship, at least as far as common threats are concerned. Secondly, the focus goes beyond the states, to the region. The states are relevant actors in the Arctic region, but the primary concern is not on securing the eight Arctic states, but securing the region.

In order to secure the region for the people living there, the above grouping is helpful. It directs the focus on the threats identified by the people concerned. The goal should then be providing security for these people against their insecurities. I have emphasized the indigenous peoples - via the Inuit and the Sami -- in

³²⁸ Current world events that support this are many. For example, the two main identity-groups is Israel, the Israeli Jews and Palestinians, both feel insecure if the other is granted certain territorial and other rights.

this paper, because through their needs, the non-traditional aspects of security are best exemplified. Also, these groups have clearly articulated what is lacking in their lives and what is making them insecure. Methodologically, it is difficult to make assumptions and claims for groups that are not organized. In the Arctic Region, "other people" (the non-indigenous people living in the region) must therefore often be taken into account by listening to the local political representation that presumably reflects their values and needs. This is another example of bringing local politics into the international arena - something that, for example, the EU has attempted in recent years.

Any security analysis in my opinion should start by answering the question about whose security. In general I believe that the answer should always be "people's", but one has to identify which people or which groups are the best representatives of the answer. When this has been determined one can move forward to think about what security is and lastly, who should provide security for those in question.

What is Security in the Arctic Region?

The answer to the previous question is a key to the second one about the content of security. What security is has been taken for granted as long as the discipline of International Relations has existed. Security has been about military interventions, and territorial disputes - in short, it has been about war and peace. The idea behind the extended security analysis attempted in this dissertation has been to accept a definition of security that would

allow it to mean any threat to people's survival.

The answer to the question of what constitutes security in the Arctic Region was partly provided previously, by discussing insecurities faced by people. If we are to move towards a broader security picture, it is essential to take all the relevant aspects into account. People should have security, but so should the states. It is paradoxical that one would have to separate the two, but the reality of international relations has been formulated in a manner that makes this necessary. The states simply seem to have separate security needs and as long as we continue to be politically organized in states, this remains the case. Therefore, we should at least accept that security has a dual meaning: one based on people's perceived and identified insecurities, and one determined by state politics. The same was implied in Chapter 3, when a distinction between people's security and "scientific" security was made. Whereas this may be an unsatisfactory compromise for many who wish to reformulate the concept of security, I would find it promising if even such limited broadening was "legitimized" in International Relations.

Where regional security is concerned, the security model utilized here suggests that people's - identity groups' - security needs are to be taken into an account. This was done in Chapter 5, when Arctic insecurities were discussed from Sami and Inuit points of view. Today both groups are so well organized that expert knowledge about complex environmental threats and other "scientific" issues is often available within their organizations. However, the methods of resisting such threats often cause controversy, as has been observed in the Arctic context.

Threat of war has been considered a phenomenon where people cannot be expected to have all the required knowledge to assess its

actuality and defense needs that go with it. War is "high politics", something that supposedly concerns skillful politicians and negotiators. People cannot be expected to know when another state is a possible offender and threatens their own state's - as well as its people's -- security. This is a dubious reasoning. Because war has been legitimized as the primary and most serious threat in international affairs, the primacy of "defense" is taken for granted. This problem has been raised several times here. The fact that people are insecure because of the needs of military security, as was developed in the previous chapter, is then easy to dismiss. In the Arctic and elsewhere military installations undoubtedly cause serious environmental threats - something that has been allowed without criticism for too long. Undoubtedly, there is very little reason for optimism in this matter: military build-up and its ecological consequences will continue. The best that can be expected is that increased awareness will decrease some of the defects.

As far as the Arctic region is concerned, most specialists and politicians alike agree that the threat of war has considerably decreased since the end of the cold war. The belief that democracies do not fight one another seems to have taken over some of the Arctic high politics. At the same time we are constantly reminded that the situation, especially in Russia, is more explosive than it has been for decades and therefore a continuing military alertness is in order. As was shown earlier, Arctic Russia remains heavily militarized, and as a result, the rest of the Arctic states cannot relax their military presence in the region. Nevertheless, given the atmosphere of opening and improved relations, I believe that there should at least be room for setting a broader base for Arctic security.

Any threat to people's survival -- whether one caused by military

security or something significantly different -- should be considered a matter of security. However, it is important to realize that whereas the suggested content of security is considerably broader here than traditionally, it does not imply that every concern the people in question have is about security. This is another reason why it has been especially meaningful to concentrate on the indigenous peoples' security. As both the Sami and the Inuit testify, their existence as people is *threatened* due to various non-traditional security issues. In Chapter 5, indigenous security concerns were divided into self-determination, economic survival and environmental concerns. A close connection between the three types of threats was established.

Who Provides Arctic Security?

The Arctic, as defined in Chapter 1, consists of a certain region that is currently composed of areas within eight different states. The focus on states has been eliminated in much of the discussion relevant to this study, and priority has been given to people and the region as one whole. This is meaningful and necessary in order to understand that there are security threats that face the region - and people living there -- as a whole. Indigenous peoples within the borders of seven different states face similar security threats, and the Sami and the Inuit within four different states identify each as one people.

Despite the one region/one people approach, "reality checks" throughout have demonstrated that states must be taken into account one way or another in order to avoid a faulty idealism. Early on, despite the criticisms directed at the statist practices within the discipline, it was admitted that there are no competitors for states as providers

of security. The problem of the provider is the most neglected one of the three central security questions. Theoretical essays about broadening the content of security and moving away from national security are many, but the question about the provider remains largely unanswered. Most often the answering of the question is taken for granted or ignored. This has certainly been the case in the Arctic context.

It has been relatively simple to establish people as those who should be secure and base the content of security on their perceived threats. In the case of the Arctic, where we are dealing with a limited region, it makes sense to establish the states as the providers. Despite some of the conceptual difficulties involved, the states and their people *should* have similar - if not the same -- security interests. For centuries it has been understood that states are to be providers of security for their citizenry. The connection between the principle of sovereignty and security is perhaps one of the most central determinants of international order. At the same time, however, the principle of sovereignty has twisted our understanding of security. The fact that states have sovereignty should not imply that they determine the components of security. This was discussed at length in Chapter 2. It would be meaningful to evoke the idea of social contract between states and people in order to re-assess its suitability in the contemporary context. This would place states as the providers of security, the content of which could be determined by people.

As far as democratic decision-making is concerned, this would be a case of transferring some of the traditional central government's power into the hands of local authorities, groups and in the final analysis, local people. While such decentralization has been a visible

trend in democratic politics during the recent years, it has seldom involved foreign policy decision-making, let alone matters of security - something that has been off-limits for anything or anyone else other than the central government.

The state's role as the main provider is nevertheless non-negotiable. The question concerning the Arctic region is then, how should the providing be organized if we are to take into account people's various security concerns? Providing refers to the distribution of financial resources, which naturally sets certain restraints for the process. It is not in the scope of this paper to suggest budgetary changes for national governments or calculate funds available for Arctic projects. For this paper it is enough to identify problem areas and make suggestions about security organization in the Arctic region.

A purely national emphasis is not satisfactory for an approach that has evoked people's transnational identities and emphasizes the region as a whole. Therefore, the most feasible way of organizing Arctic security would seem to be a transnational organization, where different groups -- representative of Arctic identity groups and states - would come together. The states would be represented, but they would not be the sole decision-makers. I shall return to this later in the chapter.

The answers to the three security questions are thus the following: we should be concerned with people's security, the content of which is determined by the people's perceived threats, and it should be provided for by the states. In the Arctic context, this means taking into account indigenous peoples and other residents of the region.

Models of (Security) Cooperation in the Arctic Region.

This section reviews the existing models of transnational cooperation in the Arctic region. Before proceeding further, I wish to point out that I am not interested in establishing new and reviewing old Arctic regimes. "Regimes are social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern the interactions in specific issue areas."³²⁹ Much thorough and substantial work has been done on Arctic regimes,³³⁰ but I do not believe that regimes are a proper way of approaching my suggested security framework. This does not mean that issue areas could not be viewed through regime formulations - they could and in some cases they should. However, my resistance to engaging in regime theorizing stems from its institutional framework and "forced scientism".³³¹ Therefore, my analysis is not based on any pre-established theoretical criteria - other than keeping in mind the security needs of the people in question.

Due to the fact that Arctic international relations are governed by a multitude of bilateral and multilateral treaties, it is necessary to distinguish the ones that are suitable reference points to the proposed framework of extended security. Therefore, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic Council and the

³²⁹ Oran Young and Gail Osherenko, "The Formation of International Regimes: Hypotheses and Cases," in Polar Politics, ed. Oran Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1.

³³⁰ See especially Oran Young, The Arctic in World Affairs (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1989); Oran Young and Gail Osherenko, ed., Polar Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Donald R. Rothwell, "Polar Lessons for an Arctic Regime." Cooperation and Conflict 29, no. 1 (1994): 55-76.

³³¹ By forced scientism I mean the pre-determinants that are often used as the "right" variables of regime formation.

Barents Region have been chosen. AEPS has now become an integral part of the Arctic Council, but here I introduce it as the separate organization it used to be. These three have been selected on the bases of their geographic parameters, membership/participation, and focus. The criterion for extent, in the case of the AEPS and the Arctic Council, is that the focus is on the Arctic as a whole. The Barents Region is concerned with a smaller geographical area, but I chose to include it because it is otherwise a particularly suitable reference point as will be seen. As far as participation is concerned, it is important to look at organizations that have included at least a partial representation of "people" apart from the states. Although the AEPS and the Arctic Council accept the states as their only official members, the indigenous peoples are acknowledged as relevant actors. Lastly, while the issue areas vary from the particular (as in the AEPS) to the general (in the Arctic Council and the Barents Region), all three structures cover aspects of our extended view of security proposed in this paper.

In these three organizations, the focus lies especially on the issues of participation of the indigenous peoples and the acknowledgment of indigenous priorities, together with their understanding of the region as one entity. Similarly, I am interested in these organizations from the vantage point of security, although none of the three is set up to deal with security. Therefore, I am considering the possibilities of any given organization to function as a medium to provide security. Organizations do not provide security, but they can and should aid the states in forming a less insecure region. My concern has been for the states to take people into account in their multiple identities. Therefore, another main interest regarding for the organizations in question is what opportunities have

been delegated to people in identifying regional problem areas - or their in/securities.

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

In 1991 representatives of the eight Arctic states signed the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, and agreed upon an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). While the actual parties to the agreement are the participating states, the three central indigenous organizations in the region -- the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), (Nordic) Sami Council, and the USSR/Russian Association of Small Peoples of the North -- were accorded observer status in the circumpolar initiative. The indigenous organizations were also involved in the preparations of the strategy.

According to the declaration, the Arctic states are to adopt the AEPS as a joint action plan to conserve the integrity of the Arctic ecosystem. In this sense, the AEPS implements a view of the Arctic as a whole - something that is instrumental in tackling environmental problems that certainly do not respect state borders. The AEPS deals with four original themes: (1) monitoring and assessing contamination; (2) protection of the marine environment; (3) emergency preparedness and response; and (4) conservation of flora and fauna. The first issue, containment in the Arctic is the most important of the four. Therefore, an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) has been established to deal with persistent organic contaminants, oil, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity, and acidification. The other three themes are tackled by informal working groups. In 1993, sustainable development was added as the fifth key element to the AEPS agenda.

The indigenous groups especially encouraged focus on sustainable development, and it was agreed that particular attention would be given to indigenous economies. A task force - not a full working group -- was established to address the challenges facing northern economies and ecosystems.³³² At the same time in 1993, the indigenous peoples were granted access to the AEPS senior official meetings. Access, however, does not imply full say on issues.

The broad objectives of the strategy are to:

- ensure the health and well-being of Arctic ecosystems;
- provide for the protection and enhancement of environmental quality and sustainable utilization of resources, including their use by indigenous peoples;
- ensure that requirements, values, and practices of indigenous peoples, as determined by themselves, be accommodated; and
- assist participating countries in fulfilling their national and international responsibilities in the Arctic in a sustainable and equitable manner.³³³

Additionally, some of the guiding principles of the strategy emphasize the special situation of the indigenous peoples in the region:

- Developments in, or affecting, the Arctic shall be compatible with the sustainable utilization of Arctic ecosystems and shall take into account the results of scientific investigations and (italics are mine) the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples...
- The health, social, economic, and cultural needs and values of indigenous peoples shall be incorporated into planning and developing activities.
- Environmentally protected areas are important elements of any environmental protection strategy. Therefore, development of a network in such areas shall be encouraged and promoted with due regard for the needs of indigenous peoples...³³⁴

³³² Chester Reimer, "Moving Toward Co-operation: Inuit Circumpolar Policies and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," Northern Perspectives 21, no. 4 (1993-94): 22.

³³³ "The Road to Rovaniemi: Forging Environmental Strategies," Arctic Circle 1, no. 6 (1991): 1.

³³⁴ Ibid., 2

In many ways the AEPS offered a sufficient solution for some -- but by no means all -- of the problems of environmental insecurity in the Arctic region. Similarly, the need to include indigenous peoples' knowledge about Arctic environment is sufficiently taken into account throughout the AEPS. Yet problem areas persist.

A common problem concerns questions of interpretation. Whereas the strategy recognizes the needs of the indigenous peoples, and it is implemented to aid the participating countries in following the above objectives, its principles leave a lot in question. The ICC-published The Participation of Indigenous Peoples and the Application of their Environmental and Ecological Knowledge in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy addresses many of the issues. While all of the respective indigenous groups acknowledge the importance of the strategy, "little has been done to include them in concrete and productive ways."³³⁵

Four interconnected categories of controversy can be identified: 1) the use of scientific research in environmental problem solving; 2) the role of indigenous environmental and ecological knowledge; 3) the way of collecting indigenous knowledge through a research program; and 4) the pursuit of cooperative research and co-management.³³⁶ All four points come down to the problem of which methodology should be used in ensuring the lasting quality of Arctic environment. As mentioned earlier, the scientific community and the indigenous peoples have a very different type of knowledge base. One Inuk pointedly expresses this:

We never understood what science was all about. But even a few years ago, we didn't understand much about government and politics

³³⁵ ICC, The Participation of Indigenous Peoples, (Ottawa, ON: ICC, 1993), 2.

³³⁶ Ibid., 11.

either. Some things have changed and we have a better idea about government and we know how to hold our own in politics. But I don't think anyone still has a clue what science really is.³³⁷

The problematic involved in working together, other than in principle, is obvious despite the delicate wording used in the Strategy.

For science and scientists to understand indigenous ecology, they would need to understand indigenous culture. In order to understand culture, one would have to take time and patience to learn the language as well as the methods of passing information. Most indigenous peoples do not keep any scientific records; much of the information is word-of-mouth knowledge passed from generation to generation. An Inuit would not necessarily know how to answer a question posed by a scientist, although he may very well have the necessary knowledge. Increasing communication alone is thus not enough. Increasing innovative communication that would bridge cultural gaps, perhaps through mediating efforts by members from indigenous communities that have "Western" scientific education, could provide partial solutions.

This leads us to some necessary security-related analyses. Can an organization like the AEPS provide (environmental) security for Arctic (indigenous) people/s? The answer is no. As is the case with most international organizations, its purpose was not to provide anything but guidance in the matters of concern. Guidance may take the form of setting pending rules and laws for the states involved, and therefore its value should not be totally underestimated. If the states are the providers of security, they can indeed work together through an organization such as the AEPS to establish common goals and rules. In the final analysis, it is therefore possible that an environmental program such as the AEPS can decrease the level of

³³⁷ Ibid., 14.

environmental insecurity in the region - firstly, if the states follow the set guidelines, and secondly, if people's insecurity issues are respected and addressed.

Therefore, the second main question is about whether the AEPS was taking people into account as legitimate identifiers of security in the region. Indeed, the three indigenous organizations are granted observer status in the Strategy, and they were actively involved in drafting the document and have continued to suggest relevant changes to it. The principle of people's participation in identification of the problem areas is thus fulfilled. Matching people's interests with those of the states remains nevertheless problematic, as already discussed earlier. Interpretative misunderstandings on methods and science are based on clashing cultures, but also on resistance on the part of state-appointed scientists and policy-makers to sharing decision-making power.

The Arctic Council

The promising example of the AEPS as the first substantial inter-Arctic international organization encouraged the establishment of the Arctic Council. The Council was first envisioned in 1989 by Canadian observers of Arctic affairs, who saw the need for higher-level Arctic intergovernmental co-operation. A series of discussions and preliminary meetings with the "Arctic eight"³³⁸ led to the establishment of the Arctic Council finally in 1996. The Arctic Council has two complementary objectives: sustainable development and environmental protection.

³³⁸ The eight Arctic states.

Sustainable development is clearly a problem that faces all the Arctic states - thus the region as a whole needs to tackle this issue. Mary Simon, Canada's Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, has called this the biggest challenge for the Arctic Council. According to her, sustainable development must be understood as "a broad concept, which includes economic and social development, health, and cultural well-being."³³⁹ Indeed, the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council affirms the member states' commitment to sustainable development in these terms. However, as Oran Young has observed,

sustainable development is a generative concept that is difficult to turn into an operational paradigm or, in other words, to translate into practical guidelines in a manner that is acceptable to a variety of constituencies. There is a danger, therefore, that the idea of sustainable development, evocative as it is, will ultimately prove a cul-de-sac in the sense that it fails to provide workable criteria for making decisions about human/environment relations.³⁴⁰

For the goals attached to sustainable development to function in practice, the challenge is to "transform this attractive vision into a set of practical directives."³⁴¹ As far as Arctic environmental protection is concerned, the Arctic Council largely accepted the goals set by the AEPS. In 1997 the AEPS was incorporated into the Arctic Council.

The uniqueness of the Arctic Council, however, is not its agenda, but rather its membership composition. Apart from the eight Arctic member states, the three indigenous peoples' organizations - the Inuit

³³⁹ Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships: Perspectives from the Arctic," Behind the Headlines 54, no. 3 (1997): 15.

³⁴⁰ Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (New York, NY: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1997), 20.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

Circumpolar Conference, the Sami Council, and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of Russia - maintain *permanent participant status* on the Council. Permanent participants attend meetings, but cannot take part in decision-making. During the preparations to establish the Arctic Council, the indigenous representatives had wished to receive an equal status with the member states, but most governments resisted this. The final result was a compromise: the indigenous peoples still do not have the power to make decisions, but the status of a permanent participant clearly goes beyond "the typical commitments to meaningful participation or full consultation."³⁴²

At several points, The Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council speaks directly of the inclusion and importance of the indigenous peoples for the Arctic as a whole:

- The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues...
- [The three indigenous organizations] are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. Permanent participation is equally open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples... The category of Permanent Participation is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council...
- The Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat established under AEPS is to continue under the framework of the Arctic Council.³⁴³

All of this reflects an apparent turn toward a more people-oriented approach in international organizations. The Arctic Council recognizes that Arctic people are an integral part of the region, and that in order to deal effectively with the region, its people cannot be overlooked. The Arctic Council - despite shying away from using the

³⁴² Simon (1997), 14.

³⁴³ Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.

word "security" -- also represents the first step towards inclusion of people as identifiers of broad insecurity issues.

There is no question, however, that states remain the principal members in the Council. Earlier, in Chapter 3, I somewhat reluctantly recognized the fact that due to the current, persisting state of international affairs, there still are no structures other than the state that could take the role of primary provider of security. This should not imply states' monopoly in identifying issues of in/security. It is yet too early to say whether an organization such as the Arctic Council is able to work this way. Whereas the monopoly of providing security should not necessarily equate to *deciding* about security, neither states nor international organizations are ready to accept this. It remains to be seen whether the fact that peoples are not part of the decision-making in the Arctic Council will short-circuit their unique participatory status. Will the states make decisions according to the needs of the people, or according to their own priorities? In case of conflicting interests it is not difficult to guess the answer to this question.

Another problem area in the Arctic Council concerns its limitations. It is noteworthy that I have spoken of the Arctic Council as a security organization, because it clearly addresses issues relevant to my broader understanding of security. The last chapter pointed to both sustainable development and ecological problems as major security concerns for the Arctic peoples. However, when the Arctic Council was established, the declaration's most infamous part was inserted in a footnote after what was implied as "common Arctic issues." The footnote stated that the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security. Whereas this alone is not detrimental for the conclusions sought in this paper regarding extended

understanding of security, it nevertheless speaks of the special, superior status given to traditional national security issues. At the same time, it puts a constraint on the depth of cooperation available for transnational organizations. Furthermore, it is clear that Arctic environmental problems can only be partially dealt with under such restraints. The previous chapter demonstrated a clear connection between the Arctic people's insecurity and the necessities implied by military security. How are the goals regarding sustainable development and the health of Arctic ecosystems maintained if such related issue areas cannot be touched?

The most important problem areas for the Arctic Council are thus the practice of participation and the limitations set by exclusion of military security. In my opinion the two are likely to be connected. The Arctic Council deals with sustainable development and environmental problems, both of which are indirectly connected to military security. The states as the decision-makers in the Council are thus able to eliminate any concerns even indirectly connected to military security. This does not mean that the Council will not be able to have positive impact in the Arctic region and even reduce people's insecurity. Nevertheless, the results can be partial at best.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region is a cooperative effort for the European part of the Arctic region. Known as a Norwegian initiative, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (from now on in short, the Barents Region) was formally organized in 1993. The membership of the Barents Organization consists of the governments of Finland, Norway, Russia and

Sweden, the eight provinces in the region,³⁴⁴ and representatives of indigenous peoples.

It is noteworthy that decision-making is established on two levels: the intergovernmental and the interregional. The structure is presented below:³⁴⁵

INTERGOVERNMENTAL
LEVEL

Barents Council
Representatives of
Central Governments
And the EU Commission

Group of Senior
Officials
Ambassadors of the
The signatory states,
The EU, and the
Observer states

Special Committees
(2)

INTERREGIONAL
LEVEL

Regional Council Barents Secretariat
Provincial Governors, Administration and
and indigenous peoples information

Regional Committee

Provincial senior
officials and
representatives of the
indigenous peoples

Special Committees
(10)

The idea behind such a two-tier system is that regional actors have operative responsibility, while the states set up broader frameworks and allocate finances.³⁴⁶ In this way, active participation of the regional actors is encouraged whereas the states maintain their role as providers. The Barents Region, therefore, is an example of just such a structure that I have envisioned in this paper.

Beyond this, a multi-dimensional concept of security was the prime motivator for establishing the Barents Region

³⁴⁴ In Finland Lapland; in Norway Norland, Troms and Finnmark; in Russia Karelia, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; and Norbotten in Sweden.

³⁴⁵ Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 1994; Barents-Nytt 9 (1994) in Eriksson, 8.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

Our initiative is intended to move away from one-dimensional security and military relationship between East and West which has been dominant during the last 70 years, and to add two new dimensions to traditional cooperation in the High North. Firstly, we wish to give it an eastern dimension by associating Murmansk and Archangel politically with the Barents cooperation. Secondly, we wish to give it a southern dimension by placing developments in the Barents region in a wider European framework wherever appropriate. In this sense, our proposal to establish the Barents region... is part of a Nordic policy towards Europe which ties together this region and developments in Western and Southern Europe. However, we must not forget the fundamental premise: the region should have a firm foundation in the countries in question.³⁴⁷

As the above quotation illustrates, promoting security seems to be an underlying issue -- not necessarily one that is tackled directly. This becomes apparent in the ten specialized committees within the Barents structure: environment, communication and infrastructure, science and technology, transfer of knowledge and education, economic and industrial cooperation, tourism, indigenous peoples, cultural relations, agriculture and reindeer herding, and health.³⁴⁸ Whereas many of these issue areas would fit under the broad concept of Arctic security observed as in the previous chapter, the Barents Region nevertheless is more about reducing tension in the traditional areas than tackling new security issues. Neither is security *per se* an established issue area for the Barents organization. In my opinion, it is difficult to reduce insecurity when it is not directly addressed. Therefore, it is perhaps fair to say that the novelty of the Barents Region is more in its participatory scope than in its content.

Olav Stokke and Ole Tunander have observed three primary reasons that make the Barents region unique: 1) great cultural and economic heterogeneity in the east-west divide; 2) the region represents an area

³⁴⁷ Thorvald Stoltenberg, "The Barents Region: Reorganizing Northern Europe," International Challenges 12, no. 4 (1992): 7.

³⁴⁸ Eriksson, 10.

that has been a military confrontation zone for the past decades; and 3) the region has a two-layered institutional structure: provinces and states.³⁴⁹ A fourth one can be added: the Barents Region represents regionalization of peripheral areas.³⁵⁰ Clearly, similar issues concern the Arctic region as a whole. First of all, whether we are speaking about the Euro-Arctic context or considering the Circumpolar region as a whole, the cultural and economic heterogeneity is undoubtedly one of the major challenges to cooperation. Because of the persisting statist understanding of International Relations, the problem is usually tied to the differences between Russia and the Western capitalist states. However, cultural and economic heterogeneity also comes into play with the states (represented usually by the wealthier South) -- people (especially the indigenous peoples) divide. Secondly, while the Barents Sea represents the most militarized zone in the region, the Arctic as a whole has been, and continues to be affected by problems related to military security. Thirdly, the Barents Region represents a unique model for regional cooperation, where states and people (through municipal and indigenous representation) have been brought together to work on issues clearly relevant to all parties concerned. Similar other efforts would certainly be welcome in the region as a whole.

What are the lessons that can be learned from the Barents Region in terms of the goals of this study? Despite its limitation to the European Arctic, the last of our examples is, in a number of ways, the most promising model for broad security cooperation in the region. However, it is noteworthy to keep in mind that the Barents Region is primarily about the need to make ties between east and west, not

³⁴⁹ Stokke and Tunander, 3.

³⁵⁰ Østreng, 13.

between south and north.³⁵¹ This aspect is important, although in this paper I have chosen to look at the region and its security needs more from the inside. Also, a point should be made about the state-initiative behind the Barents Region. Regional actors -- from local Sami organizations to municipal representatives -- have not been altogether pleased with the governmental "intervention" in the North's local politics.³⁵²

If the goal is to follow the idea of people's involvement in cross-border regional politics, the Barents Region clearly marks a promising step towards this direction. Part of the promise is apparent in the focus on the region. The Barents Region is recognized as its own entity and people living there are taken into an account as rightful actors for determining - at least partly - the issues close to them. Similarly, the states are involved - among their other roles -- as providers.

However, whereas the Barents Region is presumably a structure motivated by the broad concept of security, a sharper focus seems lacking. The above listed ten specialized committees represent the issue areas relevant to the Barents Region, and undoubtedly all are pertinent topics. A simple goal of "reducing tension by increasing cooperation" is however problematic and does not imply that systematized efforts of reducing insecurity are made. On the contrary, the common problem of "not seeing the forest for the trees" is likely: it is easy to forget the bigger picture when the focus is on many smaller issue areas.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 15.

³⁵² Eriksson, 10-12.

The three Arctic organizations introduced above have marked new beginnings for Arctic international relations. All three involve promising steps toward the kind of security cooperation that is being sketched in this paper. None of them however is complete. The two main problem areas seem to concentrate on the issues of people's participation and the problematic concept of security. Similarly, decision making is organized in a way that allows states to decide unilaterally their part in any suggested policy. In the Arctic Council states have the right to veto any topic off the agenda. The Barents organization is more open to pursue communication on various issues, but in the end there is no mechanism to force states to follow any recommendations if they choose not to. This kind of decision making structure clearly is not suitable for an organization that seeks to promote people's participation.

Reorganizing Arctic Security

Despite the efforts to reorganize Arctic (security) cooperation, many problems nevertheless persist; this section will try to deal with some of the most pertinent ones. First, one must attempt to deal with security as a broad yet workable concept that could function as the basis for Arctic security. Second, the problem of people's participation is considered. Based on these two, thirdly, a flexible model of security cooperation is suggested. Lessons learned for the three Arctic organizations introduced above will be drawn as applicable.

As discussed earlier, issues of economic survival, environmental problems, as well as self-determination should be included as regional security issues. Economic security was mainly dealt with from the indigenous peoples' point of view, but there are obvious concerns regarding unemployment and economic distribution among any people living in peripheral areas. Self-determination is naturally more related to indigenous peoples, whereas environment is a concern for all. Also, despite the fact that the concept is broadened, one must not forget military security. There must be an attempt to understand both sides of military security - the state side and the insecurities it may cause to the people living in the region.

It is necessary to work on these issues from the vantage point of security, not just "common issues of concern." It is the only way to increase true security and it also eases the attempts to conceptualize the region as a whole. Interestingly, however, the main problem in doing this does not seem to be in the impossibility and non-functionality of a broader concept, but rather in the inability to understand and speak of security as something that could include issues other than those relevant to military security. During the process of writing this paper, I met with several researchers as well as representatives from indigenous organizations. It soon became apparent that even when the idea of broadening the concept of security was introduced, most could not conceptualize it. Questions such as "What does security mean to people you represent?" would most often be answered by "we do not deal with security" or perhaps at best by discussing problems created by military installations in the region. It was therefore obvious to me that the problem of security is very deep indeed from the conceptual point of view. The definition put forth by International Relations is ingrained in people's minds so

powerfully that even its literal meaning - freedom from threat or fear -- is less known than the one based on military security.

Therefore, it is easier to say that the Arctic people must have a forum to discuss security than it is to implement such a practice. On the other hand, I do believe that it takes only some initiative to make security understood as a broader and more inclusive concept. Once a meaningful and inclusive concept of security is understood, the next step toward Arctic security is to rethink the organizational bases of people's participation. I already mentioned some of the strengths and weaknesses in the two Circumpolar organizations - the Arctic Council and the Barents Region - above that aimed to create a forum for broadening the concept of security. As far as setting up a structure that would allow people's participation, neither one is appropriate as they stand now.

In order to determine regional security threats in a cohesive manner, there must be a forum to do this. The Arctic Council could be this forum. The Arctic Council undoubtedly has serious limitations as to its structure and its commitment to stay outside issues relevant to military security. But as a forum for setting a security agenda, the Council is unique in bringing together the eight Arctic states as well as the main indigenous organizations in the region. A welcome addition would be an inclusion of interregional level a'la the Barents Region for provincial political representatives. The main difference between the structure at the Barents Region and my suggestion - apart from the obvious enlargement of the region from Euro-Arctic to the Arctic as a whole - would be that whereas the former emphasizes extra-regional relations, especially with Europe, the latter would focus inside first.

It seems obvious that an interregional organization would be in order to take up these issues. The Arctic already has had three

functioning international and intergovernmental organizations, with indigenous and other representation, as illustrated above. I would welcome one - instead of many -- organization to deal with broad security issues. An obvious alternative would be an organization such as the Arctic Council with some major adjustments. The present Arctic Council was established on such different principles that its foundations cannot be altered. Therefore, one must simply imagine a different interregional Arctic organization - one that the Arctic Council could have been, or one that should replace it in the future. Despite this idea of replacing the Arctic Council, it is worth remembering that today it still represents a new and innovative international organization. Its model of participation is unlike anything else in the world. On a positive note, perhaps it represents an international organization that can and will evolve into a model allowing deeper and stronger participation from people, not just the states.

As in any democratic setting, the question of *representation* is a central one when *people's* participation is concerned. Neither can it be ignored when the problem of security is transformed from state security to *people's* security. As explained previously, in my view the state structure is too far removed to be able to identify *people's* insecurities. Therefore, another kind of representation is necessary.

At the regional level, such as the Arctic, it is relatively easy to conceptualize meaningful channels for *people's* representation. As a guideline it is useful to think of the identity groups established earlier in this paper. Indigenous peoples are best represented by their interregional organizations, such as the Sami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. This keeps the focus on the region as a whole, which is meaningful. As in any politics, this raises a

question of elitism apparent also in indigenous politics.³⁵³ Therefore, there can be no illusion that everyone is being properly represented, through large interregional groups. The fact that I have treated indigenous peoples as one people, or at least as one within their ethnicity, does not mean that they are a unified voice. This is generally understood in politics, but once the focus is on the minorities, the dominant groups tend to assume them either as one, or by overly focusing on the disagreements within a group, and seeing them as not able to agree on anything. Despite these problems I find it beneficial to keep the larger structures intact. Smaller indigenous groups should, however, be included separately within provincial representation, which would therefore allow for a more localized voice to be included as well.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region has been organized in a manner that is exemplary. However, I would rather see the localized interests and needs organized separately from the state representation, akin to the following model. It can be called a two-level model of Arctic regional security.

³⁵³ This has been expressed especially in Greenland where the indigenous peoples are strongly involved in the national politics of the island: the Inuit hunter in an isolated place can be far removed from the decision-making taking place in Thule.

LEVEL 1: INTERREGIONAL LEVEL

TASK: Identification of the security areas.

REPRESENTATION: Provincial representation depicting Arctic people.
Indigenous representation depicting indigenous peoples according to identity groups.

INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEVELS: Negotiation Decision-Making

LEVEL 2: INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL

TASK: Providing security.

REPRESENTATION: Governmental representation from the eight Arctic states.

This model would clearly place people - through representation - in the position of determining the security issues that must be dealt with on a regional basis. The states would have a role not just as providers, but would also have an opportunity to express their own possibly conflicting views in the decision-making process. However, the decision-making should not be arranged in a manner that would give the states veto power or any other means of unilateral decision-making power.

The fact that people have the right to determine the security issues of their concern is likely to create conflicts in the area of national security. The idea behind people's security is that it is separate from state security and most likely people in a region such as the Arctic do not identify traditional military security threats as those most pertinent to them. As discussed earlier, it is not realistic to omit the states' power to decide on national security based on military concerns. Therefore, in a sense, the benefits of this model are that it keeps military security as a separate issue

other than granting people the right to bring up concerns relevant to threats caused by it. However, this organization would not be a forum to discuss military security *per se* - something that should enhance its possibilities of success.

It is now clear what the goals set here for the Arctic security region are. It is also apparent from the section above that in the Arctic, some innovative regional arrangements have taken place. As it stands, there is no Arctic security organization. The AEPS is about environment, the Arctic Council is about common regional concerns omitting military security, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, while underlining the importance of security, is not set up to deal with issues of security directly. However, all three organizations do emphasize issues that are included in our broad concept of security -- issues that Arctic people identify as security threats. I believe, however, that until these issues are acknowledged as real security threats that cause insecurity among people, and until there is a workable, broad understanding of insecurity in the region, the sense of security cannot be increased.

7 CONCLUSIONS: QUESTIONING THE REDEFINITION

Security has now been redefined, the region has been redrawn, and hopefully, the discipline has consequently been broadened. Since each section has reached certain conclusions of their own, this last chapter addresses broader questions that have arisen in their wake. The goal is to clarify key points, and to attempt an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed redefinition.

The questions at hand may be divided into three categories. The first two take up the issue of changes to International Relations as a discipline, resulting from its operative concepts being expanded:

- (1) Can any identity group be considered a relevant actor in the eyes of International Relations?
- (2) If the limits of internal and external are blurred, does International Relations still matter?

The next questions are more specifically connected to the redefinition of security itself:

- (3) What is the relationship between military security and people's security?
- (4) Why would the state consider relinquishing its power to identify security needs?
- (5) How can the pursuit of people's security be implemented in practice?
- (6) Is people's security as universal a concept as traditional notions of national security?

Finally, the last two questions concentrate on the conceptual role of the Arctic case:

(7) Is the suggested redefinition applicable to anything but a territorially specific region, such as the Arctic?

(8) Does the suggested redefinition really take peoples, like the Sami and the Inuit of small remote communities, into account?

(1) Can any identity group be considered a relevant actor in the eyes of International Relations? We are accustomed to understanding international relations as affairs between state actors. Although this notion has changed as a result of the increased importance of private actors -- especially large multinational and transnational corporations -- it is still commonly assumed that state relations form the core of the discipline as well as the practice. In essence, a state action that affects another state is an indicator that it falls within International Relations. What then are the new indicators?

Since the intention of this study has not been to make International Relations disappear, certain disciplinary restrictions may be necessary. Most important is the issue of who counts as a relevant actor. As a rule of thumb, any identity group that acts or identifies outside a given state is relevant to International Relations. Firstly, this categorization includes groups like the Inuit and the Sami, who identify beyond state borders. Secondly, it includes ethnic and other minorities who form identity groups that attempt to run a parallel political life within the state that hosts them. According to this logic, the state still remains central in determining the division between international and domestic.

However, a third and more abstract category should be included: peoples, whose concerns go beyond those tied up with their own region, and revolve around global phenomena affecting all of them - for instance, the world's indigenous peoples. As an example, the Canadian

Inuit alone would not qualify as an identity group relevant to International Relations. But they can be considered part of a global indigenous identity group entirely germane to International Relations, in terms of their shared political aspirations. Unfortunately, it is usually only those groups which decide to put up a fight for independence - sometimes abruptly - that qualify as "relevant". We have recently witnessed such a case with the Kurdish protest take-overs of embassies and consulates throughout Europe. This goes to the heart of my critique of the traditional view: that people matter in International Relations only if they threaten state borders. Therefore, we must recognize that any identity group is potentially relevant, but that relevance is situational and contextual.

(2) What happens to International Relations when the distinction between "internal" and "external" ceases to matter? Despite the continued primacy of state borders, it is becoming less and less clear what takes place inside, and what takes place outside the state. International Relations has been forced to acknowledge this tendency in environmental issues, as well as in transnational business. However, as has been pointed out, there are many more multi-faceted issues which are blurring the distinction between internal and external. At the same time, the traditional association between external and International Relations has itself become hazy. A complete destruction of internal - external is impossible as long as states persist in their roles as political communities and their claims to retain sovereignty.

One may ask: when and why is it a matter of International Relations to deal with land rights between a state and its indigenous peoples? The first inclination is to answer that it is not relevant to the field. However, the lack of land rights was identified as a cause

of insecurity for Arctic indigenous peoples. Pinpointing regional insecurities and establishing regional security solutions based on people's needs made landrights a matter of International Relations. Furthermore, if the indigenous peoples are taken into account as an international identity group, it also becomes relevant to International Relations. This logic is similar to some feminists' claims that violence against women is a global phenomenon and therefore belongs to the field of International Relations. There is no reason why the discipline should not include such issues of global caliber. This calls for moving away from the pure problem-solving approach to more wholistic analyses.

What becomes of International Relations? For some it may mean becoming a discipline that has no limits and is thus likely to lose its relevance; a discipline that loses its powers of prediction when its central parameters are questionable; a discipline that is "all over the place." On the other hand, it becomes a discipline that is not pre-determined; one that is able to tackle variety of different issues that have global relevance -- a discipline that is flexible.

(3) What is the relationship between military security and people's security? Nowhere has it been suggested that issues of military security are no longer relevant or a priority. The concept of people's security was simply introduced to supplement an otherwise the lop-sided notion of security. Certainly, people are insecure if their state is threatened by war. But it was also established that people are insecure for numerous other reasons. The relationship between the two requires some further clarification.

The lessons that can be learnt from people's insecurities may also have a direct connection to military security. In the

contemporary era, one of the most common types of conflict is ethnic war -- either between two ethnic groups, or between an ethnic group and a state. Cultural and economic insecurities may lead to violence, even war. Perhaps if more effort was made to identify insecurities faced by ethnic minorities -- as well as other identity groups -- some violent conflicts could be prevented. In other words, if people in their different identities were accepted as relevant units of analysis, the discipline's powers of prediction may considerably increase.

In light of the fact that these different faces of security are complementary, there should always be room for recognizing people and issues that are not war-bound. The discipline of war and strategy can expand to encompass people and security. Indeed, the traditional framework is only enhanced by the broader definition.

(4) *Why would the state give up its power to identify security needs?* It was suggested that whereas the state is the provider of security, specific insecurities should be identified by relevant groups of people. Again, a distinction between my term of "scientific security" and people's security was made so that the state has a hand in keeping track of issues it deems necessary.

The concept of *people's security* introduced in this study has a two-fold purpose. Most importantly, it is a tool for the discipline of *International Relations*. Ideally, however, it would also serve as a guideline as to how real security regions could be built. As far as the discipline is concerned, there is no reason why people's security in its broadest sense should not be the goal. Moreover, even "in the real world," it would only be logical for a democratic state to take its people's insecurities into account. The democratic state is meant

to be for people and by the people, and addressing people's insecurities should be a priority.

Naturally there are countless cases where the state and an important identity group have seriously conflicting interests and where one's insecurity is other one's security. But having an arena for identifying those security needs may help the state to deal with some of the pertinent issues, pre-empting potential conflicts.

In reality, the state often enough recognizes its people's insecurities -- whether or not it chooses to act on them. Although they may not be labeled "security issues", people such as the Inuit and the Sami, through various forums, make themselves heard. The point is for the discipline to recognize some of these concerns as a matter of security.

(5) How can people's security be implemented in practice?

Again, one should bear in mind that the suggested redefinition is primarily a conceptual aspiration. However, since it was stressed that the provider of security is included as a central part of that redefinition, a concern for practical implications is a given.

The model for the Arctic security organization offers some possible groundwork. When reorganizing a territorial region, it is relatively simple to identify the relevant identity groups, and accordingly, choose feasible representatives. In the Arctic case, the representation was organized according to ethnic identity (indigenous groups) and local political representation. This presents a feasible framework which depends only on the willingness of the states in question to delegate some of their decision-making powers to smaller units. Unfortunately, this is seldom the case -- as the Arctic Council well demonstrates.

As far as non-territorial security regions are concerned, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a functioning model of representation. Identity regions akin to "indigenous peoples of the world" certainly can establish themselves into security organizations together with their respective states. However, the transition from needs to concrete solutions would be virtually impossible due to the wide range of states and peoples represented.

(6) *Is the redefined concept of security as universal as the traditional understanding of national security?* It can be. The fundamental difference between the two is that the traditional understanding is based on the state whereas the redefinition focuses on people. The political map of the world is drawn along state lines, which are occupied by people who, however, can be identified within and beyond states.

In the traditional definition, security and what qualifies as a threat are almost axiomatic. The concept has universal applicability; because it allows comparative analysis. One can certainly compare a large number of states based on their national security arrangements. However, one cannot really determine whether a state is secure without a detailed focus on its specific situation.

When we speak of people's security, threat is a more fluid concept, and therefore direct comparisons are more difficult. However, once any peoples' insecurities and threats are ascertained, comparisons and universalistic studies are likely. Perhaps one of the most important lessons about the suggested redefinition is to recognize that security *should not* be pre-determined since insecurity can take numerous forms.

(7) *Is the suggested model of redefinition applicable to anything other than a territorially specific region? Clearly it is best suitable for a territorial region with easily identifiable identity groups. The reason is that states, which continue to act as providers of security, should have a vested interest in the region as part of their territory. Chapter 2 called into question the principle of state sovereignty, but it was recognized that the discipline maintains certain limits as long as the state remains the political community.*

While other, spatially more diffuse identity regions provide a useful context to understand security as a phenomenon of world affairs, the model remains intertwined with the territorial state. This is perhaps a shortcoming; nevertheless, the flexibility gained by the concept of "region" -- especially an identity region -- makes security analysis far less stagnant.

Additionally, when the region is territorially limited, it is possible to determine who are the people whose security lies in question. One can easily pinpoint the logistical problems involved in considering, for example, European security from the standpoint of its people. Therefore, the increased importance of people suggests that the disciplinary focus should be on more specific areas. Broadening the reality means taking a closer look at smaller units of analysis.

(8) *Does the redefinition really take people (e.g. the Inuit and Sami of small communities) into account, or is the focus simply shifted from the state to international organizations (the political leaders of ethnic groups)? The nature of International Relations, even when redefined, is such that it cannot deal with each and every small actor. Ultimately, the world constitutes the final framework of study.*

Therefore, large units -- whether states or some other form of social organization -- must represent countless people with very different views and life situations.

Identity groups rely on representation. Apart from anthropologically-oriented research, in the social sciences, we only know about threats and insecurities which are vocalized by someone. Generally this means that we hear those who have the power and the means to be heard. In this paper, Inuit and Sami views are highlighted. Technically that means that the representatives -- usually either the elected members of specific institutions or published writers -- of those groups are heard. Similarly, this constitutes an illusion in which the groups are portrayed as if they are one voice, where every Inuit or Sami are unified under one opinion. In this regard, the redefinition is elitist. Earlier, the way International Relations has treated the state as a unified actor was criticized, yet now a similar tendency becomes apparent here. Therefore, it must be admitted -- as it stands -- that the fact that we are dealing on a global scale encourages this kind of elitism.

The redefinition, however, is an improvement over statism; a broad variety of units and actors are considered and the same people can be represented in their various identity groups.

The questions posed above have pinpointed some of the benefits as well as certain deficiencies of the proposed redefinition of security. Based on these thematic questions, one thing should be clear: People's security should function as a theoretical tool to broaden the limits of reality within the discipline of International Relations.

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